STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
DARRYL JOHNSON, RESPONDENT
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Florida Supreme Court quashed the Second District's affirmance of a prison releasee reoffender sentence, holding that the trial court lacks discretion under section 775.082(8) and remanding for resentencing consistent with State v. Cotton.
The trial court has no discretion in determining whether a defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes; the Act's mandatory application does not violate separation of powers.
[1] A trial court has no discretion in determining whether a defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes; the statute manda…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. The Second District affirmed, relying on Cotton, which held the trial court had discretion in m…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in State v. Johnson, 743 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), in which the district court affirmed the lower court’s sentencing decision based upon State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)(holding that the trial court has discretion to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)). In so doing, the Second District certified conflict with Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), and McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently quashed the Second District’s decision in Cotton, and approved the First District’s decision in Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), holding that the Act, as properly interpreted by the First District, does not violate separation of powers, and rejecting other constitutional challenges to the Act. See State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000). Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in Cotton, we quash the Second District’s decision in this case with directions to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with our opinion in Cotton.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
QUINCE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000).
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Citator
Cited By
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Johnson v. State, 834 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…at the trial court had the discretion to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under the Act. See State v. Johnson, 743 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The Florida Supreme Court reversed in State v. Johnson, 762 So. 2d 521 (Fla.2000), citing to State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). In Cotton, the supreme court concluded that the Act established minimum mandatory sentences and removed sentencing discretion from the judicial branch. Id. at 347-49. The court stated…
Authorities Cited
- Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Jewell F. Raimondo v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- State v. Johnson, 743 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)