REINALDO SANTIAGO CRUZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Cruz challenged a civil restitution lien imposed for incarceration costs, arguing it should have been part of his plea bargain negotiations. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the lien, holding that civil restitution liens are collateral consequences of a plea, not direct consequences requiring disclosure during plea negotiations.
A section 960.292 civil restitution lien is a collateral, not a direct, consequence of a plea and therefore need not be considered in a plea agreement or its acceptance by the sentencing court. The lien does not have the definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of punishment required to constitute a direct consequence.
[1] A civil restitution lien imposed for incarceration costs is a collateral consequence of a plea and does not need to be part of the plea agreement or sentencing hearing.
[2] A direct consequence of a plea is one that has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a 960.292 lien is a collateral, rather than a direct, consequence of a plea and therefore need not be considered either in a plea agreement or its acceptance and enforcement by the sentencing court”
Establishes the core holding that restitution liens are collateral consequences not requiring plea bargain disclosure
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCruz agreed to plead guilty to several offenses in exchange for a sentence of 364 days in county jail followed by community control and probation. Whi…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The defendant appellant agreed to plead guilty to several offenses in exchange for a sentence of 364 days in the County jail followed by community control and probation. While he was in prison, Miami-Dade County moved for and was granted a civil restitution lien upon him pursuant to sections 960.292(1) and 960.293(2), Florida Statutes (1997)1 for the costs of his impris onment. Cruz now challenges and seeks to strike the lien on the sole ground that its imposition should have been, but was not, a subject of the plea bargain and the sentencing hearing. We disagree.
Our conclusion is based on the determination that a 960.292 lien is a collateral, rather than a direct, consequence of a plea and therefore need not be considered either in a plea agreement or its acceptance and enforcement by the sentencing court. State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960 (Fla.1987); State v. Fox, 659 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 668 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1996).
The cases define a “direct consequence of a plea” — as to which the trial judge is required to inform the defendant — as “one that has a ‘definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.’ ” Fox, 659 So. 2d at 1327, quoting Zambuto v. State, 413 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see also Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F. 2d 1364 (4th Cir.1973)(same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1005, 94 S.Ct. 362, 38 L.Ed.2d 241 (1973); Daniels v. State, 716 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(distinguishing direct and collateral consequences); State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488, 869 P. 2d 1062 (1994)(same).
For several reasons, the “civil restitution” lien in question does not at all fit this definition. Indeed, it does not meet the threshold conclusion that it have any effect, direct or indirect, “on the range of the defendant’s punishment.” Fox, 659 So. 2d at 1327. Rather, like a civil restitution order, it constitutes only a non-criminal remedy for the recovery or reimbursement of particular expenses. See State v. Dugan, 193 Wis.2d 610, 534 N.W. 2d 897 (1995)(trial court not required to advise defendant of possibility of restitution upon accepting plea); see also Mitchel v. Cigna Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (order for civil restitution imposed after plea is not criminal penalty under liability insurance exclusion).
Moreover, the imposition of the lien is hardly “definite, immediate, [or] largely automatic[ally]” imposed, Zambuto, 413 So. 2d at 462, even after a defendant’s imprisonment, let alone upon the acceptance of the plea bargain and the entry of sentence. Quite to the contrary, the statute provides that the lien may be imposed only after the relevant political subdivision actually moves for that relief. Not only is that action not automatic, its occurrence in this case, insofar as we can determine, is a unique event in this district.
Affirmed.
. 960.292 Enforcement of the civil restitution lien through civil restitution lien order.— The civil restitution lien shall be made enforceable by means of a civil restitution lien order. (1) Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s.
960.293. The conviction shall estop the convicted offender from denying the essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent proceedings.
960.293 Determination of damages and losses.—
(2) Upon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Justine Polite v. State, 990 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…s ruling. We agree with Polite and reverse. First, the issue here is not a collateral consequence of the plea. The maximum penalty that could be imposed if community control/probation is violated is a direct consequence of. the plea. Cruz v. State, 742 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). As to the substantive claim, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), created a two-prong test for determining whether defense counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance to a def…
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Smith v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 27 So. 3d 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…ution hen order.” § 960.292, Fla. Stat. The sentencing court has the authority to enter such orders on its own motion or upon motion by the state. § 960.292(1), Fla. Stat.; see also Wilson v. State, 957 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Cruz v. State, 742 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Ilkanic, 683 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), approved, 705 So. 2d 1371 (Fla.1998). Alternatively, the state [*127] may seek recovery of the amounts provided for in section 960.293 “in a separate civil ac…
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Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Mel Tyrone Moss, 842 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…days of the convicted offender’s sentence, not the number of days actually served. Liability is incurred upon conviction when the actual time served is not known and therefore, damages are determined by the length of the sentence. See Cruz v. State, 742 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (affirming a civil restitution lien assessed while the defendant was still serving his sentence). See also Goad v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S176 (Fla. Feb. 27, 2003) (imposing incarceration costs on sentence…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1987)
- State v. A.J. FOX, 659 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973)
- Francesco Zambuto v. State, 413 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Freeman Daniels v. State, 716 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Holtzinger v. Estelle, 414 U.S. 1005 (U.S. 1973)
- Blank v. United States, 414 U.S. 1005 (U.S. 1973)
- Mitchel v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)