THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DYLAN JO CURE, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court's decision to sentence a defendant to probation instead of the 21-36 months in prison specified in a boot camp agreement after the defendant violated the agreement by committing aggravated battery. The court held that while the defendant could not complain about enforcement of the agreement as written, the State cannot challenge the trial court's discretionary decision not to enforce it, and the probation sentence was permissible as a downward departure from guidelines when the prosecution itself had offered below-guidelines sentencing.
The State cannot interfere with or challenge the trial court's exercise of discretionary sentencing authority to decline enforcement of the boot camp agreement. Additionally, the probation sentence was proper because the prosecution itself had offered a below-guidelines sentence, giving the court authority to make an even greater downward departure.
[1] A state cannot challenge a trial court's discretionary decision not to enforce a sentencing agreement as written, even if the defendant breached the agreement.
[2] A defendant cannot complain if sentenced according to a sentencing agreement, but the state may not interfere with a trial court's discretion to deviate from such an agre…
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Establishes the core holding that the state cannot force enforcement of a sentencing agreement against the court's discretionary decision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant entered into a boot camp agreement with the state and court providing that if he violated its terms, he would be sentenced to 21-36 mont…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The defendant made a “boot camp agreement” with the state and court which provided that he would be sentenced to 21-36 months in state prison if he violated its terms. In fact, he did breach the agreement by committing an aggravated battery, but, on, the recommendation of both his probation officer and his boot camp supervisor, the trial court sentenced him only to a term of probation. On this appeal — the maintainability of which is in some doubt but will be assumed arguen-do — the state contends that the agreement must be enforced as written. There is no merit whatever to this claim. Although the defendant could not complain if he had been sentenced as agreed, see Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Clark v. State, 651 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(while lie detector-sentencing agreement was initially unenforceable for lack of mutuality of obligation, state and court’s performance rendered adverse terms binding on defendant), review denied, 660 So. 2d 712 (Fla.1995), this does not mean -that the state may interfere with or challenge an exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion not to enforce it. See Clark, 651 So. 2d at 1309; cf. Arriaga v. State, 666 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Arriaga, 666 So. 2d at 950 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
The state also rather offhandedly complains that the sentence of probation was improperly below the guidelines. While we might decline to consider the claim as insufficiently argued, it is, in any event, without substantial merit, because the prosecution itself offered a below guidelines sentence in return for the defendant’s plea. In these circumstances, it is well settled that the court is free to make an even greater downward departure. See Franquiz v. State, 682 So. 2d 536 (Fla.1996); State v. Devine, 512 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), review denied, 519 So .2d 988 (Fla.1987); State v. Collins, 482 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
Affirmed.
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State v. Swett, 772 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…es filed by the state. The appellate court added that the trial court could not, over the state’s objection, reduce the charge and accept a plea to the reduced charge. The supreme court approved the district court’s analysis. See also State v. Cure, 760 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(state cannot complain where trial court decides to ignore plea agreement and impose lesser sentence; no quid pro quo for agreement indicated). In the instant case, the plea was part of a deal whereby the prosecutor reduced the mu…
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State v. Rosario Aguilar, 775 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…and the defendant agree that a departure from the sentencing guidelines is appropriate, the extent of the departure is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See State v. Collins, 482 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); see also State v. Cure, 760 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). We can find no abuse of discretion on this record. Affirmed. . Gitto was subsequently disapproved in State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla.2000).…
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Lafave v. State, 149 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 2014)…led by the State, following the trial court’s failure to sentence a criminal defendant pursuant to a substantial assistance agreement previously approved by the trial court. Id. at 1181. In expressly receding from its prior opinion in State v. Cure, 760 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000),6 to the extent that it addressed the merits of the State’s argument in Jordan, Judge Green, writing for the majority, acknowledged the inequity involved where a district court is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction to enforce…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Domingo Antonio Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- State v. Collins, 482 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Franquiz v. State, 682 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1996)
- Arriaga v. State, 666 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- State v. Devine, 512 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Clark v. State, 651 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)