GARRETT JOHNS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Garrett Johns appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual battery. The court affirmed the conviction as supported by sufficient evidence but reversed the sentence, finding that the trial court erroneously believed it lacked discretion in sentencing Johns as a prison releasee reoffender under Florida Statute 775.082.
The State presented sufficient evidence to support the sexual battery conviction. However, the trial court erred in concluding it lacked sentencing discretion; under Florida law, a trial court has discretion whether to impose a sentence as a prison releasee reoffender.
[1] A trial court retains discretion to determine whether to sentence a defendant as a prison releasee reoffender.
[2] A conviction will be affirmed if the State presented sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we held that a trial court has discretion to impose a sentence as a prison releasee reoffender or not”
Establishes the core legal holding that sentencing courts retain discretion in prison releasee reoffender cases, contrary to the trial court's conclusion.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGarrett Johns was convicted of sexual battery. At sentencing, the trial court determined that Johns met the criteria under section 775.082, Florida St…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prison Releasee Reoffender Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
CASANUEVA, Judge.
Garrett Johns appeals his conviction and sentence for sexual battery. He first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case, and, second, that the trial court erred in concluding it had no sentencing discretion. As to the first issue we affirm, finding that the State presented a prima facie case.
However, Mr. Johns raises a meritorious sentencing issue and we reverse as to that issue only. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that Mr. Johns met the criteria of section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997), so as to be qualified for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender. Concluding that under this statute it had no sentencing discretion, the trial court sentenced Mr. Johns to fifteen years incarceration. In Coleman v. State, 739 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), review granted 737 So. 2d 551 (Fla.1999), we held that a trial court has discretion to impose a sentence as a prison releasee reoffender or not.
Therefore, we reverse the sentence in this cause, hastening to point out that at the time of Mr. Johns’s sentencing, the trial court had the benefit of neither Cotton nor Coleman.
We note that two of our sister courts do not share our view. See McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), and Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
We affirm the conviction for sexual battery, reverse the sentence imposed, and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which time the trial court may impose whatever legal sentence it determines in its discretion is appropriate.
WHATLEY, A.C.J., and DAVIS, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Kirkendall v. State, 749 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…DCA 1999), this court upheld the constitutionality of the reoffender act; accordingly, we affirm. Next, Mr. Kirkendall asserts that the trial court possessed unbridled discretion in imposing his sentence. Mr. Kirkendall argues that Johns v. State, 750 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), extended the discretion afforded a trial court at sentencing when section 775.082(8) is involved. Without hesitation, we reject that contention. In State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), and later in Coleman v. Sta…
-
State v. Garrett Johns, 786 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2001)…LEWIS, J. We have for review Johns v. State, 750 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We vacate the decision of the district court and remand for reconsideration upon application of our decisions in Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000); State v. Cotto…
Authorities Cited
- Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Jewell F. Raimondo v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Coleman v. State, 739 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)