MICHAEL CONSIGLIO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed convictions for both carjacking and robbery, holding that two separate forceful takings of distinct property—money and a vehicle—do not violate double jeopardy principles.
Conviction for both carjacking and robbery does not violate double jeopardy when the evidence shows two separate acts with distinct intents: one to steal money and another to steal a vehicle.
[1] Conviction for both carjacking and robbery does not violate double jeopardy when evidence establishes two separate forceful takings of distinct property with separate int…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[w]hat is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.”
Court cited Brown v. State standard for determining whether multiple theft convictions violate double jeopardy.
During a beating, the appellant demanded and received car keys from the victim, then demanded and received money from her. The appellant subsequently …
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WARNER, C.J.
We affirm appellant’s convictions for carjacking and robbery against his claim that conviction of both violates double jeopardy, as we conclude that the evidence supports two separate acts and separate property. While beating the victim, appellant first demanded the keys to the victim’s car after his accomplice jumped in the vehicle and noticed the keys were not inside. The victim reached into her pocket and gave appellant the keys. During the beating, appellant demanded that the victim give him money. She complied. At that point the robbery was complete. Subsequently, the appellant drove off in the victim’s car, completing the offense of carjacking.
As the supreme court stated in Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983), “[w]hat is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.” While the temporal separation was very minimal in this case, there were two separate acts: (1) an intent and act to steal money from the victim; and (2) an intent and act to steal the victim’s car. See, e.g., Simboli v. State, 728 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), rev. denied, 741 So. 2d 1137 (Fla.1999); Mason v. State, 665 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Conviction for both crimes under these circumstances does not violate principles of double jeopardy.
DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Blevins v. State, 756 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…e, 402 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We have recently recognized that multiple convictions for robbery and carjacking may constitute separable crimes, even where the temporal separation between the two acts may be minimal. See Consigno v. State, 743 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In Consiglio, the defendant beat the victim, first demanded her keys, then shortly thereafter demanded money. When the robbery was complete, the defendant drove off with the victim’s car. This court found that the intentions and…
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Drayton v. State, 791 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…on v. State, 777 So. 2d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Where there is a short temporal separation between criminal acts, the court will look to intent in deciding whether the actions of the defendant constitute separate acts. See Consigno v. State, 743 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); see also Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446 (Fla.1983). In the case at bar, the intent of Drayton’s physical resistance was to avoid arrest entirely. The intent of the lie about his age was to avoid being jailed as an adult. These a…1 / 2
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Butler v. State, 753 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…1999). We disagree. This Court, as well as other courts, has consistently held that double jeopardy does not bar convictions and sentences for both robbery and carjacking. See Cruller v. State, 745 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Consiglio v. State 743 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Brown v. State, 743 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Simboli v. State, 728 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 741 So. 2d 1137 (Fla.1999); Smart v. State, 652 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 660 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1995);…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1983)
- Barkett v. State, 728 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Ellis R. Mason v. State, 665 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)