ALONZO T. BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a habitual offender sentence for cocaine possession with intent to sell because section 775.084(l)(a)(3) excludes controlled substance violations from habitual offender sentencing.
Habitual offender sentencing does not apply to violations of section 893.13 relating to possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell.
[1] Habitual offender sentencing under section 775.084(l)(a)(3) does not apply to violations of section 893.13 relating to possession of a controlled substance with intent to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was sentenced in 1995 for possession of cocaine with intent to sell and received a habitual offender sentence along with special conditions of p…
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BLUE, Judge.
In this belated appeal, Alonzo T. Brown argues that the trial court erred by imposing a habitual offender sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to sell and by imposing special conditions of probation that were not orally pronounced at sentencing. Brown was sentenced in 1995, prior to the July 1, 1996, effective date of the Criminal Appeals Reform Act. See Ch. 96-248, §§ 4, 9, at 954, 957, Laws of Fla.; Smith v. State, 714 So. 2d 1152, 1152 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
We reverse the habitual offender sentence for the possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Under section 775.084(l)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1995), habitual offender sentencing does not apply to violations of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1995), “relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance.” Thus, a habitual offender sentence is not allowed for possession with intent to sell. See Gregory v. State, 739 So. 2d 100, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). On remand for resentencing, the trial court shall orally pronounce any special conditions of probation that it seeks to impose. See Gregory.
Habitual offender sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to sell reversed; remanded for resentencing.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Penn v. State, 941 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…l. The trial court denied the claim as without merit. However, a defendant cannot be sentenced as a habitual felony offender for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. § 893.13(l)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2001); Brown v. State, 744 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Thus, the appellant raised a facially sufficient claim that counsel was deficient because there was a legitimate basis for objecting to the sentence imposed by the trial court and the appellant received an illegal sentence as a r…
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Roberts v. State, 753 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…he possession of controlled substances are exempt from habit-ualization; defendants sentenced for offenses relating to the sale of narcotics do not enjoy the benefit of this statutory exemption. See § 775.084(l)(a)3.; see also [*138] Brown v. State, 744 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reversing habitual felony offender sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to sell); Salters v. State, 781 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reversing habitual felony offender sentence for possession of cocaine). Thus, Robert…
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State v. Braley, 832 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…t Mr. Braley had previously received the benefit of a community control sentence. Without evidence of the need for restitution, the State argued, the court could not legally impose a downward departure sentence. We agree. [*256] In State v. Bernard, 744 So. 2d 1184, 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), this court observed that a critical problem exists when no evidence is presented to support a finding of a departure basis. Where the grounds for departure are provided solely through the representations of defense counsel,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gregory v. State, 739 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Smith v. State, 714 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)