ROBERT F. MEDINA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Medina appeals his burglary sentence imposed under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, arguing the Act is unconstitutional, his sentence was mispronounced, and burglary of an unoccupied dwelling does not qualify under the Act. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed his sentence, holding that occupancy is not an element of burglary of a dwelling and therefore is irrelevant to sentencing eligibility under the Act.
Burglary of a dwelling, whether occupied or unoccupied, qualifies as an offense under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. Since occupancy is no longer an element of the crime of burglary of a dwelling under Florida law, it cannot be an element for sentencing purposes.
[1] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is constitutional.
[2] A trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence is deemed consistent with the written sentence if the record supports such consistency.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“occupancy is no longer an element of the crime of burglary of a dwelling”
Establishes the foundational legal principle that occupancy was removed as a required element by statutory amendment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMedina was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and sentenced pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. The dwelling he burglarized was unoccupie…
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PER CURIAM.
Robert F. Medina (Medina) appeals his sentence for burglary of a dwelling, which the trial court entered pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the Act), section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). Medina raises three issues, none of which has merit.
First, Medina argues that the Act is unconstitutional. Recently, this court addressed all of Medina’s constitutional challenges and found the Act constitutional. See Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
Second, Medina argues that the trial court’s oral pronouncement of his sentence was not consistent with the written sentence. After reviewing the record, we find the trial court’s oral pronouncement consistent with the written sentence.
Third, Medina argues that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not a qualifying offense under the Act. Medina points out that the Act lists “burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling” as a qualifying offense. § 775.082(8)(a)l.q., Fla. Stat. (1997). Medina contends that the term “occupied” modifies both structure and dwelling and therefore the only qualifying offense under the Act is burglary of an occupied dwelling. Since the evidence at his trial established that the dwelling he burglarized was unoccupied, Medina contends he should not have been sentenced under the Act.
In Perkins v. State, 682 So. 2d 1083, 1084-85 (Fla.1996), the supreme court stated that occupancy is no longer an element of the crime of burglary of a dwelling. By amending the statutory definition of “dwelling” to include any structure or conveyance “designed to be occupied by people,” the legislature gave equal protection to all dwellings regardless of their occupancy. Id. at 1084. Since occupancy is no longer an element of the offense of burglary of a dwelling, the jury is no longer asked to determine whether a dwelling is occupied or unoccupied when it determines whether burglary of a dwelling occurred. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 195. We fail to see how the occupancy of a dwelling can be an element of the crime for purposes of sentencing when it is not an element of the crime for purposes of conviction. Therefore, we hold that burglary of a dwelling, whether occupied or not, is a qualifying offense under the Act. See State v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State v. White, 736 So. 2d 1231, 1232 .(Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
We recognize that the Fourth District recently receded from its prior decisions on this issue. See State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (eh banc). The Fourth District now finds this provision of the Act ambiguous and is interpreting it as Medina suggests. Based on the supreme court’s decision in Perkins, we find no ambiguity in this provision of the Act. We, therefore, certify conflict with the Fourth District.
Affirmed.
PARKER, A.C.J., and BLUE and SALCINES, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
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State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001)…yances of any kind that are designed for human habitation. Hence, an empty house in a neighborhood is extended the same protection as one presently occupied.” 682 So. 2d at 1085. As observed by the Second District Court of Appeal in Medina v. State, 758 So. 2d 113, 113-14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), it is incongruous that the Legislature would intend “the occupancy of a dwelling [to] be an element of the crime for purposes of sentencing when it is not an element of the crime for purposes of conviction.” Medina, 758 S…
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Whiten v. State, 765 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…loot. [*310] The first and second districts have held that for the PRRA to apply, a dwelling does not have to be occupied at the time of the burglary because occupation is not an element of the offense of burglary of a dwelling. See Medina v. State, 758 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. granted, 760 So. 2d 947 (Fla.2000); Foresta v. State, 751 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. granted, No. SC00-428, 767 So. 2d 456 (Fla. May 23, 2000). See also Perkins v. State, 682 So. 2d 1083, 1084-85 (Fla.1996). The fourth has h…
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Jones v. State, 824 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…ntence imposed for his conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. As the State properly concedes, this sentence cannot stand in light of State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla.2001) (disapproving this court’s decision in Medina v. State, 758 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), and holding that the prison releasee reoffender act does not apply to convictions for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling). Therefore, we reverse Jones’s sentence and remand for resentencing. Reversed and remanded. PARKER, SAL…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Ames v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Houston D. Perkins v. State, 682 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1996)
- State v. White, 736 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- State v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Medina v. State, 751 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)