CARLOS RAFAEL ALVAREZ, PETITIONER,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Defendant Alvarez seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent his criminal trial, claiming a speedy trial violation after the State disclosed Williams Rule evidence and eleven new witnesses only ten days before the rescheduled trial date. The court grants the writ and orders the defendant discharged, finding the State's late disclosure of witness identities violated discovery rules and was procedurally deficient.
The defendant's speedy trial demand should not have been struck. The State's disclosure of witness identities only ten days before trial violated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(A), which requires such disclosure within fifteen days of service of the Notice of Discovery. Because the trial was not held by December 14, 1998 through no fault of the defendant, he is entitled to discharge.
[1] A defendant is entitled to discharge when the State fails to provide discovery of "Williams Rule" witnesses within the timeframes mandated by the Florida Rules of Crimina…
[2] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(A) requires the State to disclose the names and addresses of witnesses with potentially relevant information, including tho…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This late disclosure is procedurally deficient and inherently prejudicial to the defendant. The record reveals that, but for the State's discovery violation, the defendant was ready to proceed with trial on December 14th. Because the trial was not held on or by that date, through no fault of the defendant, the defendant is entitled to a discharge.”
Establishes that the State's late disclosure violated discovery rules and entitled the defendant to discharge under the speedy trial rule.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlvarez was charged with grand theft of a vehicle, possession of burglary tools, and loitering on January 2, 1997. He demanded a speedy trial on Octob…
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PER CURIAM.
Carlos Rafael Alvarez (“defendant”) seeks a writ prohibiting the trial court from proceeding with his criminal trial claiming that his right to a speedy trial was violated. We grant the writ and direct the trial court to discharge the defendant.
On January 2, 1997, the defendant was charged with grand theft of a vehicle, possession of burglary tools, and loitering. The defendant demanded a speedy trial on October 5, 1998. The trial court set trial for November 16, 1998. Through no fault of the defendant, the trial was subsequently rescheduled for November 30,1998.
The State was not prepared to go to trial on November 30th and, on December 2nd, the defendant filed a notice of expiration of speedy trial time. A hearing on the defendant’s notice was held two days later, at which the trial court reset trial for December 14, 1998 in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p)(3). After the new date was set, however, the State notified the court and the defendant that it intended to rely upon “Williams Rule” evidence at trial and supplied the defendant with a list of eleven additional witnesses the State intended to have testify regarding a number of the defendant’s collateral acts. This was the first time that the defendant was appraised of these witnesses’ identities.
After hearing the defendant’s objection to the late notification and the defendant’s argument that he could not possibly depose all of the new witnesses or adequately prepare for the additional testimony within the ten-day window period, the court struck the defendant’s demand for a speedy trial and reset the trial date for March 1, 1999. In taking this action, the trial court concluded that the State’s notification was timely, in accordance with Section 90.404(2)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (1997), and that the defendant’s acknowledgment that he could not adequately prepare constituted a waiver of his demand. We disagree.
Section 90.404(2)(b)(l)’s application to the instant facts is limited. It states:
When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no fewer than 10 days before trial, the state shall furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information.
§ 90.404(2)(b)(l), Fla. Stat. (1997). This provision only addresses when the State must provide a written statement of the “acts or offenses” it intends to offer. It does not address when witness identities must be furnished.
The time for providing a defendant with a list of potential witnesses is addressed in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(A), which states:
(b) Prosecutor’s Discovery Obligation.
(1) Within 15 days after service of the Notice of Discovery, the prosecutor shall serve a written Discovery Exhibit which shall disclose to the defendant and permit the defendant to inspect, copy, test, and photograph the following information and material within the state’s possession and control:
(A) a list of names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented at trial under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes ...
Here, the defendant served his Notice of Discovery on January 2, 1997. The State, therefore, was required to provide the defendant with these witnesses’ identities within fifteen days of January 2, 1997. Instead, the State waited until December of 1998, and only ten days before trial, to provide the information.
This late disclosure is procedurally deficient and inherently prejudicial to the defendant. The record reveals that, but for the State’s discovery violation, the defendant was ready to proceed with trial on December 14th. Because the trial was not held on or by that date, through no fault of the defendant, the defendant is entitled to a discharge. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3); Stridiron v. State, 672 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted, and the trial court is directed to discharge the defendant from this case.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Naveira, 873 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2004)…after expiration of speedy trial period); Vega v. State, 778 So. 2d 505, 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (concluding that trial court improperly charged continuance to the defendant where State provided no discovery until the day of trial); Alvarez v. State, 729 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (untimely notice of collateral-crime witnesses resulted in trial not being held within recapture period through no fault of the defendant, requiring discharge); Lobik v. State, 506 So. 2d 1077, 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holdin…
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von Waldner v. State, 860 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…the speedy trial time had run, was both procedurally deficient and inherently prejudicial. Because the trial was not held within the requisite period, through no fault of the defendant, the defendant is entitled to a discharge. See Alvarez v. State, 729 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted, and the trial court is directed to discharge the defendant. PLEUS and MONACO, JJ., concur. . Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1971).…
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State v. T.G., 990 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…terial prejudice to T.G., the court granted the defendant’s motion for a continuance to be charged to the State, and subsequently discharged the defendant. We affirm on authority of Vega v. State, 778 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Alvarez v. State, 729 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); and State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). See generally Stridiron v. State, 672 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Colby v. McNeill, 595 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Granade v. Ader, 530 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Edwards v. State, 672 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)