TYRONE LAWTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1999-08-20
No. 98-3392
DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.
743 So. 2d 51 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Tyrone Lawton appeals his 15-year sentence imposed under Florida's Prison Release Reoffender Act (PRRA), challenging both the constitutionality of the statute and the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirms the sentence, rejecting all constitutional challenges and finding no abuse of discretion in excluding the victim's prior convictions.


Holding

The court affirms the sentence and rejects all constitutional challenges to the PRRA. The court also holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion in limine to exclude the victim's prior convictions, and any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.


Headnotes

[1] The Prison Release Reoffender Act (PRRA) has been consistently upheld as constitutional by Florida's district courts of appeal.

[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by accepting a victim's written statement against sentence enhancement and denying the state attorney's request for enhancemen…

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Key Quotes

“These issues have been addressed by the district courts of appeal and none has found the statute unconstitutional.”

Establishes that the PRRA constitutional challenges are not novel and have been uniformly rejected

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Facts & Procedural History

Lawton was convicted of aggravated battery after stabbing and robbing a cab driver. He was apprehended shortly after the crime when discovered hiding …

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Opinion of the Court
THOMPSON, J.,

THOMPSON, J.,

Tyrone Lawton appeals his sentence imposed pursuant to the Prison Release Reoffender Act (“PRRA”). § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997). We affirm.

Lawton was tried for armed robbery with a weapon1 and aggravated battery.2 He was convicted of aggravated battery, and after notice from the state attorney pursuant to PRRA, was sentenced to 15 years incarceration with credit for 483 days time served. He contends on appeal that the PRRA is unconstitutional for several reasons: it violates the doctrine of separation of powers; it violates the single-subject requirement; it violates his due process rights because the act was passed after he got out of prison; and, finally, because the sentence is excessive. These issues have been addressed by the district courts of appeal and none has found the statute unconstitutional. E.g., Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Woods v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D831, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The second and fourth districts have found, however, that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it accepts a victim’s written statement not to enhance a sentence and denies the state attorney’s request to enhance the defendant’s sentence. State v. Wise, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D657, 744 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Cotton. Law-ton does not raise this issue on appeal.

Lawton also contends that the trial court erred when it granted the state’s motion in limine which prevented Lawton from impeaching the victim with two prior convictions. The state moved to exclude testimony that the victim, subsequent to the time he was stabbed by Lawton, had been arrested for felony purchase of drugs.3 Further, the state moved to exclude testimony that the victim had been convicted of attaching a tag not assigned to his vehicle. Lawton argues that the court abused its discretion by granting the state’s motion since this case involved the credibility of Lawton and the victim. He contends that section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes allows a witness’ credibility to be impeached with prior convictions if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement, and that the plea to a charge involving drugs and the conviction for a crime involving dishonesty, the tag case, were appropriate for impeachment. He contends this was not harmless error. Livingston v. State, 682 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). We find the court did not abuse its discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980).

In this case, the evidence against Law-ton was overwhelming. Lawton was apprehended shortly after he stabbed and robbed a cab driver. A police officer who was investigating the victim’s car in a ditch, identified Lawton as the man he saw fleeing the scene of the crime. Lawton was apprehended when a homeowner found him hiding next to her air-conditioning unit. After his arrest, the police read Lawton his rights and then questioned him. Lawton confessed to the crime but stated the stabbing was an accident, the result of a drug deal gone awry. Even if the trial court erred, it was harmless error. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986).

AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . § 812.13(1) & (2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997).

. § 784.045(l)(a)(2), Fla. Slat. (1997).

. The victim entered a plea to misdemeanor possession of drugs at initial appearance.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …elated to the specific mandatory punishment provision in subsection eight. However, the First, Fifth, and Fourth Districts have rejected this argument as it relates to the Act. See Durden v. State, 743 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Lawton v. State, 743 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Young v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So. 2d 915 (Fla.1999). The Fourth District has provided the following analysis: The test for determining duplicity of subject “is whether or not t…
  • Antonal Thornton v. State, 767 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …horized telephone calls one year after the crime at issue has little, if any, probative value as to whether Joshua was a victim or an accomplice in [*1288] this crime. Our review here is governed by the abuse of discretion standard. Lawton v. State, 743 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Third, Thornton argues the trial court erred in admitting in evidence a gun found by Olsen’s employer, in Olsen’s desk drawer. Olsen was Thornton’s accomplice and co-defendant in this case. There was testimony at trial that…

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