MAURICE BLANCHARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Maurice Blanchard was convicted of burglary with a weapon and petit theft after entering an enclosed porch of a duplex home and taking a bicycle. On appeal, Blanchard challenged whether the porch constituted a 'dwelling' under burglary law and whether his conviction should be classified as first-degree felony. The court affirmed, holding the enclosed porch was a private dwelling and the first-degree classification was proper.
The court held that the enclosed porch constitutes part of the dwelling under Florida law, as the statutory definition of 'dwelling' expressly includes 'any attached porch,' and the evidence supported that this porch was a private rather than public area. The burglary conviction was properly classified and scored as a first-degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, based on the jury's finding that the defendant possessed a weapon.
[1] A dwelling, for purposes of burglary, includes any attached porch, even if it is enclosed.
[2] Evidence that a porch is enclosed, used for personal items, and considered private by an occupant is sufficient to establish it as part of a residence for burglary purpos…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statutory definition of "dwelling" expressly includes "any attached porch."”
Establishes the legal basis for finding the enclosed porch qualifies as part of the dwelling under Florida burglary statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlanchard entered through a screen door into the glass-enclosed front porch area of a duplex home that had separate doors connecting the two units to …
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COBB, J.
The appellant, Blanchard, was convicted of burglary with a weapon and petit theft. The facts indicate Blanchard entered the glass-enclosed front porch area of a duplex home through a screen door. Separate doors connected the two units to the shared porch. The doorbell on the front of the building where Blanchard entered was inoperative. Ms. Mejia, the occupant of one unit, heard the screen door, looked out a window, saw Blanchard, and called 911. She saw that he was taking her bicycle off the porch and when she protested Blanchard produced a knife and warned her to desist.
Blanchard argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove entry into a residence since he stole the bicycle from a “common area” of an apartment building that was open to the public. In support of this argument he relies on Miller v. State, 733 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1998). He also contends in the alternative that his conviction for burglary was wrongfully scored as a first degree felony under section 810.02(2), Florida Statutes, because the jury made a specific finding that he possessed a weapon, but not a dangerous weapon.1
In response to the first argument the state ppints to evidence that the porch was enclosed, had an outside bell (even though inoperative), that the victim kept plants and furniture on her part of the porch and treated it as part of the home, and testified repeatedly that she considered the porch “private.” The state also points out that the statutory definition of “dwelling” expressly includes “any attached porch.” See § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). The state argues that Blanchard’s claim that the porch was “open to the public” was an affirmative defense, and, as such, was properly left for jury determination. The state also relates that in Miller the supreme court expressly limited its decision to public structures, such as the grocery store involved in that case, while the instant case concerns a private home. As the state observes, there was no evidence adduced that Blanchard was either an invitee or licensee. We agree with the state and affirm the burglary conviction.
We find no merit in Blanchard’s remaining issue. Given the wording of the amended information and the jury finding that the defendant possessed a weapon, the burglary conviction was properly reclassified and scored as a first degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes.
AFFIRMED.
SAWAYA and PLEUS, JJ., concur. . The jury also specifically found that in the course of committing the offense no assault was committed.
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Weber v. State, 776 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…lic or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. . In fairness to appellate counsel, it should be noted that his argument emphasizing the absence of a porch enclosure probably was prompted by our recent opinion in Blanchard v. State, 767 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). There we set forth the state's dual arguments: (1) the evidence relating to the nature of the porch enclosure in that case, and (2) the statutory definition of a dwelling expressly including "any attached porch” in section 810.0…
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Blanchard v. State, 909 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…r summarily denying his Rule 3.850 motion. After a jury trial, Blanchard was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery and petit theft. His direct appeal to this court in 5D99-3543 resulted in an affir-mance. Blanchard v. State, 767 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), review denied, 791 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.2001). He has previously filed two Rule 3.850 motions, the summary denials of which were affirmed by this court per curiam in 5D01-1850 and 5D02-121. Thus, the Rule 3.850 motion in this case i…
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Harley Lloyd Colbert v. State, 78 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…v. State, 710 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Fourth District stated in dicta that a carport with no walls enclos [*113] ing it except for a single wall shared with the house would qualify as an “attached porch.” Finally, in Blanchard v. State, 767 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), the Fifth District held that the glass-enclosed front porch of a duplex, where the victim kept plants and furniture, though it had an inoperative doorbell on the outside, was part of the dwelling rather than a common area open t…
Authorities Cited
- Miller v. State, 733 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1998)