STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
LAWRENCE WIKSO, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's suppression order dismissing cocaine possession charges. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress based on the probable cause affidavit without hearing testimony, but the appellate court reverses, finding that the facts in the affidavit actually supported the lawfulness of the traffic stop, vehicle exit order, and resulting seizure.
The court reversed the suppression order, holding that the facts alleged in the probable cause affidavit established that the initial traffic stop was lawful, the officer's request for defendant to exit the vehicle was proper, and the subsequent seizure of the cocaine in plain view was valid.
[1] A trial court errs in granting a motion to suppress based solely on a probable cause affidavit without taking testimony.
[2] A police officer may order a driver to exit a vehicle lawfully detained for a traffic violation without violating the Fourth Amendment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to an appellate court presumed correct, see Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 159 (Fla.1997), the appellate court must decide for itself whether the facts relied on by the trial court support its legal conclusions.”
Establishes the standard of review for suppression motions—while trial court rulings are presumed correct, appellate courts independently review whether facts support legal conclusions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer conducted a traffic stop of defendant Wikso for displaying an improper license tag. During the stop, the officer noticed defendant making s…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FARMER, J.
During pretrial proceedings on charges of possession of cocaine, the defendant moved to suppress the cocaine. Without taking any testimony on the suppression motion, the trial court instead reviewed the probable cause affidavit and .granted the motion. We reverse.
The affidavit alleged the following facts. An officer effected a traffic stop of defendant because he was displaying an improper license tag. As the officer informed defendant of the reason for the stop, he noticed defendant making movements by reaching behind his back with his right hand. The officer asked defendant to step out of the vehicle “for officer safety.” As defendant left the vehicle, the officer observed in plain view in the driver’s-side door handle an off-white substance that he suspected to be cocaine. The substance tested positive for cocaine and the officer placed defendant under arrest. Purely on the basis of these “facts” established by the probable cause affidavit, the court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Although a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to an appellate court presumed correct, see Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla.1997), the appellate court must decide for itself whether the facts relied on by the trial court support its legal conclusions. In this instance they do not.
The State argues that the initial stop of the defendant’s vehicle was proper because the officer was unable to read the tag when he effected the stop. Because the initial stop was proper, the state argues, the officer was justified in requesting that defendant exit the vehicle. Once defendant opened the door and revealed the contraband to plain view, the resulting seizure of the contraband and arrest were proper. Defendant concedes that the facts disclose that the officer was initially unable to read the tag. Yet he maintains that when the tag became legible as the officer approached the stopped vehicle, the encounter should have been terminated. In Stanley v. State, 559 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we held that:
“Once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officer may order the driver to exit the vehicle without violating the fourth amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). This is a reasonable part of police procedure balancing the safety of the officer against the intrusion into the driver’s personal liberty. Furthermore, when the police have a reasonable belief, an articulable suspicion, that the suspect poses a danger, and roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, a protective search is justified. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).” [c.o.]
559 So. 2d at 461. Similarly, in State v. Bass, 609 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), under similar circumstances, the court held that “once the vehicle was properly stopped, the officer could ask to see the driver’s license and registration.” 609 So. 2d at 152.
Because the only “evidence” considered by the trial court entirely supported the stop, seizure and arrest in this case, the trial court erred in holding the seizure and arrest invalid.
REVERSED.
POLEN and KLEIN, JJ„ concur.
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Seburt Nelson Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2001)…ssion is a legal question requiring independent review”); State v. Gandy, 766 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (same); Porter v. State, 765 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (same); Sims v. State, 743 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (same); State v. Wikso, 738 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (same); Warren v. State, 701 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (same). These opinions state that the determination of whether the application of the law to the historical facts establishes an adequate basis for the trial court’s rul…
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State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2003)…LEWIS, J. We have for review the decision in Diaz v. State, 800 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which certified conflict with the decisions in State v. Wikso, 738 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and State v. Bass, 609 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Because the law enforcement officer here had no justification for continuing the restraint of this motorist and obta…
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Diaz v. State, 800 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…p ended, and Palmer should have been free to leave. Palmer’s continued detention after the justification for the stop ended was illegal.” Id. at 680. Accordingly, we reverse Diaz’s conviction. However, because the Fourth District in State v. Wikso, 738 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and the Fifth District in State v. Bass, 609 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), appear to have reached a conclusion contrary to our decision in Palmer, we also certify conflict with Bass and Wikso. Reversed. PARKER, A.C.J., and S…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (U.S. 1983)
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1977)
- State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1997)
- State v. Bass, 609 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- The Billburg Corp. v. Acct. Grp., Inc., 559 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Stanley v. State, 559 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)