TYRONE WEFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Tyrone Weford appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence imposed as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO). The court reversed in part, finding that burglary with an assault and firearm constitutes a life felony that cannot be subject to habitualization under the 1993 statute, but affirmed the denial as to his other claims.
The court held that burglary with assault and firearm constitutes a life felony under section 775.087(1)(a), which was not subject to habitualization under the 1993 statute, requiring reversal and resentencing on count two. The remaining claims fail because youthful offender sentences are permissible predicate offenses, only one predicate offense is necessary for HVFO adjudication, and the sequential conviction requirement does not apply.
[1] A youthful offender sentence may properly be considered a predicate offense for habitualization under Florida law.
[2] A youthful offender sentence is an adult sanction for purposes of habitual offender sentencing.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where the jury makes specific findings that a defendant is guilty of burglary with an assault or battery, as well as with a firearm, the offense is enhanced to a life felony under section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)”
Establishes the key legal distinction that burglary with both assault and firearm is a life felony, not a first-degree felony
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and burglary with an assault and firearm. He was sentenced to concurrent fifteen-year terms as an HV…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Life Felony Enhancement cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Tyrone Weford (defendant) appeals from the denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Defendant was convicted of one count of robbery with a firearm and one count of burglary with an assault, with a firearm, and sentenced to concurrent fifteen year terms as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO).
He contends that his sentence is illegal because he was improperly classified as a HVFO, based upon three distinct claims: 1) burglary with an assault with a firearm, a life felony, was not subject to habitualization prior to the 1995 amendment to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1993); 2) prior juvenile adjudications of delinquency cannot be used as predicate offenses; and 3) prior sentences that were all imposed on the same date do not satisfy the sequential conviction requirement of section 775.084(5).
We reverse the denial of rule 3.800 relief as to the HVFO sentence imposed upon defendant for count two of the information, which charged a life felony. The judgment in the record incorrectly reflects that defendant was found guilty of a first degree felony.
Under section 810.02(2), Florida Statutes (1993), burglary is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender either “(a) [mjakes an assault or battery upon any person,” or “(b) [i]s armed, or arms himself within such structure or conveyance, with explosives or a dangerous weapon.” However, where the jury makes specific findings that a defendant is guilty of burglary with an assault or battery, as well as with a firearm, the offense is enhanced to a life felony under section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). See Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992); Lovett v. State, 773 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Under the 1993 version of the habitual offender statute, habitualization was not allowed for a life felony. Id.
Accordingly, this cause is remanded for correction of the judgment and re-sentencing as to count two. See id.; Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Beaudoin v. State, 658 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
The balance of the order denying defendant’s rule 3.800(a) motion is affirmed on several grounds. In Bover v. State, 732 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA), review granted, 743 So. 2d 508 (Fla.1999), this court held that rule 3.800(a) cannot be used as a vehicle to attack an HVFO adjudication and that such a claim must be brought under rule 3.850. Defendant’s second and third claims would be both time-barred and successive pursuant to rule 3.850.
Even if we were to reach the merits of defendant’s remaining claims, he is not entitled to relief. It was undisputed in the record that defendant qualified as a HVFO, as he had previously been convicted of robbery with a firearm within five years of the date of the instant offenses and he had not received a pardon or had his prior conviction set aside.
Moreover, the record reflects that defendant’s prior convictions were not adjudications of delinquency, but rather that he had been sentenced as a youthful offender. Prior sentencing as a youthful offender does not preclude consideration of defendant’s crimes as predicate offenses. See Whitfield v. Singletary, 730 So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
Additionally, while the sentences for the prior predicate offenses introduced into evidence by the state were all imposed on November 11, 1991, the sequential conviction requirement of section 775.084(5) is inapplicable to our analysis. Only one predicate offense was necessary for the trial court to adjudicate defendant as a habitual violent felony offender. See § 775.084(l)(b).
Accordingly, we affirm the order in part, reverse in part and remand with directions to correct the judgment and resentence defendant on count two only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
-
Antoine L. McBRIDE v. State, 810 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) when the habitual offender statute in effect at the time of the defendant’s offense did not permit habitualization for life felonies.); State v. Knickerbocker, 616 So. 2d 33 (Fla.1993); Weford v. State, 784 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Moye. McBride alleges in the motion under review, which was filed in the circuit court on January 16, 2001, that his sentence as a habitual felony offender for the attempted first degree murder charge is illegal. The State conce…
-
Darian Williams v. State, 898 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…xplained in another of its decisions, “A defendant needs only one qualifying prior conviction in order to be sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender.” Hall v. State, 821 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citation omitted); see Weford v. State, 784 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Daniels v. State, 634 So. 2d 187, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Since only one qualifying felony is needed for an HVFO adjudication, it does not matter if the qualifying felony was sentenced together with, or separate from, other…
-
Mills v. State, 889 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…PER CURIAM. Ryan Mills appeals from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. We affirm. § 775.084(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); Weford, v. State, 784 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1992)
- Bover v. State, 732 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Lovett v. State, 773 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Whitfield v. Singletary, 730 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Selig v. Jonathan and Eleanor Heptinstall, 658 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Beaudoin v. State, 658 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)