JOHN L. SKINNER, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STARLETT C. SKINNER, APPELLEE
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Appellant John Skinner challenged venue in a Florida family law action where his ex-wife filed in Palm Beach County seeking to domesticate and modify an Alabama divorce judgment. The court held that the specific venue statute for modification actions did not apply because the wife's complaint sought enforcement of existing alimony and support obligations rather than modification of their amounts, thus making general venue law controlling and requiring the case be transferred to Okaloosa County where the appellant resides.
The trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss for improper venue because section 61.14(1)'s venue provision applies only to actions seeking to increase or decrease support or alimony amounts. Since the wife's action sought enforcement of existing awards rather than modification, general venue law controlled, requiring the action to be brought in the county of the defendant's residence.
[1] A specific venue statute takes precedence over a general venue statute.
[2] Statutory construction requires adherence to the plain and unambiguous language of a statute.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 61.14(1) applies by its own terms to actions seeking a modification order "decreasing or increasing the amount" of alimony or support. The action brought by appellee seeks neither an increase nor a decrease of alimony or support but seeks only to secure the award already made.”
Establishes that the specific venue statute does not apply to enforcement actions, only to modification actions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' marriage was dissolved in Alabama. Both parties later moved to different parts of Florida. Appellee moved to Palm Beach County and filed …
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WARNER, Judge.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue. Appellee contends that under section 61.14(1), Florida Statutes (1995), venue is proper. Because this is not an action for an order decreasing or increasing the amount of support or alimony, we hold that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss for improper venue.
The parties’ marriage was dissolved in Alabama. Later both parties moved to different parts of Florida. The appellee/wife moved to Palm Beach County where she filed a complaint to domesticate and modify the Alabama judgments. Appellee alleged that appellant had stopped paying alimony and had refused to pay for the children’s college education as agreed in the parties’ settlement. The complaint did not seek an increase in alimony but rather sought to establish an escrow account from which the appellee could draw her alimony payments and the children could secure their college tuition.
Section 61.14(1) provides in pertinent part:
[E]ither party may apply to the circuit court of the circuit in jvhieh the parties, or either of them ... reside at the date of the application ... for an order decreasing or increasing the amount of support, maintenance, or alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires ....
§ 61.14(1) (emphasis supplied). This section is in conflict with the general venue statute, section 47.011, which provides that venue would lie in the appellant’s county of residence. A specific venue statute takes precedence over general venue law. Bryant v. Bryant, 566 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Nevertheless, a primary rule of statutory construction is that courts should not depart from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Dade County v. Pena, 664 So. 2d 959 (Fla.1995). Section 61.14(1) applies by its own terms to actions seeking a modification order “decreasing or increasing the amount” of alimony or support. The action brought by appellee seeks neither an increase nor a decrease of alimony or support but seeks only to secure the award already made. It is more of an enforcement action than a modification proceeding. As such, the venue provision of section 61.14(1) does not apply, and the general venue statute provides that the action should be brought in the county of defendant’s residence.
Reversed and remanded to transfer these proceedings to Okaloosa County.
KLEIN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
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Bogue v. The Honorable John E. Fennelly, 705 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ly when a statute is of doubtful meaning should matters extrinsic to the statute be considered in construing the language employed by the legislature. Capers v. State, 678 So. 2d 330, 332 (Fla.1996) (citations omitted); see also Skinner v. Skinner, 678 So. 2d 512, 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (primary rule of statutory construction is “courts should not depart from plain and unambiguous language of statute”). The vast majority of jurisdictions, including all of the state appellate courts considering the issue, h…
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Mingione v. Mingione, 756 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…ying to the circuit court in the circuit in which either party resides. See § 61.14(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). The trial court concluded that the former husband was seeking to enforce the parties’ agreement, not to modify it. Compare Skinner v. Skinner, 678 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (reversing order denying transfer in accordance with section 47.011, where former wife filed a motion to domesticate and modify Alabama judgment in county in which she resided, because action was more of an enforcement than modif…
Authorities Cited
- Dade Cnty. v. PEÑA, 664 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1995)
- Bryant v. Bryant, 566 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)