JOHN B. WEBB, APPELLANT,
v.
KATHERINE S. WEBB, APPELLEE
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In this marriage dissolution appeal, the court held that a successor judge lacks authority to modify a final order entered by a predecessor judge on the same facts and without evidence of mistake or fraud. The decision reinforces the principle that dissatisfied parties must appeal unfavorable orders rather than seek reconsideration before a different judge.
A successor judge cannot review, modify, or reverse on the merits the final order of a predecessor judge on the same facts absent evidence of mistake or fraud. If a party disagrees with a predecessor judge's ruling, the proper remedy is appellate review, not reconsideration before a different trial judge.
[1] A successor judge cannot review, modify, or reverse on the merits the final order of a predecessor judge on the same facts, absent mistake or fraud.
[2] A successor judge lacks the authority to countermand a prior order entered by the original judge in a marriage dissolution case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A successor judge "cannot review and reverse on the merits and on the same facts the final orders and decrees of his predecessor"”
Establishes the fundamental principle that successor judges lack authority to modify predecessor orders on the same facts
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties initially appeared before Judge Coleman regarding appellant's motion to reduce or suspend alimony based on claimed financial hardship. Jud…
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DAUKSCH, J.
This is an appeal from a post-judgment order in a marriage dissolution ease. The issue on appeal is whether a successor judge has the authority to countermand the order entered by the original judge. He does not. See Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla.1956)(A successor judge “cannot review and reverse on the merits and on the same facts the final orders and decrees of his predecessor”).
Here, the parties appeared before Judge Coleman to have him rule upon appellant’s motion to reduce, eliminate or suspend alimony payments because appellant alleged a reduction in his ability to pay all of the alimony required in the original judgment and property settlement agreement. Judge Coleman considered the matter and suspended the duty to pay permanent alimony “because the Court finds there has been a significant change in the Former Husband’s financial circumstances.” Two years later appellee sought a reinstatement of the alimony payments and appeared before Judge Evans because of the usual judge rotation system in the circuit. Had Judge Evans merely reinstated the alimony payments, based upon sufficient evidence, then no problem would have occurred.
However, a finding was made that, “Former Husband has voluntarily decreased his working hours” and then an order was entered requiring appellant to pay all of the alimony that Judge Coleman had ordered suspended. This finding implies wrongdoing or a purposeful reduction in work to reduce pay to reduce alimony. In order to support the order requiring the payment of arrearages during the suspension period, the voluntary reduction had to have existed at the time the appellant made his original request before Judge Coleman. If that were so then it was up to Judge Coleman to have acted upon that evidence. So, either the evidence did not exist or Judge Coleman was not convinced by it. Either way, it is not for the successor judge to go behind Judge Coleman’s ruling. As many cases have said “in the absence of mistake, or fraud, a successor judge cannot review, modify, or reverse on the merits the final order of his predecessor on the same facts.” See Groover, 88 So. 2d at 314; Peterson v. Peterson, 715 So. 2d 977, 978 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); McBride v. McBride, 352 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Bailey v. Bailey, 204 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
If appellee felt aggrieved by Judge Coleman’s original order she should have appealed it and this court could consider her claims. Not another judge at the same level in the system. The order is quashed and the case remanded for entry of an order in accordance herewith.
ORDER QUASHED.
GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956)
- McBRIDE v. McBRIDE, 352 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Bailey v. Bailey, 204 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- VG Sales Co. v. Tight, 715 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)