CLINT MCQUAIG AND PAM MCQUAIG, APPELLANTS,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC., APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2001-07-20
No. 1D00-3849
DAVIS, VAN NORTWICK AND POLSTON, JJ., CONCUR.
789 So. 2d 1215 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2001) Caution
Cited by 36 cases

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Synopsis

The McQuaigs appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of Walmart, but the Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as untimely filed. The court lacked jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not filed within the required timeframe under Florida Appellate Procedure Rule 9.110(b).


Holding

The appeal was dismissed as untimely filed because the notice of appeal was not filed within the required timeframe. The August 16, 2000 Final Summary Judgment was a final, appealable order due to its self-executing, unequivocal language of finality, rendering the subsequent August 28, 2000 order redundant for appellate review purposes.


Headnotes

[1] An order that merely grants a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final order.

[2] An order containing unequivocal language of finality, such as 'final summary judgment is hereby entered,' constitutes a final order for purposes of appellate review.

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Key Quotes

“[W]ithout language in the order which 'hereby enters' a judgment, or similar unequivocal language of finality ... we do not possess jurisdiction.”

Establishes the court's requirement for clear, self-executing language of finality in summary judgment orders to create appealable final orders.

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Facts & Procedural History

On August 16, 2000, the trial court entered a Final Summary Judgment in favor of Walmart, which included findings of fact, conclusions of law, and une…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

On September 27, 2000, Clint McQuaig and Pam McQuaig, on behalf of their minor child, Cameron McQuaig, filed a notice of appeal of a Final Summary Judgment entered on August 16, 2000 and of a Final Judgment entered on August 28, 2000. Sua sponte, we ordered appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely filed. See rule 9.110(b), Fla. RApp. P. After consideration of the appellants’ response, we dismiss this appeal.

An order which merely grants a motion for summary judgment, without more, is not an appealable final order. See Bowman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 599 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

In the August 16, 2000 Final Summary Judgment, the trial court did more than merely granting the appellee’s motion. The court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered that “final summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of Wal Mart.” We have stated that such self-executing, unequivocal language of finality is sufficient to constitute a final order. See Monticello Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 743 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(“[W]ithout language in the order which ‘hereby enters’ a judgment, or similar unequivocal language of finality ... we do not possess jurisdiction.... ”).

We recognize that the August 28, 2000 Final Judgment included additional language of finality by providing that “Plaintiffs ... shall take nothing by this action and that defendant ... shall go hence without day.” In the August 28 Final Judgment, the trial court did not, however, vacate the August 16 Final Summary Judgment. Further, the additional language in the August 28 Final Judgment was not essential to render the judgment final for the purposes of appellate review, see State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Open MRI of Orlando, Inc., 780 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), and, with respect to the matters addressed in the orders appealed here, no other judicial labor remained to be done by the trial court after the entry of the August 16, 2000 Final Summary Judgment.

The notice of appeal being untimely filed, we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Peltz v. District Court of Appeal, Third District, 605 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla.1992). Accordingly, this appeal must be, and is hereby, DISMISSED.

DAVIS, VAN NORTWICK AND POLSTON, JJ., CONCUR.


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Citator

Cited By (18 total)

  • Hickox v. Taylor, 933 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …rder Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. However, because the order merely grants a motion for summary judgment and fails to actually enter judgment, it is not a final appealable order. Compare McQuaig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 789 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), with Benton v. Moore, 655 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The appeal is also untimely. Although the appellant’s motion for rehearing of the order on appeal was served within ten days of the filing of the order pursuant to Flori…
  • …sufficient language of finality to unequivocally bring an end to the required judicial labor, and therefore it failed to dispose of the case as to a party. Hoffman v. Hall, 817 So. 2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); McQuaig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 789 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Monticello Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 743 So. 2d 1215, at 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Similar to an order granting a motion for summary judgment, an order granting summary judgment, without more, is not a final order. Because the order…
  • Boyd v. Goff, 828 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
    …ot an appealable order because it merely granted the motion for summary judgment. In fact, it does more. “An order which merely grants a motion for summary judgment, without more, is not an appealable final order.” McQuaig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 789 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). While titled an “Order Granting Summary Judgment,” this order did more than grant the appellants’ motion. The order specified that certain counts of the complaint, those that were against Metra, were dismissed and that, “Final S…

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