LIFEMARK HOSPITALS OF FLORIDA, INC., D/B/A PALMETTO GENERAL HOSPITAL, ALVARO GORDO, M.D. AND ALVARO GORDO M.D., P.A., APPELLANTS,
v.
ODALYS ROQUE AND EDDY SOTO INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENTS AND LEGAL GUARDIANS OF DAMARIS ROQUE, APPELLEES; ISIDOR CARDELLA, M.D., APPELLANT, V. ODALYS ROQUE AND EDDY SOTO INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENTS AND LEGAL GUARDIANS OF DAMARIS ROQUE, APPELLEE
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Defendants Lifemark Hospitals and two physicians appealed a trial court's denial of their motion to transfer venue from Broward County to Dade County in a medical malpractice case arising from an allegedly negligent delivery. The court held that under Florida's "joint residency" rule, when multiple defendants reside in the same county, venue is proper only in that county, and that the cause of action accrued where the injury occurred (Dade County).
The court reversed and remanded with directions to transfer venue to Dade County. Under the "joint residency" rule, where multiple defendants have a common county of residence, venue is proper only in that county despite some defendants also residing elsewhere. Additionally, the cause of action accrued in Dade County where the injury occurred, not in Broward County where prenatal care was provided.
[1] Venue for an action against multiple defendants residing in different counties may be brought in any county where any defendant resides, unless a common county of residen…
[2] The 'joint residency' rule dictates that if multiple defendants share a common county of residence, venue is proper only in that county, even if other codefendants reside…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where multiple defendants have a common county of residence, venue is proper only in that county, even if one or more codefendants also reside in other counties”
Statement of the joint residency rule controlling the venue analysis when defendants reside in multiple counties
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellees Odalys Roque and Eddy Soto, residents of Broward County, brought suit on behalf of their daughter Damaris Roque, alleging medical malpractic…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal a non-final order denying their motion to dismiss or transfer venue from Broward to Dade County. Appellees reside in Broward County. The record establishes that defendant Lifemark Hospitals of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Palmetto General Hospital, is a Florida corporation with its hospital, Palmetto General, located in Dade County. The individual defendants, Drs. Gordo and Cardella, reside in Dade County. Drs. Gordo and Cardella are employed by Alvaro Gordo, M.D., P.A. The professional association has offices in Dade County and in Bro-ward County. Appellee Odalys Roque received her prenatal care at the Broward County office.
The complaint seeks damages arising from the delivery of infant Damaris Roque at Palmetto General Hospital. The complaint alleges that Dr. Cardella made the decision to attempt a vaginal rather than caesarean delivery, despite being advised by the mother that she was a poor risk for a vaginal birth. The complaint further alleges that Dr. Car-della negligently attempted a “trial of labor” resulting in a rupture of the uterus and that the defendants then negligently delayed the caesarean section, resulting in the infant being born deaf, blind, and neurologically impaired.
Under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1997), actions may be brought in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. In the case' of multiple defendants residing in different counties,' section 47.021, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that an action “may be brought in any county in which any defendant resides.” Section 47.051, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that actions against domestic corporations shall be brought only in the county where such corporation keeps an office for transaction of its business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.
Section 47.021 permits an action to be brought in a county in which any defendant resides when the defendants reside in different counties. However, the “joint residency” rule first announced in Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1957), provides that where multiple defendants have a common county of residence, venue is proper only in that county, even if one or more codefendants also reside in other counties. Sinclair Fund, Inc. v. Burton, 623 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Twigg v. Watt, 558 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Accord Inter-Medic Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Murphy, 400 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
We are not persuaded by appellees’ contention that because the individual doctors practice medicine in Broward County they are deemed to reside there. The record shows that for venue purposes, they reside in Dade County. We also conclude that the cause of action accrued in Dade County, where the injuries to the infant occurred. See Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 181-82 (Fla.1993) (cause of action does not aeerue until the injury occurs); Wincor v. Cedars Healthcare Group, Ltd., 695 So. 2d 924, 925-926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (for purposes of venue statute, tort action accrues where plaintiff first suffers injury, even where defendant’s negligence occurs in another county); Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.1986) (although defendant “negligently shot his arrow into the air of Broward County, it did no harm and had no effect until it fell to the earth in Dade.”). In light of our holding, we need not reach appellants’ alternative, forum non conve-niens argument. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to transfer venue to Dade County.
REVERSED and REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
DELL, SHAHOOD and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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Pozo v. Roadhouse Grill, Inc., 790 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…aw is settled that where a corporate defendant resides in the same county as an individual defendant, venue is only proper in the county of joint residence.2 Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1957); Lifemark Hospitals of Florida, Inc. v. Roque, 727 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), Methodist Hospital Foundation, Inc. v. Irvin, 403 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 1st. DCA 1981). Because the record fails to establish where any defendant’s residence is located, venue in Orange County cannot be based upon residenc…
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Carbone v. Value Added Vacations, Inc., 791 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…tural person defendant resides, this general proposition does not apply and venue based on residency is proper only in the county of the joint residence. See Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So. 2d 638 (Fla.1957); Lifemark Hospitals of Florida, Inc. v. Roque, 727 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Mercer, 226 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). See Trawick, Fla. Prac. and Proc., § 6-3; Padovano, Florida Civil Practice, § 2.5, p. 38. Since the cause of action in Count I accrued in Miami-Dade County,…
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Brown v. Nagelhout, 33 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…county as the individual defendant. Id. at 540-41. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that venue lies in the common county of residence between the individual and the corporate defendant. Id.; see Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., Inc. v. Roque, 727 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The principle outlined in Enfinger ultimately became known as the joint residency rule. See Lifemark Hosps., 727 So. 2d at 1078. In this case, the Browns incorrectly argue that the joint residency rule does not apply wher…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tanner v. Ellie Hartog, M.D., 618 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993)
- Miller v. Miller, 96 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1957)
- Tucker v. Chantal Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Inter-Medic Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Murphy, 400 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Wincor v. Cedars Healthcare Grp., Ltd., 695 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- The Sinclair Fund v. Burton, 623 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Elvin Twigg v. Watt, 558 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)