JAMES A. LEGGETT, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE
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James Leggett, an inmate, sought a writ of mandamus to restore administrative gain-time and provisional credits that were canceled in 1998. The court affirmed the denial of his petition, holding that his ex post facto rights under the early release statute were determined by the definition of 'lawful capacity' in effect on his offense date (1984), not by a later settlement agreement that redefined capacity standards.
The court held that Leggett's ex post facto rights arose solely under section 944.598 as it existed on his offense date, when 'lawful capacity' meant maximum capacity, not under the later Costello settlement agreement. The inmate could have no legitimate expectations regarding future standards referenced in the settlement agreement, and he was entitled to relief only if the prison population exceeded 98% of maximum capacity during the relevant periods.
[1] A prisoner's ex post facto rights regarding gain-time credits are governed by the statute in effect on the date of the offense, not subsequent agreements or statutory cha…
[2] The definition of "lawful capacity" for the purpose of emergency gain-time grants under section 944.598, Florida Statutes (1988), was maximum capacity until July 1, 1985.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant's ex post facto rights arise under section 944.598, not under the Costello agreement. Appellant could have no legitimate expectations with regard to future standards referenced in the Costello agreement. The statute established his ex post facto rights and the statute put him on notice that the definition of lawful capacity could be redefined.”
Establishes the core holding that ex post facto rights are vested under the statute at the time of offense, not affected by later settlement agreements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeggett was incarcerated for an offense committed on November 7, 1984, under an early release law (section 944.598, Fla. Stat. 1988) that granted emer…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of the denial of his petition for writ of mandamus. We affirm.
Appellant was incarcerated for an offense he committed on November 7, 1984. The early release law in effect on the date of his offense was section 944.598, Florida Statutes (1988). Pursuant to superseding enactments, appellant was granted 420 days of administrative gain-time pursuant to section 944.276 and 1860 days of provisional credits pursuant to section 944.277. In April or May 1998, appellant’s credits were canceled. Appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus seeking restoration of the credits was denied.
We reject appellant’s argument that the standard of overcrowding applicable to his sentence after July 1, 1985 is “design capacity” based on the settlement agreement and February 1980 order entered in Costello v. Wainwright, 489 F.Supp. 1100 (M.D. Florida 1980). On the date of his offense, section 944.598 provided for grants of emergency gain-time at 98% of lawful capacity. “Lawful capacity” was defined to mean “the total capacity of all institutions and facilities in the prison system as determined either by the Legislature or by the courts.” As noted in Gomez v. Singletary, 738 So. 2d 499, 507 (Fla.1998):
In 1983, however, the legislature had not actually determined an exact definition [of lawful capacity], nor had any court done so. As discussed above, in the early 1980s, the Department was embroiled in the Costello prison overcrowding lawsuit. According to the Costello settlement agreement, effective July 1, 1985, the definition of “lawful capacity” was determined to be 133% of total design capacity.
(Emphasis in original). We agree with the Department that from the effective date of section 944.598 until July 1, 1985, “lawful capacity” was maximum capacity. Appellant’s ex post facto rights arise under section 944.598, not under the Costello agreement. Appellant could have no legitimate expectations with regard to future standards referenced in the Costello agreement. The statute established his ex post facto rights and the statute put him on notice that the definition of lawful capacity could be redefined.
Appellant’s remaining arguments are without merit. The trial judge correctly determined that appellant would only be entitled to relief if the prison population exceeded the relevant threshold of 98% of maximum capacity during the time periods at issue. See Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499 (Fla.1998); Sanford v. State, 739 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Grant v. Singletary, 730 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Accordingly, the order on appeal is AFFIRMED.
BARFIELD, C.J., MINER and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.
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Winkler v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2002)…ted itself during this time-frame, neither the Legislature nor any court had done so, and therefore we decline to accept that definition. The Department's definition was apparently accepted by two district courts, however, see e.g., Leggett v. Moore 765 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Black v. Moore, 768 So. 2d 1236, 1236-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Grant v. Singletary, 730 So. 2d 805, 805-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and, therefore, to the extent those district court decisions conflict with this opinion, they are…
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Black v. Moore, 768 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…trative gain time and provisional credits. We see no reason not to adopt the Department’s position that between 1980 and July 1, 1985, “lawful capacity” meant the maximum capacity of the prison system as detailed in its charts. See Leggett v. Moore, 765 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Accordingly, we hold that petitioner’s right to overcrowding credits available in 1983 was never triggered. [*1239] Because petitioner could only have contemplated receiving overcrowding credits if prison capacity had exceeded t…
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Vaughan v. State, 769 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…rt records would show on their face that his sentence was adversely affected by the application of the 1995 guidelines because the sentence imposed could not have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 765 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that motion raising Heggs claim was insufficient because it failed to allege sentence imposed could not have been imposed under 1994 guidelines). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order without prejudice to appellan…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1998)
- Grant v. Singletary, 730 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Sanford v. State, 739 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Costello v. Wainwright, 489 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Fla. 1980)