STRONTRAVEZ NASH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Strontravez Nash was convicted of robbery and burglary of a vehicle with battery and sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 years and life as a habitual felony offender and prison releasee reoffender. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentences but remanded to correct a clerical error in the judgment characterizing the robbery as a first-degree felony rather than second-degree felony.
The court affirmed the battery conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient because intentional touching of a closely held object against a person's will constitutes battery under Florida law. The court also rejected the constitutional challenge to the prison releasee reoffender statute, consistent with prior precedent.
[1] A battery may occur when a defendant intentionally touches an object that is intimately connected with a victim and held by the victim against their will.
[2] The constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act has been upheld against challenges based on the single subject requirement of the Florida Constitution.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Battery is the actual and intentional touching of another person against that person's will, § 784.03(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), but the word 'person' in the statute includes an object that has such an intimate connection with the person as to be regarded as a part or extension of the person, such as clothing or an object held by the person.”
Establishes the legal definition of battery and that closely held objects are treated as extensions of the person for battery purposes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe victim was standing near her disabled vehicle on the roadside when Nash approached her and demanded her purse. When she refused and returned to he…
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OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge.
Appellant, convicted of both robbery (Count I) and burglary of a vehicle with battery (Count II), was sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 years and life, respectively, as a habitual felony offender and as a prison releasee reoffender. We affirm the judgment and the sentences, but with direction to correct a clerical error as to the judgment on Count I.
The victim, while standing near her disabled vehicle on the side of the road awaiting the arrival of assistance, was approached by appellant who demanded she give him her purse. She refused and got back into the driver’s seat of her vehicle, clutching the purse firmly by its handles.
Appellant then reached into the victim’s vehicle, took hold of' the purse with the victim still clutching it, and the two struggled for its possession. Appellant was able to pull the purse from the victim’s grasp, but only by exerting force sufficient to cause the purse to separate from its handles which remained firmly in the victim’s grasp. Appellant contends that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal of aggravated battery because, he says, this evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding of a battery upon the victim.
Battery is the actual and intentional touching of another person against that person’s will, § 784.03(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), but the word “person” in the statute includes an object that has such an intimate connection with the person as to be regarded as a part or extension of the person, such as clothing or an object held by the person. Malczewski v. State, 444 So. 2d 1096, 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Because the recited evidence would support the reasonable inference that appellant intentionally touched the victim’s closely held purse against her will, the court properly denied appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant also contends, as he did at sentencing, that the Act creating enhanced punishment for a prison releasee reoffen-der under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), violates the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. He nonetheless acknowledges that this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act against a similar charge in Young v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So. 2d 915 (Fla.1999). See also State v. Eckford, 725 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dismissed, 732 So. 2d 326 (Fla.1999).
The judgment as to Count I correctly reflects that appellant was adjudged guilty of robbery, but apparently as a result of clerical oversight, it listed the offense as a first degree felony rather than as a second degree felony. Upon remand the court is directed to enter a corrective judgment nunc pro tunc.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
WARNER, C.J., and KLEIN, J., concur.
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Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). The victim’s “person” includes “something intimately connected with the victim’s body,” including a bag or purse the victim is holding. Malczewski v. State, 444 So. 2d 1096, 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see also Nash v. State, 766 So. 2d 310, 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Thus, a conviction for burglary with a battery may be based on a defendant’s act of engaging in a tug-of-war over the victim’s purse during a burglary. Although counsel essentially conceded Benitez-Saldana’s guilt, counsel…
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Antinarelli v. State, 822 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Johnson v. State, 766 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). THOMPSON, C.J., GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R. B., JJ., concur.…
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Baker v. State, 959 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…hat Mr. Baker intentionally bit the [*1252] victim and this biting was against her will, or that Mr. Baker intended to harm her. See Beard v. State, 842 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Byrd v. State, 789 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Nash v. State, 766 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Here, the State presented prima facie evidence only that Mr. Baker was the perpetrator. The State failed to present any evidence that the alleged touching — the bite — was intentional and against the victim’s will. The State’s c…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barfield v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Young v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Malczewski v. State, 444 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- State v. Ramie Jomon Eckford, 725 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Brown v. Cory, 725 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)