KEVIN MARK STEELE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the denial of appellant's motion for credit for time served because the 1996 sentencing order properly directed the Department of Corrections to award such credit, and the appellant may pursue mandamus relief after exhausting administrative remedies.
A sentencing order awarding credit for all time previously served is sufficient to alert the Department of Corrections that the prisoner is entitled to credit for time actually served and any gain time not forfeited.
[1] A sentencing order awarding credit for all time previously served is sufficient to alert the Department of Corrections that the prisoner is entitled to credit for time ac…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Steele sought credit for time served and filed a motion challenging the lower court's 1996 sentencing order.…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the denial of appellant’s motion seeking credit for time served, since the lower court’s 1996 sentencing order properly directed that appellant be given credit for time previously served in prison, to be determined by the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). See Singletary v. Slay, 688 So. 2d 319 (Fla.1997) (a sentencing order awarding credit for all time previously served is sufficient to alert DOC that the prisoner is entitled to credit for time actually served .and any gain time that has not been forfeited). Appellant’s motion did not indicate whether he exhausted his administrative remedies with DOC.
Accordingly, this affirmance is without prejudice to the appellant’s right to petition the circuit court for a writ of mandamus after exhausting his administrative remedies with DOC, assuming he has not already done so. See Smith v. State, 682 So. 2d 147, 149 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dismissed, 689 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.1997); King v. State, 666 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). If, upon the filing of a mandamus petition, it appears that appellant would be entitled to immediate release from incarceration if properly credited with the time he is seeking, the petition should be treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Waldrup v. Dugger, 662 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla.1990); Slay v. Singletary, 676 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), approved, 688 So. 2d 319 (Fla.1997).
FARMER, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Bustamante, 662 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1995)
- Genorval Slay v. Singletary, 676 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Singletary v. Genorval Slay, 688 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1997)
- Smith v. State, 682 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)