XAVIER SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Xavier Smith appeals his conviction for battery of a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence. The court affirms the convictions but reverses the sentence due to a mathematical error in the sentencing guidelines scoresheet and strikes the investigative cost assessment.
The court held that the mathematical error in the scoresheet required reversal and resentencing, the disputed prior misdemeanor should not be included unless the State provides corroborating evidence, and the investigative cost assessment must be struck but may be reimposed if the State submits proper documentation and the trial court considers Smith's financial resources.
[1] A sentencing scoresheet containing a mathematical error that results in additional points, leading to a sentence above the recommended guidelines, requires reversal and r…
[2] A disputed prior offense may not be included in a sentencing guidelines scoresheet without the State providing corroborating evidence of the offense.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This mathematical error caused the trial court to sentence Smith above the recommended guidelines sentence.”
Establishes the basis for reversing the sentence due to the scoresheet calculation error
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence. He was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Scoresheet Calculation cases and more on FLexlaw
PARKER, Chief Judge.
Xavier Smith appeals the judgment adjudicating him guilty of battery of a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, and the corresponding sentence. We reverse the sentence and strike the investigative cost assessment.1 We affirm on all other issues raised by Smith.
Smith was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison on each count to run concurrently. This sentence represented the maximum recommended sentence under the sentencing guidelines scoresheet prepared by the State. Smith correctly argues that the scoresheet contains a mathematical error that resulted in two additional points on his sentencing guidelines scoresheet. This mathematical error caused the trial court to sentence Smith above the recommended guidelines sentence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to enter a new sentence based on a properly calculated scoresheet. See Angel Torres v. State, — So. 2d -, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1054 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr.22, 1998); Nantz v. State, 687 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), review denied, 695 So. 2d 700 (Fla.1997).
Smith also correctly argues that the trial court erred by including a disputed, prior misdemeanor offense in his sentencing guidelines seoresheet without requiring the State to provide corroborating evidence of the offense. When a defendant disputes a prior offense the sentencing court must either require the State to produce corroborating evidence of the offense or not consider the offense. See Baldwin v. State, 700 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Moss v. State, 581 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Spann v. State, 550 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Accordingly, at resentencing, we direct the trial court to not include the disputed misdemeanor offense in the new guidelines seoresheet, unless the State is able to produce corroborating evidence of it. See Baldwin, 700 So. 2d at 96; Spann, 550 So. 2d at 166.
Finally, Smith argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay $176 for investigative costs without referencing any statutory authority, and without requiring any documentation from the State to prove entitlement to said costs. While the record indicates that the statutory authority for the investigative costs was referenced in' the written judgment for fíne and costs, Smith is correct that the requisite documentation for the costs was lacking. See § 939.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1995) (renumbered as section 938.27 and amended, effective July 1, 1997); Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111, 116-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc); Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, we strike the $176 investigative costs. On remand, the trial court may reimpose these costs provided the State submits the appropriate documentation under section 938.27, Florida Statutes (1997), and after considering Smith’s financial resources. See Sutton, 635 So. 2d at 1033.
The convictions are affirmed. We reverse Smith’s sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
QUINCE and WHATLEY, JJ., concur. . Smith was sentenced on June 5, 1996, just prior to the July 1, 1996, effective date of the "Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996.” Therefore, the preservation of the alleged error is not a factor in deciding these issues.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Brown v. State, 744 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…ial conditions of probation that were not orally pronounced at sentencing. Brown was sentenced in 1995, prior to the July 1, 1996, effective date of the Criminal Appeals Reform Act. See Ch. 96-248, §§ 4, 9, at 954, 957, Laws of Fla.; Smith v. State, 714 So. 2d 1152, 1152 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We reverse the habitual offender sentence for the possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Under section 775.084(l)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1995), habitual offender sentencing does not apply to violations of secti…
-
Diaz v. State, 901 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…2116 by entering an amended judgment and sentence omitting the prosecution costs and investigative costs that had appeared in the original judgment and sentence. See § 938.27(1); Ortiz v., State, 884 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Smith v. State, 714 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). However, the trial court failed to address the motion as it related to case number 03-4492; thus, as to that case, the motion was deemed denied. See O’Neill v. State, 841 So. 2d 629, 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Because the pros…
-
State v. Leeroy Wayne Barfield, 995 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…he burden of producing competent evidence of the disputed conviction” and the prior conviction must be proven by evidence, not just argument by the prosecutor). The same burden of proof applies for proof of [*1140] prior offenses. In Smith v. State, 714 So. 2d 1152, 1152-53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the Second District recognized that if the State wants to use a prior offense in sentencing, it must produce corroborating evidence. Specifically, the court held that “[w]hen a defendant disputes a prior offense the sent…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Baldwin v. State, 700 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Moss v. State, 581 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Nantz v. State, 687 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Vincent v. Hamilton, 550 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Spann v. State, 550 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)