JOHN B. LANCASTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John B. Lancaster appeals the trial court's summary denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion seeking resentencing under the 1994 sentencing guidelines rather than the 1995 guidelines applied at sentencing. The court reversed and remanded because Lancaster alleged a prima facie basis for post-conviction relief under Heggs v. State and committed his offense during the proper window period, and the trial court must address the motion as a Rule 3.850 motion to properly consider disputed factual issues.
Lancaster has alleged a prima facie basis for post-conviction relief under Heggs because he committed his offense within the window period (October 1, 1995 to May 24, 1997) and the record does not definitively establish whether he is entitled to resentencing. On remand, the trial court must treat his sworn motion as a Rule 3.850 motion and, if he is found entitled to relief under Heggs, the state must be given the opportunity to either proceed to trial or agree to resentencing under the 1994 scoresheet.
[1] A defendant alleging a sentence was imposed based on an incorrect scoresheet, in light of Heggs v. …
[2] A sworn motion filed under Rule 3.800(a) alleging disputed issues of fact may be treated as a Rule 3.850 motion on remand.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because Lancaster alleges that he was sentenced within the window period for raising a Heggs claim and further alleges that he is adversely affected by the use of a 1995 scoresheet, he has alleged a prima facie basis for post-conviction relief under Heggs.”
Establishes that Lancaster met the threshold requirement for post-conviction relief by alleging facts within the Heggs window period and adverse impact from the scoresheet used.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLancaster committed aggravated battery on December 12, 1996, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 36 months pursuant to a 1995 scoresheet as part of a…
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PER CURIAM.
John B. Lancaster appeals the trial court’s order summarily denying his sworn Rule 3.800(a) motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Lancaster committed the offense of aggravated battery on December 12, 1996. He pled guilty and was placed on probation. Subsequently, he violated that probation. He alleges that as a result of plea negotiations, he agreed to a prison sentence in the “middle of the guidelines.” Ultimately, under that plea agreement he was sentenced to 36 months pursuant to a 1995 scoresheet.
Lancaster now complains that he is entitled to be resentenced with a 1994 score-sheet in light of Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620, (Fla.2000). He alleges that he committed his offense during the window period for raising a Heggs claim. He claims that since he was to receive a sentence in the “middle of the guidelines” under the plea agreement, the sentence he received is longer than it would have been had the trial court used a 1994 scoresheet. With a 1994 scoresheet the permitted range allegedly would have been 15.3 to 25.0 months. The state in its response candidly acknowledges that the trial court erred in denying Lancaster’s motion on the basis that his claim was not within the window period in light of the recent ruling of the supreme court in Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla.2000) (window period opened on October 1, 1995 and closed on May 24, 1997, rather than October 1,1996).
Because Lancaster alleges that he was sentenced within the window period for raising a Heggs claim and further alleges that he is adversely affected by the use of a 1995 scoresheet, he has alleged a prima facie basis for post-conviction relief under Heggs. However, as the state points out, at this juncture it is not certain that Lancaster is necessarily entitled to resentencing under Heggs because the record does not contain such items as the transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings. The state suggests that in order to determine whether Lancaster is ultimately entitled to relief, it would be necessary for the trial court on remand to prepare a 1994 score-sheet.
Unresolved issues of fact clearly remain in the instant ease. As indicated, Lancaster filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion in the instant case, and it is well-settled that Rule 3.850, rather than Rule 3.800(a), is the proper vehicle for raising a claim in the post-conviction context when disputed issues of fact are involved. State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995). However, as also indicated, Lancaster’s instant motion is sworn. Given that circumstance, on remand we direct that the trial court, in addressing whether he is entitled to be resentenced using a 1994 scoresheet under Heggs, treat Lancaster’s motion as a Rule 3.850 motion. And if it appears that Lancaster is entitled to relief under Heggs, on remand the state must then be given the opportunity of either going to trial or agreeing that Lancaster be resentenced under a 1994 scoresheet, because the plea agreement was based on a fundamental infirmity. See Rickman v. State, 713 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COBB, W. SHARP and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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Jenkins v. State, 771 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement in which he agreed to receive a mid-guidelines sentence as a habitual offender. The proper vehicle for raising such a claim is a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850. See Lancaster v. State, 764 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing and directing trial court on remand to treat defendant’s sworn rule 3.800(a) motion as motion under rule 3.850, and providing that if defendant is able to prove entitlement to mid guidelines sentence, then state must b…
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Wright v. State, 769 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…concerning the low end of the guidelines or that the omitted scoresheets show that he received an illegal sentence and was adversely affected. Factual issues concerning plea agreements must be raised in a sworn 3.850 motion. See Lancaster v. State, 764 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Because nothing in the record indicates that Wright received anything but a legal sentence, we affirm the order denying his 3.800 motion, without prejudice to the subsequent filing of a [*481] facially sufficient Rule 3.850 or 3…
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Levory W. Hickmon v. State, 766 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…da Supreme Court has now ruled the longer window period is the correct one to apply,2 we reverse and remand for further consideration by the trial court. REVERSED and REMANDED. W. SHARP, HARRIS and PLEUS, JJ., concur. . In Lancaster v. State, 764 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), this court addressed the difference in the requirements of rule 3.800(a) motions and rule 3.850 motions, vis a vis Heggs claims. In contrast, Martino v. State, 759 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), this court, basically without di…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995)
- Rickman v. State, 713 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)