JAMES M. BARKETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1999-02-24
No. 98-3288
BARFIELD, C.J., LAWRENCE and BROWNING, JJ. CONCUR.
728 So. 2d 792 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 25 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

James M. Barkett was convicted of premeditated first degree murder. He appealed and this court affirmed the conviction and sentence in Barkett v. State, 666 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The mandate issued January 23,1996. Barkett filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which denied the petition on June 3, 1996. See Barkett v. State, 517 U.S. 1237, 116 S.Ct. 1884, 135 L.Ed.2d 179 (1996). Barkett then filed this rule 3.850 motion, on May 26, 1998. See Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla.1992). The trial court denied the motion as untimely.

Barkett’s rule 3.850 motion is timely. See Beaty v. State, 701 So. 2d 856 (Fla.1997); Huffy v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247 (Fla.1990). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Barkett’s rule 3.850 motion as untimely and remand for consideration of the motion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARFIELD, C.J., LAWRENCE and BROWNING, JJ. CONCUR.


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Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • Kynyodda Deonne Jones v. State, 922 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …A 2004)). Jones’s comparison to a petition for writ of certiorari filed in the Supreme Court is unpersuasive. While a petition for writ of certiorari tolls the time for filing collateral proceedings, such as Rule 3.850 motions, see Barkett v. State, 728 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and Brooks v. State, 209 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), such a petition is wholly different from a petition for belated appeal. A petition for writ of certiorari, like the motions listed in Rule 9.020(h), directly challenges a…
  • Blevins v. State, 756 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …f with the victim’s car. This court found that the intentions and actions in stealing the money and the car were separate; hence, convictions for robbery and carjacking did not violate double jeopardy. See id. [*1055] Similarly, in Simboli v. State, 728 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), the defendant, a taxicab passenger, demanded the driver’s money and threatened to stab him, then had the driver exit the cab, whereupon the defendant drove away in the cab. The court held that two crimes, robbery and carjacking,…
  • Consiglio v. State, 743 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
    …for each transaction.” While the temporal separation was very minimal in this case, there were two separate acts: (1) an intent and act to steal money from the victim; and (2) an intent and act to steal the victim’s car. See, e.g., Simboli v. State, 728 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. [*1222] 5th DCA 1999), rev. denied, 741 So. 2d 1137 (Fla.1999); Mason v. State, 665 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Conviction for both crimes under these circumstances does not violate principles of double jeopardy. DELL and STONE…

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