STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CLIFFORD DAVIDSON, APPELLEE
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The State appeals the trial court's suppression of cocaine found during a traffic stop of Clifford Davidson's vehicle. The appellate court reverses, holding that the deputy had founded suspicion to stop Davidson's vehicle based on observations of erratic driving characteristic of impaired driving.
The court held that the deputy had founded suspicion to conduct the stop. The observations of continuous lane drifting combined with abnormally slow driving speed provided an objective basis for suspecting impaired driving, satisfying the lower standard of founded suspicion required for DUI investigatory stops.
[1] A law enforcement officer needs only a "founded suspicion" of criminal activity to effect a valid stop for driving under the influence.
[2] A legitimate concern for public safety can justify a brief investigatory stop to determine if a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to effect a valid stop for DUI, the officer need only have a "founded suspicion" of criminal activity.”
Establishes the legal standard applicable to DUI stops, which is less stringent than the probable cause required for other criminal stops.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA deputy sheriff observed Davidson's vehicle traveling between 40-50 m.p.h. on I-75 (a highway with a 70 m.p.h. maximum and 40 m.p.h. minimum speed li…
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WHATLEY, Judge.
The State appeals the order suppressing the cocaine found during a search of Clifford Davidson’s vehicle incident to his arrest. We reverse.
In his motion to suppress, Davidson argued that the stop of his vehicle was improper because the deputy lacked the requisite founded suspicion. At the hearing on the motion, the deputy sheriff who stopped Davidson testified that he was sitting in his marked patrol car in the median of 1-75 running radar at approximately 11:50 p.m. He noticed a vehicle proceeding south at a speed of between 40 and 48 m.p.h. on a highway with a maximum speed limit of 70 m.p.h. and a minimum speed limit of 40 m.p.h. The deputy pulled onto the highway and followed the vehicle, observing that, while maintaining a speed of somewhere between 40 and 50 m.p.h., it continually drifted across the line and then jerked back in the opposite direction in a correcting manner. The deputy testified that he pulled Davidson over because these actions are characteristic of an impaired driver. He further testified that he knew something was wrong because people do not normally drive like Davidson was driving.
In order to effect a valid stop for DUI, the officer need only have a “founded suspicion” of criminal activity.
The courts of this state have recognized that a legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior. State Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). As revealed by the deputy’s testimony, the deputy’s observations of Davidson’s driving provided him with the founded suspicion necessary to conduct a stop of Davidson.
In Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla.1975), the supreme court upheld the initial stop of a vehicle on the Florida Turnpike on facts less suspicious than those here:
Because of the dangers inherent to our modern vehicular mode of life, there may be justification for the stopping of a vehicle by a patrolman to determine the reason for its unusual operation. In this instance, although no vehicular regulation was being violated, it seemed strange to the officer that the vehicle was proceeding at only 45 miles per hour and was weaving, although not so much as to move out of its lane on one side or the other. See also Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (officer’s observation of vehicle’s continuous weaving within its lane presented objective basis for suspecting driver under the influence and supported stop); State v. Carrillo, 506 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (same); Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (officer’s observation of vehicle weaving within its lane of traffic at a speed of 45 m.p.h. on 1-95 justified stop).
Davidson’s reliance on Crooks v. State, 710 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), is misplaced. In holding that the arresting deputy had no objective basis to stop Crooks for failing to maintain a single lane of traffic, this court noted that the deputy did not think that Crooks was intoxicated or otherwise impaired. Moreover, from the facts described in Crooks, it appears that some or all of Crooks’ drifting over the line was caused by the actions of the law enforcement personnel involved.
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and DAVIS, J., Concur.
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Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…the principle that a stop is permitted even without a traffic violation, so long as the stop is supported by a reasonable suspicion of impairment, unfitness or vehicle defects. Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); State v. Davidson, 744 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (evidence of abnormal driving, albeit not amounting to a traffic violation, justified stop based on reasonable suspicion of impairment). In the case at hand, there was nothing in the record to establish probable cause that the ac…
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Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…A 1987) (weaving within lane five times within one-quarter mile sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of impairment); Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (weaving several times sufficient to justify stop); State v. Davidson, 744 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (evidence of abnormal driving, albeit not amounting to a traffic violation, justified stop based on reasonable suspicion of impairment); State v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (using lane as “marker” to position vehi…
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Laurence Alvin Duke v. State, 82 So. 3d 1155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…riving can establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop based on an officer's legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public, such as where the officer believes the person may be impaired, sick, or tired. See State v. Davidson, 744 So. 2d 1180, 1180-81 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); St…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)
- State v. DeSHONG, 603 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- State v. Carrillo, 506 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Garnet Crooks v. State, 710 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Brockington v. State, 506 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)