MONTICELLO INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
EARL THOMPSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A AUTOPRIDE CAR WASH, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Monticello Insurance Company appealed from an order determining that Earl Thompson was entitled to final summary judgment on his third-party complaint for a declaratory judgment regarding liability insurance coverage. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court's order merely established entitlement to judgment without entering an actual final judgment with the requisite language of finality.
The order is not final and appealable because it merely establishes entitlement to judgment without actually entering or rendering a judgment and without including the specific language of finality necessary for such orders to be considered final for appellate purposes. Form is determinative in such matters, and orders lacking unequivocal language of finality such as 'hereby enters' or similar language do not confer appellate jurisdiction.
[1] A declaratory judgment determining insurance coverage has the force and effect of a final judgment and is appealable as a final order.
[2] An order merely establishing entitlement to a summary judgment, without actually entering or rendering a judgment with language of finality, is not a final, appealable or…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A declaratory judgment determining insurance coverage 'has the force and effect of a final judgment,' section 86.011, Florida Statutes (1997), and 'is appealable as a final order regardless of whether the judgment is rendered in a separate declaratory judgment action or as part of a third-party action.'”
Establishes that declaratory judgments on insurance coverage are generally appealable as final orders under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEarl Thompson, doing business as Autopride Car Wash, filed a third-party complaint seeking a declaration that Monticello Insurance Company was require…
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PER CURIAM.
Monticello Insurance Company appeals from an order which determined that Earl Thompson, individually and d/b/a Auto-pride Car Wash, appellee, “is entitled to Final Summary Judgment as a matter of law” on his third party complaint seeking a declaration that appellant was required to provide him liability insurance coverage in the underlying personal injury action by Karla Sue Edge. A declaratory judgment determining insurance coverage “has the force and effect of a final judgment,” section 86.011, Florida Statutes (1997), and “is appealable as a final order regardless of whether the judgment is rendered in a separate declaratory judgment action or as part of a third-party action.” Canal Ins. Co. v. Reed, 666 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla.1996).
The order on appeal, however, merely establishes entitlement to a judgment and does not actually enter or render a judgment as to insurance coverage or include specific “language of finality” necessary for a judgment of this type to be considered “final” for purposes of an appeal. See Catchings v. Florida-McCracken Concrete Pipe, 101 Fla. 792, 135 So. 561, 562 (1931); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Collier, 405 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)(order which provided that “Defendant’s motion for final summary judgment is hereby granted that the plaintiff take nothing by the suit and go hence without day” was final, appealable order; use of additional language “len[t] the necessary unequivocal declaration of finality that will support an appeal”); Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967, 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)(orders granting motions for summary judgment, which contained neither “the traditional words of finality nor other words of similar import,” were not final orders subject to appellate review).
Although we recognize that our ruling may well elevate form over intended substance, see Chesbrough v. Shope, 544 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), case law establishes that “the form of orders of this kind is determinative.” Id.
Thus, without language in the order which “hereby enters” a judgment, or similar unequivocal language of finality, ruling that insurance coverage exists for appellee Thompson under the applicable policy issued by Monticello, we do not possess jurisdiction even under Canal Insurance.
Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed without prejudice to appellant to file a timely notice of appeal when a summary judgment as to coverage is entered by the trial court. See Benton v. Moore, 655 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
WEBSTER, DAVIS and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.
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Citator
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McQUAIG v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 789 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…usions of law and ordered that “final summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of Wal Mart.” We have stated that such self-executing, unequivocal language of finality is sufficient to constitute a final order. See Monticello Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 743 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(“[W]ithout language in the order which ‘hereby enters’ a judgment, or similar unequivocal language of finality ... we do not possess jurisdiction.... ”). We recognize that the August 28, 2000 Final Judgment included additio…
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Lidsky Vaccaro & Montes, P.A. v. Morejon, 813 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). An order granting only summary judgment merely establishes an entitlement to a judgment, but is not itself a judgment. See Monticello Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 743 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Thus, the earlier order which merely granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, but contained no words of finality was not a final judgment. The circuit court panel apparently recognized the non-final nature of this ord…
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Earnest Stanberry, Jr. v. Escambia Cnty., 813 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…[*280] That the order under review is not a final order within the meaning of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(A) as contemplated by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(a)(1) is clear. See, e.g., Monticello Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 743 So. 2d 1215, 1215-16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that even an order that “establishes entitlement to a judgment [is not final unless it] ... actually enter[s] or render[s] a judgment ... or include[s] specific ‘language of finality’ necessary for a judgment ..…
Previewing 3 of 32 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Benton v. Moore, 655 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Emory Catchings v. Florida-McCracken Concrete Pipe Co., 101 Fla. 792 (Fla. 1931)
- Canal Ins. Co. v. Reed, 666 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1996)
- Danford v. City OF Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Mitchell v. State, 405 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Chesbrough v. Shope, 544 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)