MITCHELL EPSTEIN AND KAREN EPSTEIN, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
GUIDANCE CORPORATION, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND RUNABOUTS OF CORAL SPRINGS, INC. D/B/A DAN MARINO'S TOWN TAVERN OF CORAL SPRINGS, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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Mitchell Epstein slipped and fell on a greasy substance in a shopping center common area and sued the owner and a co-tenant bar. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bar defendant, but the appellate court reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because discovery was incomplete when the bar canceled depositions of its own employees.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because discovery was not complete. The depositions of Dan Marino's employees may provide relevant evidence on the issues in the case, and as a general rule, summary judgment should not be entered when the opposing party has not yet completed discovery.
[1] A trial court should not grant summary judgment until discovery is complete and the facts are sufficiently developed to ascertain the absence of genuine issues of materia…
[2] A trial court errs by ruling on a motion for summary judgment when the opposing party has not yet completed discovery.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Summary judgment "should not be granted until the facts have been sufficiently developed to enable the court to be reasonably certain that there is no genuine issue of material fact."”
Establishes the standard for when summary judgment is appropriate, emphasizing that sufficient factual development is required.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn April 10, 1996, Mitchell Epstein slipped and fell on a greasy substance near a dumpster in a common area of a shopping center where Epstein's busin…
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PER CURIAM.
Mitchell and Karen Epstein appeal the trial court’s final summary judgment in favor of Runabouts of Coral Springs, Inc. d/b/a Dan Marino’s Town Tavern (“Dan Marino’s”). We reverse.
On April 10, 1996, Mitchell Epstein slipped and fell on a greasy substance near a dumpster located in a common area used by the tenants of the shopping center where Epstein’s business was situated. The Epsteins filed a personal injury action against Guidance Corporation, Inc., the owner of the shopping center, and Runabouts of Coral Springs, Inc. d/b/a Dan Marino’s Town Tavern (“Dan Marino’s”), a co-tenant.
On August 25, 1998, Dan Mari-no’s filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the Epsteins failed to establish that Dan Marino’s created the dangerous condition, owed Mitchell Epstein a duty of care, and breached that duty of care. During the October 16, 1998 summary judgment hearing, appellants’ counsel informed the trial court that the depositions of Harold Bajusz and Dave Segal, employees of Dan Marino’s, had been scheduled for October 9, 1998, but were canceled by defense counsel on October 8, 1998. Counsel argued that the case was not ripe for summary judgment because discovery was not complete.
The trial court allowed the hearing to proceed and granted the motion in favor of Dan Mari-no’s. Summary judgment “should not be granted until the facts have been sufficiently developed to enable the court to be reasonably certain that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Singer v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
See Lubarsky v. Sweden House Properties of Boca Raton, Inc., 673 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
As a general rule, ‘“a court should not enter summary judgment when the opposing party has not yet completed discovery.’ ” Fleet Fin. & Mortgage, Inc. v. Carey, 707 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting Lubarsky, 673 So. 2d at 977).
Here, the trial court should not have ruled on the motion for summary judgment until discovery was completed because the depositions of Dan Marino’s employees may provide relevant evidence concerning the issues in this case. See Fleet Fin., 707 So. 2d at 950; Henderson v. Reyes, 702 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Collazo v. Hupert, 693 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
Accordingly, we reverse the summary final judgment in favor of Dan Marino’s and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DELL, POLEN and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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Sanchez v. Sears, 807 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…he record demonstrates that summary judgment was granted before the facts of the case were sufficiently developed to enable the trial court to be reasonably certain that no genuine issue of material fact existed. See Epstein v. Guidance Corp., Inc., 736 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Singer v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); see also Lubarsky v. Sweden House Properties of Boca Raton, Inc., 673 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). “A court should not enter summary judgment when the opposing party ha…
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Dickey v. Kitroser, 53 So. 3d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ummary judgment where the opposing party has not had an opportunity to complete discovery.... Under the circumstances presented in this case, entry of summary judgment was premature. Id. (citation omitted); see also Epstein v. Guidance Corp., Inc., 736 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (reversing entry of summary judgment because trial court should not have ruled on motion for summary judgment until completion of relevant discovery). Crowell holds that a defendant has standing to oppose a codefendant’s mo…
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Anson St., LLC v. Rosado, 100 So. 3d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…e arbitrary sixty-day deadline, the appel-lees filed an answer and demands for discovery. “As a general rule, ‘a court should not enter summary judgment when the opposing party has not yet completed discovery.’ ” See Epstein v. Guidance Corp., Inc., 736 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting Fleet Fin. & Mortg., Inc. v. Carey, 707 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). For the appellant to have gone ahead with the summary judgment while appellees’ demands for discovery were outstanding would merely have…
Authorities Cited
- Theresa Singer Ad Litem for Ann Doe v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Lubarsky v. Sweden House Props. OF Boca Raton, Inc., 673 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Fleet Fin. & Mortg., Inc. v. Carey, 707 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Collazo v. Hupert, 693 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Girtman v. Iva Hauck Girtman, 693 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Birgit Henderson v. Riama S. Reyes, 702 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- LAW Off. OF Sara Lawrence, P.A. v. Livingston, 702 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)