BERNARD BORTEL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bernard Bortel challenged his nine-year sentence under the 1995 sentencing guidelines, arguing the enacting legislation violated Florida's single subject rule. The Fourth District affirmed the denial of his motion, holding that the guidelines were cured of any constitutional defect when reenacted in 1996, before his October-November 1996 offenses occurred.
Bortel is not entitled to relief because the sentencing guidelines were reenacted in 1996 with an effective date of October 1, 1996, curing any constitutional defect. Since Bortel's offenses occurred after the reenactment, he falls outside the window period for challenging the guidelines.
[1] A chapter law is no longer subject to challenge on the ground that it violates the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution once…
[2] A constitutional defect in a chapter law may be cured by its reenactment as part of the Florida Statutes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once reenacted as a portion of the Florida Statutes, a chapter law is no longer subject to challenge on the ground that it violates the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that reenactment of legislation cures constitutional defects related to the single subject rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1997, Bortel pled nolo contendere to burglary of a dwelling, attempted burglary, and grand theft committed between October 26 and November 24, 1996…
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GROSS, J.
In 1997, appellant pled nolo contendere to various counts of burglary of a dwelling, attempted burglary of an occupied dwelling, and grand theft. He committed these offenses between October 26,1996 and November 24, 1996. He was sentenced to nine years in prison pursuant to the 1995 sentencing guidelines.
In his sworn motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, appellant argues that his sentence is illegal because the enacting legislation for the 1995 sentencing guidelines, Chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, violated the single subject rule of Article III, Section 6, of the Florida Constitution. The trial court denied relief.
The case relied upon by the circuit court, Valdes v. State, 728 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), rejected a constitutional challenge to the 1995 sentencing guidelines based on the single subject rule. Valdes acknowledged conflict with Heggs v. State, 718 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. granted, 720 So. 2d 518 (Fla.1998), and rev. granted, 729 So. 2d 391 (Fla.1999), on this issue. The second district based its holding in Heggs on its earlier decision in Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. granted, 717 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1998), in which it held that another portion of the 1995 sentencing scheme — Chapter 95-182, which addressed violent career criminal sentencing — was unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule.
Heggs held that “any defendant sentenced ... between October 1, 1995 and May 24,1997 might have an argument that his sentence should be reversed.” 718 So. 2d at 264. The court identified those dates based on its observation that The window period for challenges to chapter 95-184 would begin on its effective date, October 1, 1995. The window would close on May 24,1997, when chapter 97-97, Laws of Florida, reenacted the 1995 amendments in chapter 95-184 as part of the Florida Statutes’ biennial adoption. “Once reenacted as a portion of the Florida Statutes, a chapter law is no longer subject to challenge on the ground that it violates the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution.” State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla.1993).
Id. at n. 1. In Thompson, the second district identified the same window period with respect to Chapter 95-182.
In Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this court identified a different window period, holding that a defendant’s opportunity to challenge his sentence as a violent career criminal ended on October 1, 1996, because Chapter 95-182 was reenacted on that date. We certified conflict with Thompson regarding the applicable window of opportunity.
Applying Salters, we conclude that appellant is not entitled to any relief because the sentencing guidelines at issue here were reenacted in 1996 pursuant to Chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of October 1, 1996, thereby curing the constitutional defect raised in this case. See Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245, 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Appellant’s offenses occurred in October and November, 1996, after the statute was reenacted.
We affirm the circuit court’s order denying appellant’s motion to correct illegal sentence and certify conflict with Heggs concerning the applicable window period.
FARMER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (33 total)
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Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)…a, reenacted the provisions contained in chapter 95-184 as part of the Legislature’s biennial adoption of the Florida Statutes. See Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264 n. 1 (relying on State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla.1993)). However, in Bortel v. State, 743 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the Fourth District certified conflict with the Second District’s determination in Heggs [*624] regarding the close of the window period. Specifically, the Bortel Court held that the defendant in that case, who committed hi…
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Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)…parties have filed supplemental briefs.5 II. WINDOW PERIOD ANALYSIS In Heggs, we noted the conflict between the Second District’s decision in Heggs v. State, 718 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), and the Fourth District’s decision in Bortel v. State, 743 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), as to when the window period closed for persons claiming a guidelines sentence to be invalid due to the amendments made by chapter 95-184. See 759 So. 2d at 623. In its decision in Heggs, the Second District determined that the…
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Diaz v. State, 752 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…7-97 on May 24, 1997. Therefore, we hold that, for the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 95-184, the window closed on May 24, 1997. In so holding, we acknowledge conflict with the Fourth District’s opinion in Bortel v. State, 743 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), wherein the court held that the window period for challenging Chapter 95-184 closed on October 1,1996. [*107] Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for resentencing under the guidelines in effect prior to the enactment of Ch…
Previewing 3 of 33 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
- Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Heggs v. State, 718 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- McKinley Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Vining v. Segal, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Valdes v. State, 728 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)