JEFFREY ALLEN FARINA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court vacated Jeffrey Farina's death sentence and reduced it to life imprisonment without parole for twenty-five years based on the constitutional prohibition against imposing capital punishment on juveniles. The decision applied the ruling from Brennan v. State, which established that death sentences for sixteen-year-old defendants constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Florida Constitution.
The death sentence imposed on Jeffrey Farina is unconstitutional and must be vacated. The sentence is reduced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, pursuant to the principle established in Brennan v. State that capital punishment cannot be imposed on a sixteen-year-old defendant.
[1] A death sentence imposed on a sixteen-year-old defendant constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Florida Constitution.
[2] A court may reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“this Court concluded that the imposition of a death sentence on a sixteen-year-old defendant constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution”
Establishes the primary constitutional violation and the basis for vacating the death sentence under Brennan v. State
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJeffrey Farina, age sixteen at the time of the crime, and his brother Anthony were tried together and convicted of first-degree murder for fatally sho…
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PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the order of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Jeffery Allen Farina. We have jurisdiction pursuant to-article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the death sentence and reduce the sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
Jeffrey Farina and his brother, Anthony J. Farina, were tried together and convicted of fatally shooting Michelle Van Ness during the May 1992 robbery of a Taco Bell restaurant in Daytona Beach. Jeffrey Farina was sixteen at the time of the crime. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Farina’s first-degree murder conviction but remanded for a new sentencing proceeding due to the trial court’s error in granting the State’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror. See Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla.1996).
Pursuant to our remand, the trial court held another sentencing proceeding and again sentenced Farina to death. Subsequently, in Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1999), this Court concluded that the imposition of a death sentence on a sixteen-year-old defendant constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. Accordingly, we vacate Farina’,s death sentence and reduce the sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. See Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1999) (stating that the 1994 amendment of section 775.0.82(1), Florida Statutes, which provides for a life sentence without the possibility of parole, applies only to crimes committed after May 25,1994).
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. HARDING, J., concurring.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.
HARDING, J.,
concurs with an opinion.
I am compelled to concur. Although I still adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1999), I recognize that the Brennan majority is now the law of this state, and nothing has changed or occurred since the Brennan decision to justify altering the majority’s holding in that case. See Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256, 1258 (Fla.1993) (Overton, J., concurring).
WELLS, C.J.,
dissenting.
I dissent because of the reasons I stated in Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1999).
QUINCE, J., concurs.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2002)…she could set aside her feelings against the death penalty if the murder were sufficiently aggravated ... responded that she was not sure that she could”) (emphasis added). Finally, Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392, 396 (Fla.1996), sentence vacated, 763 So. 2d 302 (Fla.2000), on which Morrison relies, is inapposite. The juror in question in Farina stated that she would try to be fair and that she would “fairly consider the imposttion of the death penalty, depending on the evidence [she] heard in the courtroom…
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Guerry Wayne HERTZ v. State, 803 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 2001)…uld not want to take someone else's life, just because — I mean, I know it’s bad that they killed someone or anybody kills anybody, but it wouldn't bring that person back. . Furthermore, Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla.1996), sentence vacated, 763 So. 2d 302 (Fla.2000), on which Hertz relies, is inappo-site. The juror in question in Farina stated that she would try to be fair and that she would "fairly consider the imposition of the death penalty, depending on the evidence [she] heard in the courtroom,”…
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Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 2001)…uld not want to take someone else’s life, just because — I mean, I know it's bad that they killed someone or anybody kills anybody, but it wouldn't bring that person back. . Furthermore, Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla.1996), sentence vacated, 763 So. 2d 302 (Fla.2000), on which Looney relies, is inappo-site. The juror in question in Farina stated that she would try to be fair and that she would "fairly consider the imposition of the death penalty, depending on the evidence [she] heard in the courtroom,…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dykstra-Gulick v. Gulick, 620 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1993)
- Kayle Barrington Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1999)
- Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1996)
- Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999)