JAMES COVINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Covington appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm found during a traffic stop, arguing the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed, holding that the officer had probable cause to stop Covington's vehicle for blocking traffic in violation of a Fort Lauderdale ordinance, making the subsequent search lawful regardless of any ulterior motive.
The stop was valid because Officer Diaz had probable cause to believe a traffic infraction had occurred under Fort Lauderdale Ordinance No. 26-127, which prohibits stopping, standing, or parking in street lanes designated for vehicular movement. The officer's subjective intent or potential ulterior motive regarding drug activity is immaterial to the validity of the stop when probable cause exists for a traffic violation.
[1] A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct on review, and evidence and inferences will be construed in the light most favorable to sustaining the…
[2] A traffic stop is valid if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred, regardless of whether the officer would have enforced th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Whether the arresting officer would have enforced the traffic law absent potentially drug related activity is immaterial to the validity of the stop, provided that the officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that subjective intent is irrelevant when probable cause for a traffic violation exists
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 18, 1997, Officer Diaz in an undercover vehicle observed Covington's car stopped in the middle of NW 11th Street in Fort Lauderdale, block…
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GROSS, J.
Appellant James Covington entered a plea of no contest to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress a search and seizure for violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution. See § 924.06(3), Fla. Stat. (1997); Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(b)(2)(A).
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the reviewing court clothed with the presumption of correctness, “and the reviewing court will interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustain the trial court’s ruling.” McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla.1978). In a written order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
On February, 18, 1997, at 1:50 P.M., Officer [Mario] Diaz was in an undercover vehicle, proceeding northbound on NW 9th Avenue in Fort Lauderdale. He turned eastbound onto NW 11th Street and saw the Defendant’s car stopped in the middle of the roadway with the driver’s door open, and the Defendant had one foot on the road. The Defendant’s car was in the middle of the road, blocking traffic, straddling both lanes. The officer was going too fast to stop so he had to go around the Defendant’s car and make a U-turn. The Defendant was talking with a black male, a known narcotics dealer, who was standing four or five feet away from the Defendant. The black male was on a bike, and he was counting something in his hand. This area is a high crime area. Officer Diaz then blocked the Defendant’s car and ordered him to stay in the car until back-up arrived. The Defendant was then asked to exit the vehicle. As the Defendant exited the vehicle and turned, Officer Diaz saw the Defendant’s shirt lift up, and Officer Diaz saw a gun in the small of the Defendant’s back. The Defendant was arrested for Carrying a Concealed Firearm.
Appellant’s case turns on the legality of the stop from the moment Officer Diaz blocked appellant’s car and ordered him to stay inside of it. As the trial court held, the stop of appellant was valid, since the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had occurred. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817-19, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1997). Whether the arresting officer would have enforced the traffic law absent potentially drug related activity is immaterial to the validity of the stop, provided that the officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. See Mendez v. State, 678 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Petrel v. State, 675 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Ft. Lauderdale Ordinance No. 26-127 provides:
No person shall stop, stand, or park a vehicle on any portion of a street lane designated for the exclusive use of vehicular movement, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the direction of a police officer. Section 316.008(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), allows local authorities to regulate or prohibit “stopping, standing, or parking” on streets and highways under their jurisdiction. Under the facts as determined by the trial court, Officer Diaz had probable cause to make a traffic stop under the ordinance. Even though the trial court based the officer’s authority to make the stop on sections of the Uniform Traffic Control Law which do not apply, a decision of the trial court should be affirmed, even when based on erroneous reasoning, if “an alternative theory supports it.” Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla.1988); Belvin v. State, 585 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
AFFIRMED.
DELL and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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State v. Robinson, 756 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…sed on those objective facts, the stop was not illegal. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1997); State v. Chaney, 744 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Covington v. State, 728 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); State v. Girard, 694 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The subjective intent of the police officer who made the stop as whether the officer would have stopped another vehicle for that infraction and whether he and the canine unit…
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Welch v. State, 741 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…nce seized should have been suppressed. REVERSED. THOMPSON, J., concurs. HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion. . § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. . Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A); Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla.1979); Covington v. State, 728 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Patterson v. State, 569 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Newbold v. State, 521 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Banks v. State, 467 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). .§ 322.03(1), Fla. Stat. . Art. 1, § 12, Fla. Const. . Whren v.…
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Stone v. State, 856 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…se (discussed below), where the trial court determines that a stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment for incorrect reasons, that finding should be upheld where it is supported by an alternative, even if unar-ticulated, theory. Covington v. State, 728 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (citing Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla.1988)). To support its argument that Bell had probable cause to stop Stone for a license violation, the state justifiably focuses on the fact that Bell was aware that as rece…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996)
- McNAMARA v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1978)
- Rigoberto Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1988)
- Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1997)
- Petrel v. State, 675 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Mendez v. State, 678 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Belvin v. State, 585 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)