EDWARD C. VINING, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
HOWARD I. SEGAL, BERNICE YELLEN AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LORRAINE K. SEGAL, AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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In this garnishment case, the court reversed the trial court's order dissolving a writ of garnishment on a dentist's bank accounts. The court held that proceeds from a dental practice do not qualify as exempt "wages" under Florida's garnishment exemption statute, even though the dentist claimed the account funds represented earnings from personal services.
The court held that the accounts are not exempt because the proceeds of a dental practice deposited into the subject accounts are not "wages" or "salary" and do not qualify for the garnishment exemption. An indeterminable part of the account funds represents payments for other charges normally imposed for professional services, not merely compensation for personal labor.
[1] Funds deposited in bank accounts representing proceeds from a sole proprietorship dental practice are not exempt from garnishment as "wages" under Florida Statutes sectio…
[2] The determination of whether account monies are exempt from garnishment as "earnings" hinges on whether the funds represent payment for personal services or labor.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under section 222.11(2), the determination of whether Segal's accounts are exempt from garnishment hinges on whether the account monies represent Segal's "earnings" for his "personal services or labor."”
Establishes the legal standard for determining if funds qualify as exempt wages under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEdward Vining sought garnishment of four bank accounts held by Howard Segal with Commercial Bank of Florida. Segal moved to dissolve the writ, claimin…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SHEVIN, J.
Edward C. Vining, Jr., appeals an order dissolving a writ of garnishment on Howard I. Segal’s four accounts with Commercial Bank of Florida. Segal moved to dissolve the writ, asserting that under section 222.11, Florida Statutes (1997), the funds were exempt from garnishment as “wages.” We reverse.
Under section 222.11(2), the determination of whether Segal’s accounts are exempt from garnishment hinges on whether the account monies represent Segal’s “earnings” for his “personal services or labor.” § 222.11(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). See Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353 (1931); Refco, Inc. v. Sarmiento, 487 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Segal testified that the four accounts in question hold the proceeds from his dental practice. Segal operates two offices as a sole proprietorship. Segal uses these accounts to pay taxes, payroll, insurance, and expenses— both personal and business. Segal testified that he did not pay himself a wage or a salary. Segal does not work for anyone else; in fact, on occasion, he has another dentist perform work at his office on a part-time basis. Based on this testimony, the court erred in concluding that the garnishment exemption applied.
In this case, as in Patten, 102 Fla. at 610, 136 So. at 356, an indeterminable part of the account funds was received for Se-gal’s personal services, but another indeterminable part represents payments for other charges normally imposed for professional services. Following the court’s conclusion in Patten, we hold that the accounts are not exempt. See also Amedas, Inc. v. Brown, 505 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Refco, 487 So. 2d at 76. The proceeds of Segal’s dental practice, deposited into the subject accounts, are not “wages” or “salary” that the patients remit to Segal and do not qualify for the exemption. See also France v. Ross, 165 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)(sums charged by professional firms for services “does not convert those services into wages.”); accord In re Harrison, 216 B.R. 451 (S.D.Fla.1997); In re Zamora, 187 B.R. 783 (S.D.Fla.1995); In re Manning, 163 B.R. 380 (S.D.Fla.1994).
Based on the foregoing reasoning, we reverse the order dissolving the garnishment writ and remand with instructions to the court to order the replacement of the funds into the subject accounts.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
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Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)…lines at issue here were reenacted in 1996 pursuant to Chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of October 1, 1996, thereby curing the constitutional defect raised in this case.” Bortel, 743 So. 2d at 596 (relying on Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). We note that whether the window period closed on October 1, 1996, or on May 24, 1997, in the present case Heggs would still have standing to raise his single subject rule…
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Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)…t 264 n. 1. Conversely, the Fourth District in Bortel determined that the window period closed on October 1, 1996, when the relevant provisions of chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida, became effective. See 743 So. 2d at 596 (relying on Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). We declined to resolve the conflict regarding the window period in our decision in Heggs, however, because the defendant there had standing to raise a single subject rule…
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State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)…is Court, the parties in Thompson did not dispute the Second District’s determination regarding the applicable window period. While Thompson was pending before this Court, however, the Fourth District [*646] issued its decision in Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826, 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), wherein the court certified conflict with the Second District’s decision in Thompson regarding the window period issue. Specifically, the Salters Court held that the defendant in that case, who committed his offense on Apri…
Previewing 3 of 46 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Morehead v. The First Nat'l Bank of Lake City, 102 Fla. 522 (Fla. 1931)
- DeSoto Beach Improvement Co. v. Sias, 102 Fla. 603 (Fla. 1931)
- Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603 (Fla. 1931)
- France v. Ross, 165 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Refco, Inc. v. Sarmiento, 487 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Amedas, Inc. v. Brown, 505 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)