KEWANEE SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Kewanee Smith appeals his cocaine possession conviction, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The appellate court agreed, finding the frisk that uncovered the cocaine violated Terry v. Ohio because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that Smith was armed with a dangerous weapon.
The court reversed Smith's conviction, holding that the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment and section 901.151(5), Florida Statutes, because the officer lacked articulated and reasonable suspicion that Smith was armed with a dangerous weapon prior to conducting the search.
[1] A traffic stop for a cracked windshield is a lawful basis for initiating a vehicle stop.
[2] Passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle may be ordered to exit the vehicle for officer safety.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an officer must be able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed with a dangerous weapon before a frisk is presumed lawful”
Establishes the legal standard for conducting a frisk under Terry v. Ohio
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was a passenger in a vehicle lawfully stopped for a cracked windshield. The driver was arrested for driving with a suspended license. The office…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Traffic Stop Justification cases and more on FLexlaw
CASANUEVA, Judge.
Kewanee Smith appeals the judgments and sentences entered against him for possession of cocaine and for violation of probation (case no. CF 96-0357BA-XX), contending the trial court erred in denying his dispositive motion to suppress. We agree and reverse the judgment on the substantive offense.
The vehicle in which Mr. Smith was riding was stopped for having a cracked windshield, a violation of Florida law. Ultimately, the driver of the automobile was .arrested for driving with a suspended driver’s license. The arresting officer testified that he ordered the passengers, including Mr. Smith, to get out of the car for his own safety as he was, at the time, the only officer on the scene. He also testified that he intended to search the car and Mr. Smith, who was sweating and acting nervously as the officer placed the driver under arrest. A second officer arrived as the driver was being placed in the patrol car. After ordering Mr. Smith out of the car, the officer commanded that Mr. Smith lean against a car and assume what is commonly referred to as “the position.” Mr. Smith, however, refused to spread his legs. During the ensuing frisk, the officer became suspicious that Mr. Smith might have a weapon hidden in his shoe because he tried to hold that foot to the ground. Mr. Smith was ordered to remove his shoes. He complied, but ultimately the officers wrestled him to the ground. Feeling a hard lump in a sock and thinking it might be a razor blade, the officer removed Mr. Smith’s sock and discovered a package of crack cocaine.
Two other facts merit comment. First, the officers observed no bulges that would indicate a concealed weapon in Mr. Smith’s clothing; and second, the arresting officer testified that the check on the vehicle’s occupants indicated a possible warrant for Mr. Smith’s arrest. However, no warrant was ever proven to exist. There being no valid warrant, the search cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest.
Because the windshield was cracked, the vehicle’s stop was justified. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d<89 (1996). A police officer, as here, is permitted to then order the vehicle’s passengers to exit pending the stop’s completion. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). Nevertheless, the authority to remove Mr, Smith from the car did not automatically confer upon the officer the authority to frisk him. Rather, an officer must be able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed with a dangerous weapon before a frisk is presumed lawful. See Richardson v. State, 599 So. 2d 703, 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citing Thompson v. State, 551 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)).
Prior to the patdown, the arresting officer observed nothing that created an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Mr. Smith was armed. He saw no bulges that might conceal a dangerous weapon, nor did Mr. Smith act furtively or suspiciously or say anything threatening. The mere fact that Mr. Smith, perspiring and nervous, watched as the driver was arrested does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he carried a weapon. The patdown of Mr. Smith violates the principles enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and section 901.151(5), Florida Statutes (1997).
Because the search exceeded constitutional limitations, we reverse and remand with instruction to discharge Mr. Smith from the possession of cocaine charge, and for further proceedings in case number CF 96-03573A-XX consistent with this holding.
PARKER, C.J., and PATTERSON, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Hatcher v. State, 834 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)….Q. v. State, 801 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In order to confer upon the officer the authority to frisk the occupants of the vehicle, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed with a dangerous weapon. Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Richardson; Thompson v. State, 551 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)); see also C.Q. “Examples of types of conduct which may constitute articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dan…1 / 2
-
Tristan Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…n unsafe condition. “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires only a reasonable assessment of the facts, not a perfectly accurate one.” Cashman, 216 F. 3d at 587. This court has held that a vehicle stop for a cracked windshield is justified. Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“The vehicle in which Mr. Smith was riding was stopped for having a cracked windshield, a violation of Florida law.... Because the windshield was cracked, the vehicle’s stop was justified.”); see also Coleman v. State, 723 S…
-
Welch v. State, 741 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Saviory v. State, 717 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 729 So. 2d 394 (Fla.1999); Scott v. State, 710 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Snead, 707 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). . See Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (the authority to remove a passenger from a vehicle legitimately stopped for traffic infraction did not automatically give the officer the authority to frisk him; pat-down search was thus unconstitutional and motion to suppress mu…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996)
- Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1997)
- Richardson v. State, 599 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Thompson v. State, 551 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)