THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DEBRA WEBB, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals the suppression of a blood alcohol test administered to a motorist involved in an accident causing serious bodily injury. The court affirms the suppression, holding that absent probable cause to believe the driver was under the influence, the blood test violated statutory requirements even though the accident caused serious injuries.
The blood alcohol test was properly suppressed. Although section 316.1933 permits blood testing when an officer has probable cause to believe a driver under the influence caused serious bodily injuries, the statute requires probable cause that the driver was under the influence. Here, there was no evidence the officer had such probable cause, and the test was ordered merely as standard operating procedure, not pursuant to statutory requirements.
[1] A driver's consent to a blood alcohol test under an implied consent statute is strictly construed.
[2] Evidence obtained from a blood test beyond the scope of limited consent granted under an implied consent statute is subject to suppression.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the accident in this case resulted in serious bodily injuries there is absolutely no evidence in the record before us that the officer who ordered the blood to be drawn from the appellee had any probable cause to believe that she was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, chemical or controlled substance at the time of the accident.”
Establishes that while the serious bodily injury element was satisfied, the essential requirement of probable cause that the driver was under the influence was completely absent
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDebra Webb was involved in an automobile accident that caused serious bodily injury to another motorist. A law enforcement officer ordered a blood alc…
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GREEN, J.
The state appeals an order suppressing the results of a blood alcohol test administered to the appellee motorist pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1995), after she was involved in an automobile accident causing serious bodily injury to another motorist. We affirm.
Section 316.1933(1) provides that if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a motor vehicle driven by a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages has caused the death or serous bodily injuries to a human being, such person shall submit to a blood alcohol test. See White v. State, 492 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Although the accident in this case resulted in serious bodily injuries there is absolutely no evidence in the record before us that the officer who ordered the blood to be drawn from the appellee had any probable cause to believe that she was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, chemical or controlled substance at the time of the accident. The officer who ordered the blood to be drawn from the appellee did not testify at the suppression hearing. Although the state is certainly correct that this officer could have properly relied upon the observations made by another officer at the scene to establish his probable cause, see State v. Johnson, 695 So. 2d 771, 774 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (holding that “[ajlthough it may be hearsay, a police officer is justified in relying on what he or she is told by a fellow officer, in such instances to establish probable cause”) (citing Henninger v. State, 667 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)), there is no record evidence that this is what occurred in this case. In fact, the record evidence affirmatively reflects that the appellee’s blood was ordered to be drawn as nothing more than a standard operating procedure in an accident involving serious bodily injuries.
Thus, because the appel-lee’s blood alcohol test was not ordered in accordance with the statutory requirements of section 316.1933, we conclude that the trial court properly suppressed the results of the test in this case. See Dorman v. State, 492 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); White, 492 So. 2d at 1164.
Affirmed.
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State v. Liles, 191 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…associated with different blood alcohol levels and the testing methods. The mandate found in section 316.1933 is á directive to law enforcement to perform the test. See State v. Serrago, 875 So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing State v. Webb, 753 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)). . The Court reiterated that the question pf the reasonableness of a warrantless search should be answered on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of the circumstances. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1563. McNeely identified cer…
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State v. Serrago, 875 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…blood sample are not options....” Id. at 780. In view of these provisions, we conclude that the statutorily-required request is not a request for the consent of the person to be tested; it is a request that the test be performed. See State v. Webb, 753 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). In the context of this statute, the officer’s request is the proverbial “offer that one cannot refuse.” Having found no merit in the two reasons offered by the trial court for not applying section 316.1933, and finding that the…
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State v. Salle-Green, 93 So. 3d 1169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…requesting the legal blood draw or that Nurse Bell had informed him Salle-Green’s medical blood test showed an alcohol level above the legal limit. Therefore, the trial court properly suppressed the legal blood draw test results. See State v. Webb, 753 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (affirming the trial court’s suppression of legal blood test results where there was no evidence that the officer, before ordering the blood draw, had probable cause to believe that the driver was under the influence of any substa…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Johnson, 695 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Karlan v. Karlan, 492 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- White v. State, 492 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Henninger v. State, 667 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)