ERROL D. BROOKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A claim that a written sentence fails to comport with the oral pronouncement is cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and remand is required to correct such discrepancies.
[1] A claim that a written sentence fails to comport with the court's oral pronouncement at sentencing is cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[2] When a discrepancy exists between the oral pronouncement of a sentence and the written sentence, a remand is required to correct the error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant sought to correct his sentence, arguing the written sentence did not match the oral pronouncement regarding habitual offender status. The tr…
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PER CURIAM.
Errol D. Brooks appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Brooks asserts that his sentences in case numbers 91-3635 and 91-3539 are illegal because the trial court failed to orally pronounce his sentences as a habitual offender and, therefore, the written sentence fails to comport to the oral pronouncement at sentencing. We affirm in part as to case number 91-3635, reverse in part as to case number 91-3539, and remand for further proceedings.
A claim that the written sentence fails to comport with the court’s oral pronouncement at sentencing is cognizable in a motion to correct illegal sentence. See Dawson/Knapp v. State, 698 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on this issue as to case number 91-3635 because the sentencing hearing transcript demonstrates on page twenty-six that the trial court, after making sufficient findings, properly pro nounced that Brooks would serve this life sentence with habitual offender sanctions.
However, in case number 91-3539, the court failed to pronounce Brooks a habitual felony offender. Brooks’ sentence is not an illegal sentence because it is not beyond the statutory maximum. Nonetheless, when a discrepancy exists between the oral pronouncement and the written sentence, remand is required to correct the error. See Dawson/Knapp, 698 So. 2d at 266. Therefore, this court remands to the trial court to strike the habitual offender sanction from Brooks’ written sentence.
In his motion for rehearing, Brooks raised several new issues. If Brooks wants these issues considered, he must file a motion in the trial court; these issues may not be considered for the first time on appeal.
Accordingly, we remand this cause to the trial court with directions to conform Brooks’ sentence in case number 91-3539 to the oral pronouncement of the court.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
PATTERSON, C.J., and PARKER and CASANUEVA, JJ„ Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Barron v. State, 827 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…claim is facially sufficient and timely, and the trial court should have addressed it as a rule 3.850 sentencing error or, if necessary, treated the claim under rule 3.800(a). See Culver v. State, 790 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Brooks v. State, 768 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(a)(4), (b). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for consideration of this claim by the trial court. In his other rule 3.850 claim, Barron alleged his original habitual offender sentences were illegal, pursu…
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Errol D. Brooks v. State, 937 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…ntence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Brooks’s rule 3.800(a) motion challenges the life sentence he received at resentenc-ing following our decision in Brooks v. State, 768 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). We note, and the State concedes, that the trial court resentenced Brooks prior to the issuance of our mandate in Brooks. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Brooks. See Wallen v. State, 909 So. 2d 520,…
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Fain v. State, 780 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…mum term. Fain is correct in his assertions regarding the oral pronouncements of the trial court. This claim is cognizable in a 3.800(a) motion. See Simon v. State, No. 2D00-3703, — So. 2d -, 2001 WL 98564 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb.7, 2000); Brooks v. State, 768 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Where the written sentence indicates the defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, but the trial court fails to orally pronounce the sentence as a habitual offender, the habitual offender sanction must be stricken from the…1 / 3
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- Cynthia Ann Dawson/Knapp v. State, 698 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)