ALEJANDRO YANES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alejandro Yanes appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a vehicle search, arguing that a deputy sheriff's initial stop was improper and the detention was unreasonably extended. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the deputy had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on the driver's repeated crossing of the fog line combined with signs of impairment, and that the detention was not unreasonably prolonged.
The court held that the deputy had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on the repeated crossing of the fog line combined with observed signs of impairment, constituting a violation of the lane statute and/or reasonable suspicion of impairment. The court also held that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding the detention was not unreasonably extended.
[1] Crossing the fog line multiple times can establish reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, even if no traffic violation occurred or endangerment is present.
[2] A deputy sheriff's observation of a vehicle crossing the fog line by approximately one-half of its width on three occasions within a mile can justify a stop based on reas…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”
The relevant statutory standard for lane operation that the court applied to find Appellant violated the statute by deviating more than practicable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA deputy sheriff observed Appellant's vehicle cross the fog line on three occasions within a mile, with the vehicle crossing by approximately one-half…
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TORPY, J.
After his Motion to Suppress was denied, Appellant pled guilty to trafficking in the cocaine found in his vehicle. He contends that a deputy sheriff improperly stopped his vehicle, improperly detained him after the stop, and that the ensuing search of his vehicle was tainted by the improper stop and detention. We disagree and affirm.
The deputy sheriff, while patrolling the Florida Turnpike, observed Appellant cross the “fog line”1 on three occasions within a mile. Each time, the vehicle crossed the line by approximately one-half of its width. Believing that the operator might be impaired, sick or tired, the deputy stopped Appellant’s vehicle. He observed that Appellant had the odor of alcohol on his breath and appeared nervous. Thereafter, the deputy summoned a drug-sniffing dog. The dog detected that drugs were in the vehicle. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed cocaine.
Appellant challenges both the initial stop and his subsequent detention. He alleges that the initial stop was improper because crossing the fog line three times, without endangering anyone, neither violates the single lane statute nor otherwise provides reasonable suspicion to justify a police stop. Appellant further contends that, after the initial stop, the deputy delayed the detention for an unreasonable length of time to give the drug-sniffing dog time to arrive and sniff Appellant’s car. In support of his first contention, Appellant relies on Jordan v. State, 831 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), and Crooks v. State, 710 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). However, Jordan and Crooks are distinguished. The relevant statute relating to the operation of a vehicle within a lane states in pertinent part as follows:
A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
§ 316.089(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis supplied). Unlike Jordan and Crooks, here there was evidence that Appellant deviated from his lane by more than what was practicable. To do so is a violation of the statute, irrespective of whether anyone is endangered. Furthermore, unlike Jordan and Crooks, here evidence was adduced that Appellant’s abnormal driving caused the deputy to suspect that Appellant was impaired or otherwise unfit to drive. We think his suspicion was well-founded, thereby justifying the stop, even in the absence of a traffic violation. See Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (weaving within lane and driving slower than posted speed justified stop based on reasonable suspicion of impairment, unfitness or vehicle defects, even absent a traffic violation); State v. Carrillo, 506 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (weaving within lane five times within one-quarter mile sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of impairment); Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (weaving several times sufficient to justify stop); State v. Davidson, 744 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (evidence of abnormal driving, albeit not amounting to a traffic violation, justified stop based on reasonable suspicion of impairment); State v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (using lane as “marker” to position vehicle and slowing to 30 miles per hour sufficient to justify stop based on suspicion of impairment or defects in vehicle).
As to Appellant’s' second point, we conclude that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining that the stop was not extended for an unreasonable length of time. See Maxwell v. State, 785 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON and ORFINGER, JJ„ concur. . The white line on the right-hand side of the road.
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Cited By (15 total)
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Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…. State, 732 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (weaving several times within a single lane held sufficient to justify a stop where there was no evidence to show endangerment to others and where no traffic violation had occurred); Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25, 26-27 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (where an officer observes a driver cross the white line on the right side of the road three times within a mile, each time crossing the line by approximately one-half of the vehicle’s width, provided sufficient evidence t…
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State v. Rodriguez, 904 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…sence of a traffic infraction when the vehicle is being operated in an unusual manner. Ndow v. State, 864 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). A legitimate concern for the safety of the public can warrant such a stop. Id.; see also Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25, 26-27 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding vehicle’s abnormal movement in crossing fog line three times within one mile justified stop), review denied, 889 So. 2d 73 (Fla.2004); State v. Carrilo, 506 So. 2d 495, 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (holding stop justif…
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State v. Jones, 935 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ven when there is no violation of vehicular regulations and no citation is issued.”).2 And there is no requirement that operation of a vehicle create a risk to others to support a valid stop for failure to maintain a single lane. See Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25, 26-7 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (finding probable cause to support a stop and concluding that where an officer observes a driver cross the white line on the right side of the road three times “there was evidence that [the driver] deviated from his lane by…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DeSHONG, 603 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- State v. Carrillo, 506 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Esteen v. State, 503 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Garnet Crooks v. State, 710 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Brockington v. State, 506 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Maxwell v. State, 785 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Shamous Jordan v. State, 831 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- State v. Davidson, 744 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)