DON KING PRODUCTIONS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
JULIO CESAR CHAVEZ, TOP RANK, INC., TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P. AND ROBERT ARUM, RESPONDENTS
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Don King Productions sought to disqualify the trial judge for statements indicating he would not believe Don King. The Florida appellate court granted the petition, holding that a judge's pretrial expressions of disbelief directed at a specific party, unrelated to evidence presented, warrant disqualification.
Disqualification is warranted when a trial judge's statement of disbelief of a party is not related to impressions formed during the proceeding and is specifically directed at that party. The judge's comments expressing disbelief of Don King specifically, unrelated to any testimony heard in the case, supported disqualification.
[1] Disqualification of a trial judge is warranted when the judge's statement of disbelief of a party is not related to impressions formed during the proceeding.
[2] A judge's statement of disbelief directed specifically at a party, rather than based on impressions formed during the proceeding, supports disqualification.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“disqualification is warranted where a trial judge's statement of disbelief of a party is not related to the case before the judge”
Establishes the legal standard distinguishing comments requiring disqualification from those that do not
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring a summary judgment hearing, the trial judge made comments about the boxing industry, stating he would not believe most people in boxing. When K…
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WARNER, C.J.
Petitioner moved to disqualify the trial judge on the grounds that the judge indicated that he would not believe petitioner. While such statements do not require disqualification when based upon impressions formed during the course of a proceeding, see Mobil v. Trask, 463 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), disqualification is warranted where a trial judge’s statement of disbelief of a party is not related to the case before the judge. See Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd., 561 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla.1990). We grant the petition because the trial judge’s comments in this case were specifically directed at petitioner and not based upon impressions formed during the proceeding. In this case, the trial judge made the following comments at a motion for summary judgment hearing:
MR. HILL [counsel for DKP]: On the denial of the existence of the 1997 performance (sic) agreement, Mr. Arum says he sat Chavez down and cross-examined him. That is the first question I asked him. I said on page one of his deposition, “Did you sign the 1997 performance (sic) agreement?” He said yes. So I don’t know what sort of cross examination took place but there is at least a fact issue there as to what Chavez knew or, you know, what he could have said.
THE COURT: No question Chavez knew. The question is did he tell Mr. Arum.
MR. HILL: More to the point on that, that is no real excuse when Don King had previously told Mr. Arum of that contract and a week later gave him a copy of the contract. So that is the issue.
THE COURT: Well, let me say with all due respect to all parties, the boxing game, I’m not sure I’d believe most people in the boxing game if they told me something.
MR. HILL: That is a good point. We asked Mr. Arum in that deposition we said point blank, “Do you believe Julio Cesar Chavez is a truthful person,” and Mr. Arum said, “No, I do not”—
THE COURT: I’m not talking about Julio. I’m talking about Don King. If I’m in the boxing business, from what I understand of the boxing business, if Bob Arum called me up, said, “Don King said, ‘I’ve got a contract with such and such a fighter.’ ” I would say, “Show it to me.” I wouldn’t act based on what he told me.
Although respondents attempt to explain that the judge was expressing a disbelief of people in the boxing industry in general, the judge’s comments were directed specifically to Mr. King and not Mr. Arum. The court said, “I’m not sure I’d believe most people in the boxing game if they told me something.” When petitioner’s attorney then referred to Chavez, the court interrupted, saying “I’m not talking about Julio, I’m talking about Don King.”1 We conclude that this is a statement of disbelief of petitioner specifically, unrelated to any testimony that the court heard in the particular case, and is the type of comment which supports disqualification. See, e.g., Brown, 561 So. 2d at 257. The petition is hereby granted and the ease is remanded for further proceedings before a substitute judge.
DELL and POLEN, JJ., concur. . In the respondent’s brief, what appears to be a verbatim copy of the transcript omits the court's statement, "I’m talking about Don King.” (Respondent's brief p. 4)
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Valdes-Fauli v. Gonzalo F. Valdes-Fauli, 903 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…ight to the expression of ordinary human discourse and banter in the course of performing their duties. See Copiers Int’l, 825 So. 2d at 438; Vivas v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Don King Productions, Inc. v. Chavez, 768 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Begens v. Olschewski, 743 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Roy v. Roy, 687 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). [*219] Even more, I am concerned with the growing acceptance of the view that trial judges are there only to referee and,…
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Kopel v. Bernardo Kopel, 832 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…ight to the expression of ordinary human discourse and banter in the course of performing their duties. See Copiers Int’l, 825 So. 2d at 438; Vivas v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Don King Productions, Inc. v. Chavez, 768 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Begens v. Olschewski, 743 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Roy v. Roy, 687 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Even more, I am concerned with the growing acceptance of the view that trial judges are there only to referee and, rathe…
Authorities Cited
- Brown v. ST. George Island, Ltd., 561 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1990)
- Lapinell Mobil & Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. The Honorable David L. Trask, 463 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)