DEAN ALLEN JENKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dean Allen Jenkins appeals the summary denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence imposed under the 1995 sentencing guidelines, which were found unconstitutional. The court affirms the denial but permits Jenkins to file a timely sworn Rule 3.850 postconviction motion, as the proper vehicle for challenging whether his guilty plea was entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement for a mid-guidelines sentence.
A defendant's claim that his guilty plea was entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement for a mid-guidelines sentence must be raised through a sworn Rule 3.850 postconviction motion, not a Rule 3.800(a) motion. The summary denial of the unsworn Rule 3.800(a) motion is affirmed, but the appellant is permitted to file a timely sworn Rule 3.850 motion within two years from the issuance of the Heggs opinion.
[1] A claim that a guilty plea was entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement for a specific sentence is properly raised in a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.85…
[2] A rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence must be sworn to be considered.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The proper vehicle for raising such a claim is a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850.”
Establishes that challenges to guilty pleas based on negotiated sentencing agreements must be raised through Rule 3.850, not Rule 3.800(a)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJenkins was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender under the 1995 sentencing guidelines enacted by chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida. The Flori…
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PER CURIAM.
Dean Allen Jenkins (Appellant) appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. The state conceded below that his offenses were committed within the window period for raising a challenge to a sentence imposed pursuant to the 1995 sentencing guidelines enacted by chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, which the supreme court found unconstitutional in Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000), see Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla.2000).
The state asserts, however, that Appellant is not entitled to relief because he was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender. See § 775.084(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996) (providing that a sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions is not subject to section 921.001, the statute concerning sentencing guidelines).
Appellant contends that he is entitled to resentencing, or to be allowed to withdraw his plea, because he alleges that his guilty plea was entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement in which he agreed to receive a mid-guidelines sentence as a habitual offender. The proper vehicle for raising such a claim is a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850. See Lancaster v. State, 764 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing and directing trial court on remand to treat defendant’s sworn rule 3.800(a) motion as motion under rule 3.850, and providing that if defendant is able to prove entitlement to mid guidelines sentence, then state must be given opportunity either to go to trial or agree to defendant’s resentencing under 1994 scoresheet); see also Spacco v. State, 762 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing order denying rule 3.850 motion and providing, because sentence was result of negotiated plea, that state has option on remand of agreeing to sentence under 1994 guidelines or withdrawing from plea bargain and taking defendant to trial); Parker v. State, 767 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing denial of postconviction motion and instructing trial court on remand to determine from the record whether the plea agreement contemplated the defendant’s receiving a guidelines sentence, and if it did to allow state option of taking defendant to trial or agreeing to resentencing); Kleppinger v. State, 760 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (affirming Anders appeal where plea was entered utilizing 1995 sentencing scoresheet, but noting that defendant might be entitled to challenge voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea by filing rule 3.850 motion).
Appellant’s rule 3.800(a) motion was not sworn. Accordingly, we affirm the summary denial of his motion without prejudice to his filing a timely sworn rule 3.850 motion raising the same ground for relief. Appellant should have two years from the issuance of the supreme court’s opinion in Heggs in which to do so, as the facts on which his claim is predicated could not have been known earlier. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1). But see McMahon v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D1852, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 1062343 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug.4, 2000) (noting that two-year time limit of rule 3.850 expired during proceeding).
POLEN, KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Regan v. State, 787 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…also necessarily become a fact as per this rule, and will remove entirely any need to perform a Witt analysis. We therefore acknowledge apparent conflict on this point with Murphy v. State, 773 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2000), and Jenkins v. State, 771 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Thus, the question is whether the decision in Heggs constitutes a right of constitutional and fundamental significance under the analysis in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.1980). The supreme court in Witt held that a change…
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Coppola v. State, 795 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ed by the exercise of due diligence, or (2) the fundamental constitutional right being asserted was not established within the time period provided for and has been held to apply retroactively. Although both the Fourth District in Jenkins v. State, 771 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and the Second District Court in Murphy v. State, 773 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(en banc), held (without detailed analysis) that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heggs was an unknown fact on which a defendant’s claim was predi…
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Coppola v. State, 938 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2006)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Coppola v. State, 795 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions in Murphy v. State, 773 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), and Jenkins v. State, 771 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We hold that our decision in Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000), does not constitute “newly discovered evidence” for purposes of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)
- Jireh Kleppinger v. State, 760 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Miller v. Miller, 767 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Parker v. State, 767 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Lancaster v. State, 764 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Duc M. Pham v. State, 762 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Spacco v. State, 762 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)