DAX ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dax Anthony Rodriguez appealed the denial of his post-conviction motion challenging his sentencing under both the habitual offender statute and the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act (PRR). The court reversed, holding that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling does not qualify as an enumerated offense under PRR, and remanded for resentencing.
Burglary of an unoccupied dwelling does not qualify as an enumerated offense under PRR because the word 'occupied' in the statute modifies both 'structure' and 'dwelling.' Therefore, PRR sentencing is not applicable to Rodriguez's conviction, and his case must be remanded for resentencing.
[1] A penal statute must be strictly construed according to its letter.
[2] Where a penal statute contains an ambiguity, the construction that favors life or liberty is to be preferred.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter”
Establishes the foundational principle that ambiguous criminal statutes are interpreted narrowly and in favor of the defendant
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRodriguez was charged with burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and grand theft. He pled guilty to both counts. The trial court sentenced him under both…
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RAMIREZ, J.
The defendant, Dax Anthony Rodriguez, appeals the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to rule 3.850, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure, complaining that the judge improperly sentenced him both under the habitual offender statute and under the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998)[PRR]. Because the offenses to which Rodriguez pled guilty do not qualify for PRR sentencing, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
Rodriguez was charged by Information with one count of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and one count of grand theft. The state correctly concedes error as to the grand theft count, as the maximum he could have received was ten years in prison. See § 775.084(4)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.l998)(ten years is the maximum sentence for a third-degree felony for a habitual offender). Grand theft is not an enumerated offense under PRR. The state, however, argues that Rodriguez can be sentenced under PRR under count one. We disagree.
There is a conflict in the districts as to whether burglary of an unoccupied dwelling qualifies for PRR treatment.
Section 775.082(8)(a) enumerates “[bjurglary of an occupied structure or dwelling” as applicable for sentencing under PRR. In State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215, 1216-17 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, 761 So. 2d 332 (Fla.2000) the Fourth District unanimously held in its en banc decision that “[bjecause of the rule of lenity codified in section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1997), we conclude that the word ‘occupied’ found in section 775.082(8)(a)(l)(q) modifies both structure and dwelling.” Thus, burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not one of the enumerated offenses and PRR is not applicable to sentencing for a conviction on that charge.
We agree with this decision and disagree with State v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) and Fores-ta v. State, 751 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. granted, 767 So. 2d 456 (Fla.2000). We therefore certify conflict with the Second and First District Courts of Appeal on this point.
It is axiomatic that “ ‘penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter.’ ” McFadden v. State, 737 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla.1999) (quoting Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla.1991)).
This is a venerable principle. See, e.g., Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734, 23 So. 552, 555 (1897) ([‘Wjhere a statute of this kind [penal statute] contains such an ambiguity as to leave reasonable doubt of its meaning, where it admits of two constructions, that which operates in favor of life or liberty is to be preferred.”).
As Judge Hazouri wrote in State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d at 1216, the legislature could easily have stated “burglary of a dwelling or occupied structure.” Alternatively, the statute could have enumerated “burglary of an occupied structure or an occupied or unoccupied dwelling.” Having failed to do either, we must choose the interpretation most lenient to the defendant.
Reversed and remanded. Direct conflict certified.
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Philome Mondesir v. State, 814 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…ed for in this subsection consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense. . Even so much as a doubt on this question would be resolved under the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant. See Rodriguez v. State, 773 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). . The defendant need not be present when this is accomplished below.…
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Delsol v. State, 837 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…ns set forth in Rodriguez v. State, No. 02-1479, 826 So. 2d 464(Fla. 3d DCA 2002), we disagree. Affirmed. GODERICH and SORONDO, JJ., concur. SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge (dissenting in part). Applying the rule of lenity, as we must, Rodriguez v. State, 773 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), review denied, 817 So. 2d 850 (Fla.2002), and the maxim of noscitur a sociis, as we should, see Ex parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927), I believe that because all of the crimes listed in section 776.081 are of a violent nat…
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State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…DCA 2001)(concluding that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling was not an enumerated offense under the PRRPA); See Roundtree v. State, 786 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Cruz-Bertances v. State, 786 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Rodriguez v. State, 773 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). [*1044] The State characterizes statutory amendments made to section 775.082(9)(a)(l), effective July 1, 2001, as solely a “clarification” of existing law,2 thus permitting the PRRPA sentencing sought in the instant case. We cann…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991)
- Ex-Parte E. W. Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 (Fla. 1897)
- State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Newcomb v. Anne Pennoyer Newcomb, 751 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- McFADDEN v. State, 737 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1999)
- State v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)