WILLIAM LEE TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a life sentence imposed during resentencing because the trial court failed to appoint counsel for the defendant or ensure his presence at the resentencing hearing, violating due process requirements established in Griffin v. State.
The trial court's resentencing was error. A full resentencing proceeding must include the presence of the defendant and his attorney, as the pronouncement of sentence is a critical stage of proceedings to which all due process guarantees attach.
[1] A defendant has a due process right to be present at a sentencing proceeding, including a re-sentencing after a prior sentence has been vacated.
[2] A defendant has a right to counsel at a re-sentencing proceeding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By re-sentencing we mean a full sentencing proceeding which necessarily includes the presence of the defendant and his or her attorney.”
Establishes the fundamental requirement that resentencing must include the defendant's presence and legal representation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Lee Taylor was convicted of kidnapping and originally sentenced to 134 years in prison. This Court previously reversed that sentence in Taylor…
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PER CURIAM.
As pertinent to this appeal, William Lee Taylor, defendant, was convicted of kid- naping as charged in Count II of the Information filed against him by the State of Florida. He was originally sentenced to serve one hundred thirty four (134) years in the State prison for this crime. In Taylor v. State, 701 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), this Court reversed that sentence because the crime had been committed after October 1, 1983, and the trial court was therefore limited in sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment or a term of imprisonment not exceeding forty (40) years. See § 775.082(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This Court reversed and remanded with instructions to re-sentence the defendant.
Upon remand the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without appointing counsel to represent him at sentencing and without the defendant present. This was error. In Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1987), the Supreme Court of Florida established the following requirements where the defendant’s original sentence is vacated and the defendant is to be re-sentenced.
By re-sentencing we mean a full sentencing proceeding which necessarily includes the presence of the defendant and his or her attorney. The pronouncement of sentence upon a criminal defendant is a critical state of the proceedings to which all due process guarantees attach whether the sentence is the immediate result of adjudication of guilt or, as here, the sentence is the result of an order directing the trial court to re-sentence the defendant, (citations omitted). The presence of the defendant is as necessary at re-sentencing as it was at the time of the original sentence so that the defendant has the opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the sentence if warranted unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
Id. at 670. The State concedes that Griffin requires that the sentence imposed by the trial court be reversed and that the matter be remanded for re-sentencing.
The life sentence imposed upon the defendant is accordingly vacated. This case is remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing. The lower court will appoint counsel to represent the defendant and ensure the defendant’s presence at sentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Yoany Barcelo v. State, 774 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…also Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Fla.2000); Brice v. State, 770 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We note that an indigent defendant also is entitled to appointment of counsel at sentencing. See Scott, 439 So. 2d at 221; Taylor v. State, 745 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(citing Griffin v.. State, 517 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla.1987)). GUNTHER, STONE, and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.…
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Price v. State, 838 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…nstead of first-degree felonies even though maximum sentence was greater). In addition, we note that if the trial court wishes to increase Price’s sentence, the defendant’s presence is required at the resentencing hearing. See e.g., Taylor v. State, 745 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) citing Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1987). At resentencing, the court is also instructed to correct the retention of jurisdiction provision by eliminating retention over count one; and to have the sentences in this…
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Smith v. State, 820 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…d the Public Defender’s office to represent the defendant on appeal. The State correctly concedes that re-sentencing the defendant without the benefit of counsel was error. See Barcelo v. State, 774 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Taylor v. State, 745 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Accordingly, we remand this case for re-sentencing, at which time the defendant will be present and represented by the Public Defender. Reversed and remanded.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1987)
- Taylor v. State, 701 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- State v. Ward, 701 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)