THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
OTIS GREEN, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's order dismissing a habitual traffic offender charge and reducing it to driving with a suspended license. The appellate court reversed, holding that a defendant's revoked license does not automatically restore after the five-year revocation period expires without affirmative petition for reinstatement, and therefore the defendant remained a habitual traffic offender when charged in 1998.
A habitual traffic offender's revoked license does not automatically restore upon expiration of the five-year revocation period. The defendant must affirmatively petition the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for restoration of driving privileges. Because Green never sought reinstatement, his license remained revoked and his habitual traffic offender status persisted.
[1] A driver classified as a habitual traffic offender whose license is revoked remains revoked beyond the minimum revocation period until affirmative steps are taken to seek…
[2] The expiration of the statutory minimum revocation period for a habitual traffic offender does not automatically restore driving privileges.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the defendant was a habitual traffic offender, his driver's license was revoked, and he was not eligible to be relicensed for a minimum of five years from the date of revocation.”
Establishes the five-year minimum ineligibility period for habitual traffic offenders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn August 30, 1989, Otis Green was classified as a habitual traffic offender and his driver's license was revoked with a projected expiration date of …
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals an order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss and reducing the charge of driving as a “Habitual Traffic Offender” to driving with a suspended license. We reverse and remand.
On August 30, 1989, Otis Green, the defendant, was classified as a habitual traffic offender, and his driver’s license was revoked. The defendant’s record listed the projected expiration of the revocation as August 29, 1994, five years from the revocation. On February 4, 1998, the defendant was charged with unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes. The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that his status as a habitual traffic offender expired on August 29, 1994, even though he never sought reinstatement of his driving privilege. The trial court granted the motion and reduced the charge to driving with a suspended license.
The trial court erred in reducing the charge. Because the defendant was a habitual traffic offender, his driver’s license was revoked, and he was not eligible to be relicensed for a minimum of five years from the date of revocation. Fla. Stat. § 322.27(5) (1997); see Lord v. Davis, 288 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (holding that habitual traffic offender not entitled to have driving privileges restored until expiration of five year revocation period). Florida Statutes section 322.01(35)(1997) defines revocation as “the termination of a licensee’s privilege to drive.” Cf. Fla. Stat. § 322.01(39) (1997) (defining suspension as “the temporary withdrawal of a licensee’s privilege to drive a motor vehicle.”) After the revocation period expires, the defendant must petition the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for restoration of driving privileges, and the department conducts an investigation into the fitness of the petitioner. Fla. Stat. § 322.331 (1997).
When the defendant’s license was revoked, his driving privileges were terminated, not temporarily withdrawn for the five-year period. When the five-year revocation period expired, the defendant’s driver’s license did not magically reappear. Although he was eligible to get his license restored, he needed to take affirmative steps to get his driving privileges reinstated. Because he never sought reinstatement of his driving privileges, his license remained revoked even past the expiration of the five-year period.
For the above reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order reducing the charge to driving with a suspended license and remand with directions to reinstate the charge of unlawful driving as a habitual traffic offender. REVERSED and REMANDED.
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Blandin v. State, 976 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…ed” under section 322.34(5), and his conviction for driving while licensed revoked and admission to a violation of probation based on that conduct was proper. The Third District has reached the same conclusion under similar facts in State v. Green, 747 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). In Green, the defendant’s license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender. Id. at 1007. Over three years after the statutory revocation period expired, the defendant was charged with driving as a habitual traffic offender purs…
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Long v. State, 761 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Green, 747 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). PETERSON, GRIFFIN and SAWAYA, JJ., concur.…
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State v. Tarman, 917 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…court’s frustration with the unfortunate administrative procedures that caused a two-year delay in the State of Florida revoking Tar-man’s license, it does not change the fact that Tarman was still driving with a revoked license. See State v. Green, 747 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (a driver’s license remains revoked until the driver takes affirmative steps to get driving privileges reinstated). Further, the question of whether probable cause exists involves “whether the information relied upon by the state…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Erznoznik v. City OF Jacksonville, 288 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)