MARK ANTHONY BARRON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2002-10-11
No. 2D02-1974
FULMER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
827 So. 2d 1063 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2002) Negative Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Mark Anthony Barron appealed the summary denial of his rule 3.850 postconviction motion raising two sentencing claims. The court reversed and remanded on one claim regarding the trial court's failure to announce a habitual offender designation when imposing a nine-year probation violation sentence, but affirmed the denial of his time-barred Hale challenge to consecutive sentences.


Holding

The court reversed and remanded on the first claim because the trial court failed to address whether the nine-year sentence was properly imposed as a habitual offender sentence. The court affirmed the denial of the second claim as time-barred under Dixon v. State, but affirmed without prejudice to allow Barron to file a facially sufficient rule 3.800(a) motion.


Headnotes

[1] A claim that a sentence imposed upon a violation of probation is illegal due to an unannounced habitual offender status is facially sufficient and timely for postconvicti…

[2] A claim that original habitual offender sentences are illegal because the crimes arose from a single criminal offense is subject to a time bar.

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Key Quotes

“Barron's claim is facially sufficient and timely, and the trial court should have addressed it as a rule 3.850 sentencing error or, if necessary, treated the claim under rule 3.800(a).”

Establishes that the trial court's summary denial without addressing the habitual offender designation claim was error requiring reversal and remand.

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1992, Barron pled guilty to burglary and grand theft, receiving ten years for burglary as a habitual felony offender and consecutive ten years prob…

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Opinion of the Court
WHATLEY, Judge.

WHATLEY, Judge.

Mark Anthony Barron appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Barron raised two claims for relief, asserting that his sentences are illegal.

We reverse and remand for consideration of one claim that the trial court failed to address in its order. On Barron’s other claim, we affirm without prejudice to his right to file a facially sufficient 3.800(a) motion. In 1992, Barron entered a guilty plea to burglary and grand theft. He received ten years in prison as a habitual felony offender for the burglary and a consecutive ten years of probation for the grand theft. In 2001, he was found in violation of his probation.

The trial court sentenced him to nine years in prison as a habitual felony offender. In his rule 3.850 motion, Barron claimed that the nine-year sentence imposed upon his violation of probation is illegal. He asserted that the trial court orally pronounced the nine years without announcing it was a habitual offender sentence. He asserted that his sentence had to be corrected to reflect a sentence not exceeding five years in prison. Barron’s claim is facially sufficient and timely, and the trial court should have addressed it as a rule 3.850 sentencing error or, if necessary, treated the claim under rule 3.800(a). See Culver v. State, 790 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Brooks v. State, 768 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(a)(4), (b).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for consideration of this claim by the trial court.

In his other rule 3.850 claim, Barron alleged his original habitual offender sentences were illegal, pursuant to Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993), because his crimes arose from one criminal offense. The trial court held this claim was time-barred. In Dixon v. State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1999), the court held that the two-year window in which to challenge consecutive habitual offender Hale sentences expired in August 1997. Thus, we affirm the denial of Barron’s 3.850 claim.

A Hale claim may be cognizable under rule 3.800(a). However, in order to state a facially sufficient claim under that rule, Barron must allege that his claim can be determined without resort to extra-record facts. See Johnson v. State, 807 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Steelman v. State, 801 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Therefore, we affirm without prejudice to any right Barron might have to file a facially sufficient claim under rule 3.800(a).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FULMER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2011)
    …on, I [*273] would answer the certified question in the negative. In line with that answer, I would quash the decision of the Second District on review; disapprove the decisions in White v. State, 892 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), Barron v. State, 827 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); and recede from Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.2003), to the extent that it approved Evans. In his opinion for the Second District in the case on review, Judge Alte…
    1 / 3
  • Harris v. State, 845 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …l offender sentences). However, Harris does not allege that his crimes arose from a single criminal episode or that his claim can be determined without resort to extra-record facts. Therefore, his claim is facially insufficient. See Barron v. State, 827 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Steelman v. State, 801 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We affirm without prejudice to whatever right Harris may have to file a facially sufficient Hale claim under rule 3.800(a). Affirmed. CASANUEVA and SILBERMAN, JJ., concur.…
  • Akins v. State, 98 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
    …thirty such appeals. Nevertheless, the argument that he raises is supported by Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.2003), and Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), as well as by discussion in this court’s opinion in Barron v. State, 827 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and by the outcome in White [*61] v. State, 892 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Although we disagree with at least part of the analysis in Evans, it was approved by the supreme court in Ashley. We are not convinced that we can di…
    1 / 2

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