DAVID LEE BUTLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2000-09-15
No. 5D00-1584
COBB, HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
766 So. 2d 1196 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2000)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Defendant Butler appealed the denial of his motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, arguing he was sentenced under 1995 sentencing guidelines that the Florida Supreme Court declared unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court applied an incorrect window period for challenging the unconstitutional guidelines.


Holding

Defendant's sentence qualifies for relief because he committed his offenses on November 8, 1996, which falls within the proper window period established in Trapp v. State (October 1, 1995 through May 24, 1997). The trial court erred by applying a narrower window period from Bortel v. State, which was implicitly overruled by the supreme court's decision in Trapp.


Headnotes

[1] A sentence imposed under the 1995 amendments to the sentencing guidelines is subject to challenge if the offenses were committed within the window period recognized by th…

[2] The window period for challenging sentences imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines begins on October 1, 1995, and closes on May 24, 1997.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Defendant asserts that he was sentenced under the 1995 amendments to the sentencing guidelines, Chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, which the supreme court held to be unconstitutional for violating the single subject provision of the Florida Constitution.”

Establishes the core legal basis for defendant's challenge—that the sentencing guidelines used were facially unconstitutional

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Defendant committed his offenses on November 8, 1996. He received a total sentence of 122 months, which was the presumptive sentence under the 1995 gu…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals the summary denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Defendant asserts that he was sentenced under the 1995 amendments to the sentencing guidelines, Chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, which the supreme court held to be unconstitutional for violating the single subject provision of the Florida Constitution. See Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). Defendant alleged that he committed his offenses on November 8, 1996, which would fall within the window period when the unconstitutional guidelines were utilized for offenses committed within that time frame. See Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla.2000) (window period for challenges to Chapter 95-184 opened on October 1,1995, when amended guideline provisions became effective and closed on May 24, 1997, when Chapter 97-97, Laws of Florida reenacted the amendments). The trial court denied relief, based on a smaller window period recognized by Bortel v. State, 743 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which was implicitly overruled by the supreme court in Trapp. See Gault v. State, 762 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

Defendant received a total of 122 months, which was the presumptive sentence or middle range under the 1995 guidelines. Defendant alleged that under the 1994 guidelines, the middle range would have been 63.5 months. Although defendant did not specifically allege that he received a departure under the 1994 guidelines, that consequence may be inferred by his allegations. A guideline presumptive sentence of 63.5 months may be increased or decreased by 25%. Therefore, if defendant’s allegations are taken as true, the maximum sentence under the 1994 guidelines would be 79.375 months, which would be less than the 122 months that defendant received. We therefore reverse the order denying relief and remand the case for reconsideration in light of Trapp.

Reversed and remanded.

COBB, HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw