M.A., APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, APPELLEE
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Mother M.A. appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by denying her continuance motion when she could not be reached by phone before trial. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the mother had a duty to maintain contact with counsel after being notified to stay available on two hours' notice.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. The mother was aware she needed to remain available during the scheduled trial week on two hours' notice, and it was her duty to maintain contact with her counsel. Additionally, the mother had six weeks between the hearing and entry of judgment to seek relief by motion if she wished to have the record reopened or obtain other remedies.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for continuance when a party fails to remain in contact with their counsel and is unavailable for trial, e…
[2] A party has a duty to remain in contact with their counsel when aware of an impending trial date and the possibility of short notice for appearance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court correctly pointed out that the mother knew that she needed to be available for trial during the August 17 week on two hours' notice, and it was her duty to stay in touch with her counsel.”
Establishes that the mother had a duty to maintain contact with counsel after being notified of the trial schedule and two-hour notice requirement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court scheduled a final termination hearing for the week of August 17, 1999, and at a calendar call on August 2, instructed parties to be pr…
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PER CURIAM.
M.A. appeals a final judgment terminating her parental rights. We affirm.
The mother was represented in this case by appointed counsel. By pretrial order, the trial court scheduled the final hearing for the trial week of August 17, 1999. The court held a calendar call on August 2, which was attended by the mother and appointed counsel. At that time the case was placed on standby for the August 17 week, and the parties were instructed to be prepared to come to trial on two hours’ notice.
In the late afternoon on August 18,1999, the court contacted counsel to advise that the trial would begin the following morning. The mother’s counsel attempted to telephone her, but received a recording that the telephone had been disconnected.
The following morning counsel moved for a continuance because he had been unable to reach the mother by telephone. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the mother knew to stay in touch with counsel. Counsel advised the court that there was still a possibility that the mother would appear.1 The trial proceeded with appointed counsel participating on behalf of the mother, and the bench trial concluded the same day.2 The written judgment was entered six weeks later, and this appeal follows.
The mother’s claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the oral motion for continuance. We disagree. The trial court correctly pointed out that the mother knew that she needed to be available for trial during the August 17 week on two hours’ notice, and it was her duty to stay in touch with her counsel. See M.E. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 728 So. 2d 367, 368-69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
We note that six weeks elapsed between the conclusion of the final hearing and the entry of the final judgment. Certainly if the mother wished to have the record reopened so she could testify, or desired other relief, there was ample time for her to file an appropriate motion, or to file a motion for rehearing after the final judgment was entered in the case. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.265; M.E., 728 So. 2d at 369. She did not do so.
Concluding that no reversible error has been shown, the judgment is
Affirmed.
. The ba$is for counsel’s belief is not explained.
. The evidence indicated that the mother has a long-term alcohol abuse problem which resulted in the child being removed from her custody in 1991. After the mother completed a treatment program, the child was returned in 1994. The mother’s alcohol use resumed with severe adverse effect on the child, who was removed from the mother's custody again in 1998.
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R.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 860 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…rmination “may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live”). J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.2000). DCF, however, relying on M.A. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services, 760 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), and M.E. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services, 728 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), claims that the default and subsequent final judgment were proper. DCF argues that the father’s “failure” to maintain reasonable con…
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N.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 960 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…y. Fla. R. Juv. P 8.225(c)(4). The cases relied on by DCF involved notices and papers filed after the initial petition. L.W. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 829 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); M.A. v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 760 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); M.E. v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 728 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). None of these cases involve the service of initial process. DCF also argues that the mother’s failure to appear at the filing hearing on August 1 co…
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L.W. and P.G. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 829 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…defendant parent, it is sufficient for notices, including the notice of trial, to be given to counsel.” M.E. v. Florida Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 728 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). See M.A. v. Florida Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 760 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Here, the father’s counsel was given notice of the hearing in advance of the date. The father was aware of the original hearing date but chose not to attend. The court properly entered the dependency order as to the father. Bas…
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