ROY C. MAYNARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Roy Maynard appealed his sentence, challenging both the classification of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes and the legality of his overall sentence of thirty months imprisonment followed by thirty-six months probation. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence and rejected his argument that the combined sentence exceeded statutory maximums for third-degree felonies.
The trial court properly denied the Rule 3.800(a) motion because such motions are limited to correcting sentencing errors apparent from the face of the record without requiring an evidentiary hearing, and Maynard's claim requires factual development. The sentence is legal because the trial court imposed separate sentences for separate offenses, and the period of probation is limited only by the statutory maximum for each crime.
[1] Motions to correct illegal sentences under Rule 3.800(a) are limited to sentencing errors apparent from the face of the record that do not require an evidentiary hearing.
[2] A claim that a prior conviction was improperly classified as a higher offense level, requiring an evidentiary hearing, is not cognizable under Rule 3.800(a).
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Establishes the fundamental limitation on Rule 3.800(a) motions, supporting the trial court's denial of Maynard's motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaynard pleaded guilty to four separate offenses, three of which were third-degree felonies, each punishable by up to five years imprisonment. The tri…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant claims the trial court miscalculated his sentence because it improperly classified a prior conviction as a level 7 offense. Appellant alleges Department of Corrections records indicate the conviction at issue is a level 6 offense. Athough it is conceivable that Appellant’s position may have merit, he sought relief by way of a motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
To review Appellant’s claim, the trial court would need to conduct an evidentiary hearing on that matter.
The trial court did not err in denying his motion because rule 3.800(a) motions are limited to correcting sentencing errors that are apparent from the face of the record and which do not require an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998)(per curiam)(‘We hold credit time issues are cognizable in a rule 3.800 motion when it affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief.”); State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995)(holding that rule 3.800(a) motions should be limited to sentencing issues that can be resolved as a matter of law without an evidentiary determination), receded from on other grounds by Dixon v. State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1999); Adlington v. State, 735 So. 2d 513, 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(“Rule 3.800(a) is limited to the correction of illegal sentences which do not require an evidentiary hearing.”); Campbell v. State, 696 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)(“Relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 is unavailable for matters not ascertainable from the face of the record.”).
Appellant’s motion may be filed as a rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief provided it is done so within the applicable two year time limitation.
Appellant also claims that his sentence of thirty months imprisonment, followed by thirty-six months probation for separate offenses, is illegal because it exceeds the maximum 60 month sentence for a third degree felony authorized by law. We do not agree. An examination of the record shows Appellant pled guilty to four separate offenses, three of which were third degree felonies, each punishable by up to five years imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Unlike those cases where a defendant’s combined sentence of imprisonment and probation for a singular offense exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by law, the trial court imposed separate sentences. Cf State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1978); Weidner v. State, 559 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Ortiz v. State, 696 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
The trial court did not impose a probationary split sentence1 for any one offense. Rather, it imposed a sentence for each offense notwithstanding that the offenses are combined in one scoresheet. See Weiner v. State, 562 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)(“The court is under a duty to impose a sentence for each offense notwithstanding that the offenses are combined in one scoresheet.”). The period of probation is limited only by the statutory maximum for the crime. Id. Here, Appellant’s separate sentences of thirty months imprisonment for count I to be followed by thirty-six months probation in counts II and III (the sentences for the latter counts running concurrently) do not exceed the statutory maximum sentences permitted for these offenses.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order. AFFIRMED.
WARNER C.J., DELL and STONE JJ., concur. . A probationary split sentence "occurs when the judge sentences a defendant to a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation or any form of community control.” Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851, 852 (Fla.1989).
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Petscher v. State, 936 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…o additional jail credit.1 If the claim cannot be resolved from the face of the record without resorting to fact-finding, Petscher must file a timely motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Maynard v. State, 763 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).2 . If Petscher's motion was facially sufficient, I agree that we would be obligated to reverse the trial court's order because it failed to attach any records to refute Petscher's claim. Brown v. State, 912 So. 2d 61, 62 (…
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Santiago v. State, 22 So. 3d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…o additional jail credit.1 If the claim cannot be resolved from the face of the record without resorting to fact-finding, Santiago must file a timely motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Maynard v. State, 763 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We affirm without prejudice so that Santiago can file a legally sufficient motion. AFFIRMED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. GRIFFIN, ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur. . If Santiago's motion was facially sufficient, we would be obligat…
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Williams v. State, 899 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…h DCA 2002); Skullestad v. State, 790 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In addition, the state and appellant disagree about when he was released from supervision, and resolution of this claim would require an evidentiary hearing. See Maynard v. State, 763 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Black v. State, 754 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order without prejudice for appellant to file a rule 3.850 motion. FARMER, C.J., STONE and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998)
- State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995)
- State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1978)
- Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1989)
- Dixon v. State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1999)
- Weiner v. State, 562 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Ortiz v. State, 696 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Adlington v. State, 735 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Ramos v. State, 559 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Weidner v. State, 559 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)