MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, APPELLANT,
v.
MEL TYRONE MOSS, APPELLEE
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Miami-Dade County sought to recover incarceration costs from Mel Tyrone Moss under Florida's cost-shifting statute. The court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the statute authorizes compensation based on the full sentence imposed, not the actual days served.
The statute provides that the County is entitled to compensation for the days of the convicted offender's sentence, not the days actually served. Liability is incurred upon conviction, and damages are determined by the length of the sentence.
[1] A county is entitled to compensation for the number of days of a convicted offender's sentence, not merely the number of days actually served, pursuant to section 960.293…
[2] The plain language of section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes, dictates that liquidated damages for incarceration costs are calculated based on the total length of the co…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a liquidated damage amount of $60 per day of the convicted offender's sentence”
The statutory language establishing the basis for compensation under section 960.293(2)(b)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoss pleaded nolo contendere to cocaine possession and was sentenced to 364 days incarceration. He actually served only 271 days due to gain time earn…
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RAMIREZ, J.
Miami-Dade County appeals from a summary final judgment which awards the County compensation for the actual number of days served by appellee Mel Tyrone Moss rather than for the number of days to which he was sentenced. We reverse because section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2000) provides that the County is entitled to compensation for the days of Moss’ sentence.
Moss entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of cocaine and was sentenced to 364 days incarceration. He actually served only 271 days, presumably as a result of “gain time” earned for good behavior. After his release, the County filed suit against Moss to recover the costs of incarceration pursuant to section 960.293, Florida Statutes (2000). Section 960.293(2) provides that a convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs. Subsection (b) specifically provides for “a liquidated damage amount of $60 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence.” (emphasis added). See Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So. 2d 1371, 1372-73 (Fla.1998) (holding that the statute is constitutional and addresses the urgent need to decrease the financial burden on the state and its local subdivisions for the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders).
The County moved for summary judgment to recover incarceration and correctional costs in the amount of $18,200. The trial court held that the statute was intended to compensate the state and its subdivisions for the part of the sentence that was actually served and entered final judgment for the County in the amount of $13,550.
We reverse because the plain language of section 960.293(2)(b) states that damages are liquidated for the number of days of the convicted offender’s sentence, not the number of days actually served. Liability is incurred upon conviction when the actual time served is not known and therefore, damages are determined by the length of the sentence. See Cruz v. State, 742 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (affirming a civil restitution lien assessed while the defendant was still serving his sentence). See also Goad v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S176 (Fla. Feb. 27, 2003) (imposing incarceration costs on sentence remaining after statute’s effective date).
Reversed and remanded.
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Citator
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Smith v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 27 So. 3d 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…ffender is released, particularly with respect to life-sentenced offenders such as Appellant for which the term of incarceration is known at the time of sentencing and the statute liquidates the costs at $250,000. See also Miami-Dade County v. Moss, 842 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that the county was entitled to recover compensation for the number of days in the convicted offender’s sentence, rather than only the number of days actually served). The legislature amended section 960.297 in 2009 to p…
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Brown v. State, 128 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…defendants are liable to the state and its local subdivisions for the costs of incarceration and other correctional costs); § 960.297 (authorizing a civil action to recover the costs set forth in section 960.293); see also Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Moss, 842 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[T]he plain language of section 960.293(2)(b) states that damages are liquidated for the number of days of the convicted offender’s sentence, not the number of days actually served.”). Accordingly, we reverse Brown’s senten…
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Boykins v. State (11th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2014)
Authorities Cited
- Ilkanic v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 705 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1998)
- Cruz v. State, 742 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)