SHURGARD STORAGE CENTERS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
MARCELLE PARKER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Shurgard Storage Centers appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to vacate a default judgment entered against it for $122,749 in a negligent misrepresentation case. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that Shurgard demonstrated excusable neglect due to administrative mishandling and misrouting of the complaint between corporate offices, and that Shurgard had a meritorious defense on the merits.
The court reversed and remanded, holding that Shurgard demonstrated excusable neglect as a result of a system gone awry when its administrative mishandling and misrouting of the complaint between Denver and Miami offices prevented timely response, and that Shurgard presented a meritorious defense regarding insurance coverage.
[1] A default judgment may be vacated upon a showing of excusable neglect, provided the movant demonstrates a meritorious defense and files a timely application.
[2] Administrative mishandling or misrouting of a complaint between corporate offices, resulting in a system failure, can constitute excusable neglect.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We reverse because the affidavits presented to the trial court in support of the motion to vacate demonstrated Shurgard's administrative mishandling and misrouting of the complaint between corporate offices in Denver and Miami such that a clear case of excusable neglect as a result of a system gone awry has been shown.”
This establishes the primary reason for reversal—that Shurgard demonstrated excusable neglect through administrative error and system failure.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarcelle Parker rented a Ryder moving van from Shurgard to transport her household items from California to Florida. The van and its contents were sto…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Clerical Error cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s motion to vacate a default and default judgment. We reverse.
The dispute in the instant case arose out of appellee’s rental of a Ryder moving van from Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. in California for a move from there to Florida. During the course of the move from California to Florida, the Ryder van was stolen in Houston, Texas, along with the renter’s/appellee’s possessions. The renter/ appellee, Marcelle Parker, brought suit against Ryder and Shurgard, alleging, among other things, Shurgard’s negligent misrepresentation that all of her household items were covered for any loss when, in fact, the policy covered only up to $25,000 worth of cargo and excluded any loss for theft.
Both Ryder and Shurgard were served with process by service on their resident agent in February 1998. While Ryder moved to dismiss, Shurgard did not file any response. Parker sought and obtained a clerk’s default and, ultimately, a default final judgment in her favor against Shurgard in the amount of $122,749.00. Five days later, Shurgard filed a motion to vacate the default and default judgment. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to vacate.
We reverse because the affidavits presented to the trial court in support of the motion to vacate demonstrated Shurgard’s administrative mishandling and misrouting of the complaint between corporate offices in Denver and Miami such that a clear case of excusable neglect as a result of a system gone awry has been shown.1 See Nationsbank, N.A. v. Regency Ctrs., Inc., 725 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 629 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). This court has previously stated that “[w]here inaction results from clerical or secretarial error, reasonable misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any other of the foibles to which human nature is heir, then upon timely application accompanied by a reasonable and credible explanation the matter should be permitted to be heard on the merits.” Gateway Am. Bank of Fla. v. Lucky Jet Corp., 720 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied sub nom. Hayslip v. Somero, 476 So. 2d 674 (1985)). Additionally, the answer filed with its affirmative defenses, which sets up a dispute as to whether the theft in question was covered, and if covered, permits a loss above the amount of $25,000, supplied a meritorious defense.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
KLEIN, STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ„ concur. . By contract, Ryder had agreed to indemnify Shurgard with regard to claims such as Parker’s. Shurgard initially and timely sent the complaint to Ryder's Miami office as it had done in the past. However, due to Ryder’s recent corporate restructuring, the claim should have been sent to Ryder in Denver. A Ryder employee in Miami immediately advised Shurgard of the change in policy and assured Shurgard that she would forward the documents by mail and facsimile to the Denver office. For reasons not clear in the record, Ryder’s Denver office did not receive the documents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Lloyd's Underwriter's AT London v. Ruby, Inc., 801 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…). It is an order granting a motion to vacate which is reviewed under a gross abuse of discretion standard. Id. McKinzie By & Through McKinzie v. Hollywood, Inc., 421 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Parker, 755 So. 2d 695, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we discussed the law applicable to this area: This court has previously stated that “[w]here inaction results from clerical or secretarial error, reasonable misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any other of the foibles…1 / 2
-
City OF Pembroke Pines v. Zitnick, 792 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…anted the motion to vacate allowing them the opportunity to be heard fully on the matter. We agree. This Court has recently addressed the issue of excusable neglect in the context of a motion to vacate. See Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Parker, 755 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In that case we reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate, and in so doing stated that “where inaction results from clerical or secretarial error, reasonable misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any other of the…
-
Sundarampillai Jeyanandarajan v. Freedman, 863 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…). It is an order granting a motion to vacate which is reviewed under a gross abuse of discretion standard. Id. McKinzie By & Through McKinzie v. Hollywood, Inc., 421 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Parker, 755 So. 2d 695, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this court stated what to consider when deciding whether to vacate a default: This court has previously stated that “[w]here inaction results from clerical or secretarial error, reasonable misunderstanding, a system gone a…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Glenna Somero and Robert Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 629 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Gateway Am. Bank OF Fla. v. Lucky JET Corp., 720 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Nationsbank, N.A. v. Regency Ctrs., Inc., 725 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)