KENMARK CONSTRUCTION, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL CRONIN, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2000-06-21
No. 2D99-228
CASANUEVA and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.
765 So. 2d 129 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

Kenmark Construction appeals a foreclosure judgment where the trial court ruled in Kenmark's favor on its construction lien claim but denied attorneys' fees to both parties. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Kenmark, as the prevailing party on significant issues in the foreclosure action, is entitled to attorneys' fees under Florida's construction lien statute.


Holding

Kenmark, as the prevailing party on significant issues in the foreclosure action, is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under Florida's construction lien statute. The trial court's factual ruling denying fees to both parties was clearly erroneous and unsupported by competent, substantial evidence.


Headnotes

[1] A judgment on a construction lien requires a determination of substantial performance, not strict performance.

[2] A trial court's finding that a party did not prevail on a significant issue in a construction lien case must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.

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Key Quotes

“It is well-established that a judgment on a construction hen requires a determination of substantial performance, not strict performance.”

Establishes the legal standard applicable to construction lien foreclosure judgments and supports the court's conclusion that the monetary award reflected substantial performance

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Facts & Procedural History

In October 1997, Kenmark sued Cronin to foreclose a construction lien for $10,113.53. Cronin answered with affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for…

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Opinion of the Court
ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge.

ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge.

Kenmark Construction, Inc. (Kenmark), appeals a final judgment of foreclosure in a construction lien case. The trial court ruled in favor of Kenmark on its complaint for foreclosure, but then declined to award attorneys’ fees to either party. We must reverse.

In October 1997, Kenmark sued Michael Cronin pursuant to chapter 713, Florida Statutes (1995), to foreclose a construction lien in the principal sum of $10,113.53. Mr. Cronin filed an answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud. The case was tried in the fall of 1998. The trial court generally found in favor of Kenmark, but allowed Mr. Cronin a setoff of $2,247.01. Thus, the redemption amount in the judgment of foreclosure totaled $9,038.99.

When orally announcing its judgment, the trial court stated that it doubted whether Kenmark had built the house in a proper and workmanlike manner or that Mr. Cronin would be able use the house in the way he had wanted. Nevertheless, the trial court entered the judgment of foreclosure in favor of Kenmark and against Mr. Cronin. It is well-established that a judgment on a construction hen requires a determination of substantial performance, not strict performance. See Poranski v. Millings, 82 So. 2d 675, 678 (Fla.1955). The monetary award in this case is consistent with a determination of substantial performance by Kenmark. Although the trial court questioned Kenmark’s construction methods, it rejected Mr. Cronin’s counterclaim and did not find a breach of contract by Kenmark. Mr. Cronin did not appeal the adverse ruling on his counterclaim.

When entering the judgment of foreclosure, the trial court used a proposed judgment prepared by one of the parties. The trial court struck through some language on the proposed judgment that would have awarded attorneys’ fees to Kenmark. Instead, the trial court inserted a ruling that Kenmark had “not prevailed on a significant issue” in the foreclosure action. The trial court did not, however, rule that Mr. Cronin had prevailed on a significant issue. As a matter of barnyard equity, the trial judge wanted to deny fees to both parties because he sensed that Kenmark’s workmanship was sloppy, even though Mr. Cronin had not proven a breach of contract.

The Florida Home Builders Association, as amicus curiae, encourages us to hold that a trial court is compelled to find a prevailing party in every construction lien case. They maintain that the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts have already so held. See Hollub Constr. Co. v. Narula, 704 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Heidle v. S & S Drywall and Tile, 639 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Sanfilippo v. Larry Giacin Tile Co., 390 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The Second District has not issued an opinion that conflicts with these decisions and, thus, they are binding on trial courts in the Second District. See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla.1992).

We need not announce any bright-line rule in this case that would apply to all such cases. The trial court’s factual ruling about the absence of a prevailing party on the “significant issues” is clearly erroneous and not supported by competent, substan tial evidence.1 See Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255, 258 (Fla.1956); Bradley v. Waldrop, 611 So. 2d 31, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The trial court may regret that Kenmark prevailed in this foreclosure action, but it cannot deny that Kenmark did prevail on the significant issues. Kenmark is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.

Reversed and remanded.

CASANUEVA and STRINGER, JJ., Concur. . This case does not involve a "net judgment.” See Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla.1993). The net judgment rule applies when the contractor does not recover pursuant to a lien but obtains a net judgment of damages under other principles of contract or equity. Thus, although the owner defeats the lien, he is still liable for a net judgment of damages. In this case, the contractor did recover pursuant to the lien, thus entitling him to attorneys’ fees pursuant to chapter 713.


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Cited By

  • Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 2009)
    …08(l)(c),(g), 713.08(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). This also comports with the well-established principle that a “judgment on a construction lien requires a determination of substantial performance, not strict performance.” Kenmark Constr., Inc. v. Cronin, 765 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citing Poranski v. Millings, 82 So. 2d 675, 678 (Fla.1955)). We conclude that the equitable analysis of Prosperi is equally applicable in this case and consistent with our jurisprudential approach favoring a flexible rule i…
    1 / 2
  • Wells v. Halmac Dev., Inc., 189 So. 3d 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …DCA 1996); Sanfilippo v. Larry Giacin Tile Co., 390 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). We reject the notion that in every construction lien case the trial court is compelled to find a [*1021] prevailing party. See Kenmark Constr., Inc. v. Cronin, 765 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (declining to announce a bright-line rule that a trial court must find a prevailing party in every construction lien action). Id. at 1204 n. 13. The Trytek decision — issued in 2009— represented the settled law in Florida well b…
  • Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Haynes, 793 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
    …stion GRANTED; Balance of Motions DENIED. PETERSON, J., and POWELL, R.W., Associate Judge, concur. . Ruth B. Haynes by and through Nancy Bush, personal representative. . Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992); Kenmark Constr., Inc. v. Cronin, 765 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Reinhardt v. Bono, 564 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). . Department of Legal Affairs v. District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, 434 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1983). . Black’s Law Dictionary contains a lengthy description of "damage”…

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