HOLLUB CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
ONKAR NARULA AND JOY NARULA, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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The appellate court reversed a lower court's denial of attorney's fees to a construction company in a lien claim case. The court found the company was the prevailing party under the statute, entitling it to fees.
Yes, Hollub Construction Company was the prevailing party because it prevailed on the significant issue of enforcing its lien and received an affirmative judgment. Therefore, the denial of attorney's fees was error.
[1] A prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees for trial, appeal, or arbitration.
[2] The prevailing party in a mechanic's lien suit is the party that prevailed on the significant issues presented and had an affirmative judgment rendered on its behalf.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevaiHng party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by this court, which fee must be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions.”
This quote establishes the statutory basis for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a lien action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHollub Construction Company sued the Narulas for unpaid fees on a home construction contract. After arbitration awarded Hollub $192,000 and the Narula…
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GREEN, Judge.
The appellant, Hollub Construction Company (“Hollub”), appeals a final judgment denying its recovery of attorney’s fees in its construction Hen claim against appellees, On-kar and Joy Narula. We reverse.
HoHub was hired by the Narulas for the construction of a home. When HoHub charged the Narulas additional contractor’s fees beyond those specified in the contract, the Narulas stopped making payments. In February, 1992, Hollub submitted a demand for arbitration and filed a one count action for the enforcement of its lien on the property.1 Prior to the arbitration of this matter, however, Hurricane Andrew struck and damaged the home buüt by Hollub. The Naru-las’ homeowner’s insurance carrier compensated them for this damage.
During the arbitration proceeding, HoHub sought $105,115.38 on the contract, $49,-299.10 in interest and $31,000.00 in delay damages. The Narulas sought $1,139,014.27 for improper workmanship, improper biUing, misapplication of funds and other items. The arbitration panel ultimately awarded $192,-000.00 to Hollub on its claim and $150,000.00 to the Narulas on their counterclaim. The arbitrators further declared that HoHub should bear 40% of the arbitration costs and the Narulas should bear 60%. The arbitration award did not declare which of the parties was the prevaiHng party. Nor did the award specificaUy delineate what portion(s) of the awards constituted interest or whether there had been an accounting for the insurance proceeds received by the Narulas for the hurricane damage.
Thereafter, the parties returned to the lower court and each moved to be declared the prevaiHng party. The lower court denied both motions, finding that it was unable to declare a prevaiHng party. The court then entered a final judgment confirming the arbitration award wherein it awarded HoHub a total of $51,233.24, which represented the difference in the respective arbitration awards given to HoHub and the Narulas, plus accrued interest. The final judgment specifi-eaUy denied an award of attorney’s fees to HoHub. This appeal follows that denial of attorney’s fees.
The construction Hen statute specifi-caUy provides for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevaiHng party on a lien claim:
In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevaiHng party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by this court, which fee must be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions.
§ 713.29, Fla. Stat. (1995). This provision indeed makes mandatory an award of attorney’s fees to the prevaiHng party in a mechanic’s Hen action. See Heidle v. S & S Drywall and Tile, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); see also Metro-Centre Assocs. v. Envtl., Eng’rs., Inc., 522 So. 2d 967, 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Hub Cap Heaven, Inc. v. Goodman, 431 So. 2d 323, 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“When a claimant in a mechanic’s Hen action recovers a judgment in any amount, a trial court errs in not finding the Henor the ‘prevailing party and awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes.”).
The prevaiHng party in a mechanic’s Hen suit is that party which has prevaHed on the significant issues presented in the ease, see Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1360, 1363 (Fla.1993); Shipwatch Development Corp. v. Salmon, 646 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Moritz v. Hoyt Enterprises, Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 809-10 (Fla.1992); Green Companies, Inc. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv., Ltd., 658 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), and had an affirmative judgment rendered on its behalf at the conclusion of the case. See Peter Marich & Assoc., Inc. v. Powell, 365 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Howell & King, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1086 (Fla.1976); Sharpe v. Ceco Corp., 242 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), cert. denied, 247 So. 2d 324 (Fla.1971). Based upon this test, it is clear to us that Hollub was the prevailing party in the lien action below. Hollub prevailed on the only significant issue in the action below, (i.e., the enforcement of its lien) and received an affirmative judgment on its behalf. The trial court’s, denial of attorney’s fees to Hollub pursuant to section 713.29 was thus error. We therefore reverse that portion of the final judgment which denied Hollub’s request for attorney’s fees and remand this cause for a determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award to Hollub.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
. The Narulas filed no counterclaim to Hollub’s one count lien claim in the action below.
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Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 2009)…that there be a prevailing party, only that where a "prevailing party” is determined, the entitlement to attorneys’ fees is mandatory. See Pennington & Assocs., Inc. v. Evans, 932 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Hollub Constr. Co. v. Narula, 704 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Grant v. Wester, 679 So. 2d 1301, 1308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Sanfilippo v. Larry Giacin Tile Co., 390 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). We reject the notion that in every construction lien case the trial court is compelled…
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Wells v. Halmac Dev., Inc., 189 So. 3d 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…the trial court was required to enter an order finding him to be the prevailing party because the arbitrator “failed to determine, a prevailing party” in its Remand Order. In support of this proposition, Castro cited to the case of Hollub v. Narula, 704 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), and told the court that the Hollub case involved “the exact issue” raised in the instant case. Wells responded to Castro’s motion, asserting that the arbitrator had already and properly determined there was no prevailing party,'…1 / 2
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Kenmark Constr., Inc. v. Cronin, 765 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…on, as amicus curiae, encourages us to hold that a trial court is compelled to find a prevailing party in every construction lien case. They maintain that the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts have already so held. See Hollub Constr. Co. v. Narula, 704 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Heidle v. S & S Drywall and Tile, 639 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Sanfilippo v. Larry Giacin Tile Co., 390 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The Second District has not issued an opinion that conflicts with these decisions and…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1992)
- Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993)
- Peter Marich & Assocs., Inc. v. Powell, 365 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Sharpe v. Ceco Corp., 242 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- The Green Cos., Inc. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv., Ltd., 658 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Herman v. BOB Woschnik Constr., Inc., 336 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Heidle v. S & S Drywall & Tile, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Mini-Hospital, Inc. v. J.P. Realty, Inc., 431 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- HUB CAP Heaven, Inc. v. Goodman, 431 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Metro-Centre Assocs. v. Env't Eng'rs, Inc., 522 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)