JOHN MINGIONE, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIE MINGIONE, APPELLEE
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John Mingione appeals a circuit court order transferring venue of his alimony modification action from Broward County to Pinellas County. The Fourth District reverses, holding that the specific venue statute governing alimony modifications applies rather than the general venue statute, allowing the action to proceed in the county where the former husband resides.
The specific statute controlling venue for alimony modifications (section 61.14) applies to this action, not the general venue statute. Because Mingione seeks to decrease his alimony obligation to zero, his application falls within section 61.14, which permits a party to apply for modification in the circuit where either party resides.
[1] A specific statute governs venue over a modification of alimony when a more general venue statute also applies.
[2] A party seeking to terminate an alimony obligation based on cohabitation falls within the scope of a statute allowing modification of alimony orders or agreements.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The general statute does not control when a more specific statute also applies.”
Establishes the core legal principle governing the choice between section 47.011 (general venue) and section 61.14 (specific alimony modification venue statute)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a New Jersey divorce, John Mingione moved to Broward County and his former wife moved to Pinellas County. Mingione filed a petition in Browa…
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PER CURIAM.
John Mingione appeals a non-final order of the Broward County circuit court granting his former wife’s motion to transfer venue. We reverse.
Following the parties’ New Jersey divorce, the former husband moved to Bro-ward County and the former wife moved to Pinellas County. The former husband filed a petition in Broward County seeking to domesticate and modify the final judgment of divorce. The modification he sought was to terminate his alimony obligation pursuant to a provision of the parties’ agreement, incorporated in the divorce judgment, that alimony would cease “in the event of the wife’s remarriage, death, or cohabitation,” alleging that she had been cohabiting with a man for several months.
The trial court granted the former wife’s motion to transfer venue to the county of her residence, accepting her argument that section 47.011, Florida Statutes, the general venue statute, applied. The former husband had relied on section 61.14, a more particular statute which provides inter alia that a party may apply for a modification of an alimony order or agreement, decreasing or increasing the amount of alimony, by applying to the circuit court in the circuit in which either party resides. See § 61.14(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). The trial court concluded that the former husband was seeking to enforce the parties’ agreement, not to modify it. Compare Skinner v. Skinner, 678 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (reversing order denying transfer in accordance with section 47.011, where former wife filed a motion to domesticate and modify Alabama judgment in county in which she resided, because action was more of an enforcement than modification action, in that what wife sought was an escrow account from which to enforce the terms of the agreement requiring husband to pay alimony and for children’s college education, which she alleged that he had stopped paying).
In the instant case, however, it is clear that the former husband seeks an order that will decrease the amount of his alimony obligation to zero, and thus his application falls within the literal language of section 61.14. The general statute does not control when a more specific statute also applies. See Stewart v. Carr, 218 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).
Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal and remand for further proceedings.
SHAHOOD, GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Israel v. Israel, 874 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…a. 3d DCA 2002). Case law demonstrates that the proper procedure for dealing with a venue dispute in a post-dissolution modification proceeding is to file a motion to transfer in the court where the petition has been filed. See Mingione v. Mingione, 756 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (after husband filed motion for modification of alimony in Broward County, wife, who alleged venue was proper in Pinellas County, filed motion to transfer in Broward County, and not in Pinellas County); Thornburg v. Donovan, 866…
Authorities Cited
- Stewart v. Harriette E. Carr, 218 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Skinner v. Starlett C. Skinner, 678 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)