JEFFERY AUSTIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jeffery Austin appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence for armed kidnapping, arguing he was erroneously sentenced as a habitual offender for an offense that was not subject to habitualization under the 1991 statute. The court affirmed the denial of the first two grounds of the motion but reversed as to the third ground, holding that sentencing as a habitual offender for a life felony when the statute did not permit such sentencing constitutes an illegal sentence correctable under rule 3.800(a).
The court held that sentencing as a habitual offender for a life felony when the statute did not provide for such habitualization is an illegal sentence subject to correction under rule 3.800(a). The court expanded the definition of illegal sentences to include challenges to habitual sentences imposed on offenses not subject to habitualization as a matter of law.
[1] A sentence is illegal and subject to correction under rule 3.800(a) when a defendant is erroneously sentenced as a habitual offender for a life felony committed at a time…
[2] A challenge to the habitualization of a life felony, where the statute in effect at the time of the offense did not permit habitualization for such a felony, is cognizabl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[T]o be illegal within the meaning of rule 3.800(a) the sentence must impose a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.”
Establishes the broad standard for what constitutes an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAustin was sentenced as a habitual offender for the life felony of armed kidnapping committed in 1991. In 1991, the habitual offender statute did not …
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PER CURIAM.
Jeffery Austin appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm the denial as to the first two grounds of his motion, which were previously denied, see Raley v. State, 675 So. 2d 170, 173-74 (Fla. 5th DCA), cause dismissed, 678 So. 2d 1287 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 683 So. 2d 484 (Fla.1996), but we reverse the denial as to the third ground of his motion.
With respect to the third ground, the state concedes that appellant was erroneously sentenced as a habitual offender for the life felony of armed kidnapping, committed in 1991 when the habitual offender statute did not provide for habitual sentencing for life felonies. See §§ 787.01(2), 775.087(l)(a), & 775.084(4), Fla. Stat. (1991); Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992); Corbitt v. State, 697 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). However, the state argues that such a sentencing error does not create an . illegal sentence that may be corrected pursuant to a rule 3.800(a) motion, citing Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); and Bover v. State, 732 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
Considering Bover first, we find it in-apposite. In Bover, the third district concluded that a claim that the predicate offenses relied on to habitualize the defendant were not sequential must be brought under rule 3.850, not under rule 3.800, because the claim really is that the plea was involuntary or counsel was ineffective in not realizing that the offenses relied on for habitualization were not sequential. See 732 So. 2d at 1192. The court noted that habitual sentencing involves two aspects, the habitual adjudication and the habitual sentencing, and reasoned that the adjudication itself cannot be challenged under rule 3.800(a), but such a challenge-must be brought under rule B.850 within the two-year time limit, See id. at 1190-91.
The instant case, however, does not involve a challenge to the sufficiency of the predicate offenses. The third district, which issued Bover, has itself granted relief under rule 3.800(a) for a claim such as Appellant’s, see Beaudoin v. State, 658 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 664 So. 2d 248 (Fla.1995), and recently granted such relief in an analogous claim, that of improper habitualization for a drug possession charge when the statute does not allow such sentencing, see Marrero v. State, 741 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). So far as we can determine, the third district has not receded from Beaudoin, and the first, second, and fifth districts also all consider the habitualization of a life felony committed at a time when the statute did not permit habitualization for such an offense to be illegal and subject to correction pursuant to rule 3.800(a). See Sneed v. State, 754 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Young v. State, 716 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Summers v. State, 747 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
Although this erroneous sentence was not one of the types of illegal sentences enumerated in this court’s recent opinion in Blakley, in.which this court stated that the only kinds of illegal sentence challenges cognizable under the rule “are those that are illegal because they exceed the [statutory] maximum, ... those that were unconstitutionally increased after they had been imposed, and those for which no record, earned jail credit was given,” 746 So. 2d at 1187, we find the instant challenge still falls within this court’s more general language in Blakley that “[t]o be illegal within the meaning of rule 3.800(a) the sentence must impose a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.” Id. at 1186-87. We thus expand the list to include the challenge to a habitual sentence imposed on an offense that is not subject to habitualization as a matter of law, under any set of factual circumstances.
We reverse the summary denial as to this ground and remand for resentencing on the armed kidnapping count only. The trial court may exceed the sentencing guidelines in resentencing if there are valid grounds to do so. See Corbitt, 697 So. 2d at 1310; Grant v. State, 677 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
WARNER, C.J., DELL and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
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Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)…A 2000), the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Young v. State, 716 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998),1 and Nathan v. State, 689 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), and the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.2 The conflict issue is whether a habitual offender sentence imposed on a life felony may be corrected as illegal through a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Crimina…
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Blacker v. State, 49 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…tual offender sentencing imposed for an offense not subject to habitualization under any set of factual circumstances is cognizable in a Rule 3.800(a) motion as a matter of law. See Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1178 (Fla.2001); Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Likewise, Rule 3.800(a) may be used to challenge a sexual predator designation, so long as it is apparent from the face of record that the criteria for the designation were not met. Saintelien v. State, 990 So. 2d 494 (Fla.2008)…
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Weford v. State, 784 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…CA 2000). Under the 1993 version of the habitual offender statute, habitualization was not allowed for a life felony. Id. Accordingly, this cause is remanded for correction of the judgment and re-sentencing as to count two. See id.; Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Beaudoin v. State, 658 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The balance of the order denying defendant’s rule 3.800(a) motion is affirmed on several grounds. In Bover v. State, 732 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA), review granted, 74…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1992)
- Raley v. State, 675 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Bover v. State, 732 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Timothy v. Summers, 747 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Grant v. State, 677 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Young v. State, 716 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Marrero v. State, 741 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Sneed v. State, 754 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Selig v. Jonathan and Eleanor Heptinstall, 658 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)