STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE CHAMBERLAIN, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the trial court's refusal to classify and sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender. The appellate court held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act applies to burglary of unoccupied dwellings, contrary to the trial court's interpretation, and reversed and remanded for resentencing.
The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act applies to burglary of an unoccupied dwelling; the dwelling need not be occupied for the offense to qualify an offender for prison releasee reoffender status. The trial court erred in ruling the Act inapplicable.
[1] A stipulation to a sentence imposed after a court has ruled against the applicability of a statute is sufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of the statute's applica…
[2] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act may be applied to offenses committed after the Act's effective date, regardless of the offender's release date from prison.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the State did stipulate to the sentencing, that was only because the court had already ruled that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act did not apply. Consequently, when the State stipulated to the sentence imposed, it did so subject to its objection to the court's ruling on the applicability of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, specifically objecting for purposes of appeal.”
Establishes that the State properly preserved the issue for appeal despite stipulating to the sentence, as the stipulation was conditioned on preserving the objection.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeorge Chamberlain was convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling on July 21, 1997, after his release from prison. The trial court ruled that the…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
The State challenges appellee’s sentencing, arguing that the court should have classified and sentenced appellee as a prison releasee reoffender. We agree and reverse.
We dispose of the jurisdictional issues first. Citing to the State’s stipulated agreement to the sentence imposed, appel-lee argues that by agreeing to the sentencing, the State did not properly object for purposes of the Criminal Appeal Reform Act, thus precluding this court from exercising jurisdiction. We cannot agree. Although the State did stipulate to the sentencing, that was only because the court had already ruled that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act did not apply. Consequently, when the State stipulated to the sentence imposed, it did so subject to its objection to the court’s ruling on the applicability of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, specifically objecting for purposes of appeal. Wé believe this was sufficient to preserve the issue for review.
Appellant has also raised the ultimate applicability of the Prison Releasee Reof-fender Act to appellee given the timing of appellee’s release from prison. However, the date of appellee’s release from prison is not the determinative date for purposes of the Act. See Arnold v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1834, — So. 2d -, 1999 WL 565862 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug.4, 1999). Since appellee committed his new offenses on July 21, 1997, after the May 30, 1997 effective date of the Act, the Act may be applied to appellee.
Appellee’s first substantive argument at trial concerning the Prison Re-leasee Reoffender Act was that the Act violated the single subject rule. However, appellee abandoned that argument when he discovered that the judge had found the Act inapplicable to another defendant because of the “occupied structure or dwelling” language in the Act. See § 775.082(9)(a) 1.q., Fla. Stat. (1997). Ap-pellee then argued that the Act should be found inapplicable to him for the same reason. He reasoned that since he was convicted of burglary of a dwelling that was unoccupied, and the Act required that the burglary be of an occupied dwelling in order to apply, the Act did not apply to him. The court agreed with appellee. The State and appellee then stipulated to a ten-year sentence of appellee as a habitual felony offender. This court has since ruled in State v. White, 736 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does apply to a sentence for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. In other words, the dwelling need not be occupied for the offense to qualify the offender for prison releasee reoffender status. Since appel-lee’s entry into an unoccupied dwelling did not save him from application of the Act, we conclude that the trial court (without the benefit of our ruling in State v. White) erred in ruling that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act did not apply to appellee.
Having concluded that the court erred in refusing to classify appellee as a prison releasee reoffender, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
PATTERSON, C.J. and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.
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State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001)…f the crime for purposes of sentencing when it is not an element of the crime for purposes of conviction. Therefore, we hold that burglary of a dwelling, whether occupied or not, is a qualifying offense under the Act.”) (citing State v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State v. White, 736 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). A “dwelling” is directly and unmistakably connected with the thought of human habitation as opposed to a structure which falls into a totally different category. In my v…
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Dax Anthony Rodriguez v. State, 773 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…both structure and dwelling.” Thus, burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not one of the enumerated offenses and PRR is not applicable to sentencing for a conviction on that charge. We agree with this decision and disagree with State v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) and Fores-ta v. State, 751 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. granted, 767 So. 2d 456 (Fla.2000). We therefore certify conflict with the Second and First District Courts of Appeal on this point. It is axiomatic that “ ‘penal statut…
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Medina v. State, 751 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…ment of the crime for purposes of sentencing when it is not an element of the crime for purposes of conviction. Therefore, we hold that burglary of a dwelling, whether occupied or not, is a qualifying offense under the Act. See State v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State v. White, 736 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We recognize that the Fourth District recently receded from its prior decisions on this issue. See State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (en banc). The Fo…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. White, 736 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)