L.K., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A minor was adjudicated delinquent for misdemeanor battery and agreed to extended detention (20 days) in exchange for a lower-level program placement. The court held that Florida law prohibits detention exceeding 15 days pending placement in a moderate-risk residential program, regardless of the child's agreement, and remanded to correct the disposition order.
A trial court cannot order detention exceeding 15 days pending placement in a moderate-risk residential program, regardless of the child's acquiescence. The disposition order must be corrected to reflect a one-year statutory maximum term for simple battery and credit time served in secure detention against the commitment period.
[1] A child committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for a moderate-risk residential program may not be held in secure detention awaiting dispositional placement for a…
[2] A disposition order must be corrected to reflect the statutory maximum term for simple battery, which is one year.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Notwithstanding the child's acquiescence in a longer period of detention, the plain language of the statute forbids the trial judge from ordering detention in excess of 15 days after commitment.”
Establishes that statutory limits on detention are mandatory and cannot be waived even with the child's agreement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceL.K., a child, was adjudicated delinquent on a charge of misdemeanor battery. At disposition, the child agreed to remain in secure detention for 20 da…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the order adjudicating appellant delinquent on the charge of misdemeanor battery. At the disposition hearing, the child agreed to remain in secure detention pending placement for 20 days — five days beyond the 15-day maximum period — in exchange for the trial court’s agreement to commit the child to a level six program rather than to a higher level eight program. The state concedes, however, and we agree, that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant to 20 days in detention prior to placement in a Department of Juvenile Justice moderate-risk residential program.
Florida Statute, section 985.215(10)(a)l provides that a child committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for a moderate-risk residential program may only be held in secure detention awaiting dispositional placement for a period not to exceed fifteen days after commitment. See S.B. v. Rayford, 717 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); R.E.D. v. Gnat, 681 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., Juvenile Justice v. J.S.G., 635 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Notwithstanding the child’s acquiescence in a longer period of detention, the plain language of the statute forbids the trial judge from ordering detention in excess of 15 days after commitment.1
Additionally, the state concedes that the disposition order should be corrected to reflect that the statutory maximum term for simple battery is one year and to allow appellant credit for time served in secure detention prior to her adjudication on this offense. See E.R. v. State, 584 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Gainer v. State, 693 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); In Interest of B.A., 546 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for correction of the disposition order to limit the commitment term to one year with credit for time served in secure detention against the period of commitment.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
KLEIN, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. . L.K. has already remained in secure detention beyond the statutory maximum. As a practical matter, a juvenile seeking immediate release from secure detention of a short duration pending placement can petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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J.I.S. v. State, 930 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2006)…the commitment? The First District Court of Appeal, whose decision we review, answered this question in the negative but certified conflict “[t]o the extent our opinion conflicts with E.R. v. State, 584 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), L.K. v. State, 729 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), J.B. v. State, 829 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and C.C. v. State, 841 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).” J.I.S. v. State, 902 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We exercise our discretionary ju [*590] risdiction to resolve t…
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L.K. v. Dep't OF Juv. Just., 917 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…Woolsey, 673 So. 2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Therefore, strict compliance with' the statute is required. W.C. v. Smith, 898 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); A.S. v. Byrd, 777 So. 2d 1171, 1172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also L.K. v. State, 729 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that [*921] notwithstanding the child’s acquiescence in a longer period of detention, the plain language of section 985.215(10)(a)l. forbids the trial judge from ordering detention in excess of 15 days after commitment).…
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G.P. v. Bessette, 831 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…juvenile may not be held longer than that unless the juvenile has been committed to a maximum-level program. R.E.D. v. Gnat, 681 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The court may not extend this period even with stipulation from the child. L.K v. State, 729 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We determine that petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to section 985.215(5)(d). The legislature has clearly indicated its intent that children not be held absent high-risk requirements. Section 985.215(5)(d) provides that…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- E.R. v. State, 584 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- In the Interest of B.A., 546 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- S.B. v. Rayford, 717 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. J.S.G., 635 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Desjarlais v. Desjarlais, 681 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- R.E.D. v. Gnat, 681 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Solomon v. State, 693 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Aric Antwan Gainer v. State, 693 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)